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AN INQUIRY 



INTO TVS 



STATE OF THE NATION, 



C Stowcr, Print«r,> 
Paternostcr-row, J 



AN INQUIRY 



I 



NTO THE 



STATE OF THE NATION, 



AT THE 



COMMENCEMENT 



PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, 



K In hujus modi, re tantoque bello, maxima curse est, ut quae copiis et 
opibus tenere vix possumus ; ea mansuetudine et continentia nostra, 
sociorum fideiitate teneamus." 

Cic. Epist, 



>VX^ THIRD EDITION. 




LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REES AND ORME, 

PATERNOSTER-ROW, AND J. RIDGEWAY, 

PICCADILLY. 



1 tf 06. 
[Price Five Shillings'] 



* t 



AN 



INQUIRY, 



INTRODUCTION. 

SlNCE the constitution of this country 
acquired its present form, and public bu- 
siness came to be transacted regularly in 
the great council of the nation, it has 
been customary in all important junc- 
tures, for our representatives to undertake 
a general investigation of the state of our 
affairs. The method of conducting this 
examination has varied at different periods. 
Sometimes a motion for inquiry has been 

£ 



2 A# INQUIRY INTO THS 

agreed to by the ministry, and their adver- 
saries have bfeen permitted to bring for- 
ward their propositions upon the situation 
of the commonwealth. Sometimes thq 
motion for inquiry has been opposed, 
while a view of the public misfortunes 
"was given as the ground of claimiftg a 
solemn investigation. But in every case 
the inquiry has substantially been entered 
into, and has consisted always in the free 
and comprehensive discussion to which 
such motions gave rise. 

Those who have attended to the tactics 
of parliamentary debate, and remarked 
how greatly the separation of different 
articles of charge assists the party accused 
in shifting off. the attack from any one 
point, will easily admit the superior ad- 
vantages of such a comprehensive view 
of the actual posture of affairs, as we 
commonly denominate " a state of the 
nation" It happens, however, that se- 
veral years have now elapsed, preg- 
nant beyond all former experience in dis- 
strous changes, without any discussion of 



STATE OF THE NATION. & 

this wholesome and constitutional nature* 
In consequence, too, of certain recent oc- 
currences, it has been found impossible to 
investigate at all, even in their distinct cha- 
racter, those measures which occupied the 
government during the last vacation. Aiid 
thus a new ministry is formed, and a 
new system about to commence, before 
the account has been settled with the old ; 
before the causes of our present calami- 
ties have been ascertained ; before the na- 
tion has been able to determine, either 
the extent or the origin of its dangers,, 
Greatly as this change of men and of mea- 
sures is to be rejoiced at, we may ven- 
ture to question, whether it would not 
have secured more solid benefit to the 
country, had it been delayed until the wis- 
dom of parliament had "been applied, to 
such a full discussion of the late calami- 
tous interference w^ith continental affairs ; 
and such a comprehensive review of our 
present situation in every particular, as 
can alone furnish the ground-work of that 
radical change of system, in which our 

B 2 



4 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

only remaining chanee of salvation must 
be sought. 

It is to be feared, however, that the 
change of ministry has deprived us alto- 
gether of the benefits which would have 
resulted from a parliamentary investigation 
of these grave and difficult subjects : and 
it becomes the more necessary to attempt 
such a compilation of particulars, as may 
assist the public in examining the question 
' out of doors. — With this view the follow- 
ing statement is drawn up. It is a very 
humble attempt at providing a substitute 
for the information respecting the state of 
their affairs, which the people w^ould have 
received from the deliberations of their 
representatives, had the formation of the 
new ministry been so long delayed as to 
have given time for an inquiry into the 
state of the nation. 

This disquisition may conveniently be 
arranged under three heads — as it relates 
to the state of our foreign relations, our 
domestic wconomy and our colonial 
ftjfairs. It is of the last importance that 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



the country should be able to estimate the 
nature and extent of its resources in each 
of these departments ; and to appreciate 
the system of management in all of them, 
which has given rise to the unparalleled 
dangers that at present surround us on 
every side. After examining under each 
head the causes of our calamities, and fairly 
stating their real extent, we shall shortly 
inquire if there are any changes of system 
by which the fate of the empire may yet 
be stayed. 



\ 

($ AN INQUIRY INTO THJ5 



FOREIGN RELATIONS. 

In discussing this primary and import* 
ant branch of the subject, it is necessary 
to dwell at greater length on points which 
have never been brought before the Houses 
of Parliament. Of these the most material* 
is the late continental policy of the British 
government. We shall accordingly begin 
with an examination of the various particu* 
lars presented by the history of the " Third 
grand Coalition/' We shall then take a 
view of the situation in which it has left 
our external relations. Our attention will be 
directed in the next place toward the re- 
maining objects of foreign policy in the 
present crisis , more particularly the state 
of the neutral questions ; and we shall con^ 
elude with suggesting the change of sys-* 
tern which the previous deductions appear 
to prescribe. 

I. THE LATE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE, 

1 . The first circumstance which strikes 
us in contemplating the system of nego-> 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



tiation lately pursued by the British cabi- 
net is, that the documents laid before par- 
liament furnish no evidence of any at- 
tempts having been made to procure the 
mediation of our allies for an amicable ad- 
justment of our differences with France. 
As far back as May 1803, a direct assure- 
ance was given by ministers, that they 
w r ould solicit the mediation of Russia, and 
in recommending this salutary measure, 
all parties cordially united. A cornmuni- 
cation of a pacific nature was received 
from the French government at the begin- 
ning of 1805. His Majesty declined en- 
tering into any negotiations until he should 
consult his allies, and especially the Em- 
peror of Russia; but he expressed himself, 
at the same time, desirous of seeing such 
a peace established as might be consistent 
with security and honour. 

It is well known that the dispositions of 
Russia towards this country were never 
more favourable, nor her sense of duty 
towards the rest of Europe more strong, 
than at the time when the king returned 
this answer. — Our cabinet then, with the 



8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

i 

concurrence of all parties, stood pledged 
to procure, if possible, the mediation of 
Russia : The dispositions of France were 
officially announced, at least, to he pacific. 
Russia was engaged in the most confiden- 
tial intercourse with us : His Majesty was 
advised only to delay entering upon an 
amicable discussion with France, in con- 
seqnenceof that intercourse with Russia. — 
Might it not have been expected that our 
cabinet would seize this happy juncture, 
to press for the mediation of our august 
ally, and thus to redeem its pledge, at 
least, if not secure an honourable termina- 
tion of the dispute ? Yet it is not a little 
remarkable, that in the whole mass of 
papers laid before parliament with a view 
of detailing the history of the late negoti- 
ation, no traces whatever are to be found 
of any steps towards obtaining the medi- 
atory interference of Russia. 

On the contrary, our communica- 
tions with that power have' been from 
the beginning of a war-like nature. — • 
The treaty of Concert, llth April, 
$805, the first result of our negotiations, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



9 



is framed for the purpose of marching half 
a million of men against France, in the pay 
ofEngland, (Art. in*.) That a mediator of 
differences should be in a respectable state of 
strength, in order to interpose with effect, 
is not denied ; but no power can assume 
the functions of an umpire after forming 
such a concert with one of the con- 
tending parties. It deserves further to 
be remarked, that the pacific inclina- 
tions expressed in his Majesty's answer 
to the French message, appear never to 
have produced any effect on our negotia- 
tions. The Cabinets of Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh were Engaged in the cor- 
respondence which gave rise to the war, 
as far back as November, 1804. The 
British government was a party to this 
intercourse at the same time. The French 
message w r as communicated during these 
negotiations, and no circumstance appears 
either in the official documents, or in the 
conduct of the parties, tending to shew that 
this pacific proposal produced any effect 

* Treaties, p. 9. f Supplementary Papery p. 4. • 



1$ AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

upon the progress of an intercourse avow- 
edly hostile to France. 

But it may be said that the seizure of 
Genoa rendered it impossible for Russia to 
mediate, or hold any amicable corre- 
spondence with France. To this various 
answers are obvious. The Russian medi- 
ation was first thought of long after the 
invasion of Switzerland — a violation of the 
treaty of Luneville infinitely more im- 
portant to the interest of all parties, than 
the annexation of Genoa. The incorpora- 
tion of Piedmont, without any indemnity 
to the king of Sardinia, was made in ex- 
press violation of the same treaty, and in 
contempt of specific engagements with 
Russia herself: yet this neither prevented 
Russia from offering her mediation, nor 
our government from pledging themselves 
to accept it. But, in truth, it is absurd to 
lay any stress upon the seizure of Genoa, 
when the first article of the treaty of 
Concert, concluded two months before that 
event, bound Russia and England to league 
against France in measures of hostility, 
§ * without waiting for further encroach- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1 1 

ments on the part of the French govern* 
ment*." 

Long before the seizure of Genoa, then, 
we had given up every chance of Russian 
mediation, by our hostile league with the 
court of St. Petersburgh ; and that event 
was viewed with exultation by the friends 
of the new war, as an additional means of 
rousing Austria and Russia to join us — not 
with regret as an obstacle to the work of 
pacification, which we had pledged our- 
selves to undertake. Even after our allies 
had placed themselves in a commanding 
posture of military preparation, and were 
fully disposed to embrace whatever plarj 
might be most effectual for restraining the 
encroachments of France, no attempt was 
made to avail ourselves of so favourable a 
juncture, for effecting that object in the 
manner pointed out in 1803, by the united 
voice of parliament. Our government 
seems only to have been anxious that there 
should be a battle, and impatient but to 
see the fighting begin. This leads us to 

Treaties, p. 8. 



12 AN INQUIRY INTO THE ' 

the next remark suggested by the history 
of the late coalition. 

2. The league appears to have had no 
precise or definite object in view. To at- 
tack France, and try the issue, is the only 
fixed point of concert. How far the allies 
were prepared, in the event of their Suc- 
cess, to propose such an arrangement as 
might secure the future independence of 
Europe, may be determined by a conside- 
ration of the purposes for which they avow 
that the league was formed. These are 
stated in Art. n. of the treaty of Concert*. 
We shall begin with the independence of 
Holland. 

By the treaty of Luneville, the inde- 
pendence of Holland was guaranteed, and 
at the peace of Amiens France pledged 
herself to withdraw all her troops from 
the Dutch territories. It is of little mo- 
ment to inquire by what circumstances 
the -fulfilment of these stipulations was 
retarded. The war between France and 
England finally prevented them from 
taking effect; but France has repeatedly 

* Treaties, d. 9, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 13 

declared her readiness to evacuate Holland 
as soon as the other points in dispute 
should be settled. Suppose the new con- 
federates were successful in the war, and 
demanded a renewal of the stipulations 
respecting Holland. France withdraws 
her troops from that country during the 
peace which ensues — during the period 
when it Is not her interest to keep troops 
there. But as soon as a new war breaks 
out — as soon as the occupation of Holland 
is of the smallest importance to France, or 
detriment to us, has she not the means of 
again overrunning the Dutch territories in 
a week ? The whole of Flanders, from 
Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to 
Wesel, is her's. No barrier remains be- 
tween the 'enormous mass of the French 
dominions, and the little, insulated, de- 
fenceless province of Holland. The 
strongest part of her frontier, the triple line 
of fortresses which surround France on the 
north, is opposed to the weakest side of 
the Dutch territories. Long before the 
guaranties of Batavian independence could 
possibly send a man to the Rhine, the 



14 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

French would take Amsterdam, and k,eep 
the country as easily as they can defend 
the rest of their provinces. The Hollanders 
of this age are no longer the men who in- 
undated their fields to defend their liberty. 
France has a party in the councils, and in 
the nation of the republic, and nothing 
could be more chimerical than # to hope 
that she would meet with any resistance 
from the unaided patriotism and resources 
of this state. 

When, therefore, the new alliance 
professes to have in view the establish- 
ment of the Dutch independence, one 
of two things must be meant : either that 
nominal independence which consists in 
the removal of French troops, and which 
was guaranteed in the treaty of Luneville — 
or that real independence which consists 
in security from French influence during 
peace, and invasion during war; which was 
obtained for the Dutch by their own spirit, 
and the assistance of their allies at the be- 
ginning of the eighteenth century; which 
they only lost by the conquest of Bel- 
gium, To make war for the first of these 



STATE OF THE NATION. 15 

objects was evidently most unwise : it was 
attained by the treaties of Luneville and 
Amiens, and, when attained, was perfectly 
useless. To make war for the second 
object was quite absurd, unless those other 
measures were in contemplation, which 
alone could secure it ; and the treaty of 
Concert gives us no hint whatever of any 
such measures. We are, therefore, left to 
conclude that the allied powers wished to 
see Holland once more independent, but 
did not know how to gratify this desire ; 
that they had a general design of freeing 
the Dutch from French influence, but 
could discover no means of doing so; 
that, therefore, they resolved to attack 
France, but, if successful, they were not 
prepared with any specific demands in fa- 
vour of Holland. In so far then as the 
interests of Holland were concerned, the 
purpose of the allies was perfectly vague 
and indefinite ; it was merely the pur- 
pose of beginning to fight, trying their 
fortune, and afterwards finding out what 
they wanted. 

Nearly the same observations apply te 



] 5 _ AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the independence of Switzerland, which is 
stated as another object of the coalition. 
At the peace of Luneville, France was left 
in possession of the bishopric of Bale, the 
Frickthal, Sa\oy, and the territory of 
Geneya. The two first of these possessions 
give, her a complete command of the passes 
of Havenstein, and consequently of the 
entrance into the plain of Switzerland from 
the north ; while the acquisition of Savoy 
^nd Geneva throws open a passage on the 
south. With such advantages, it might 
be difficult for the Swiss themselves to 
prevent the return of the French troops 
at any time. But all plans for the inde- 
pendence of that country must evidently 
be futile, which do not originate in a firm 
union with the inhabitants, and no such 
union could well be hoped for under 
the constitution established by the inter- 
ference of France. The league for^naking 
Switzerland independent, however, spe- 
cifies no plan by which such an object is 
to be accomplished. The allies seem to 
have thought, that after France should be 
conquered, they would have time to dis- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1 ™ 

cover j-How Switzerland might be made free, 
and to settle whether Savoy was to be se- 
parated from France, or the Frickthal 
given back to Austria, or Geneva restored 
to independence. 

The re-establishment of the King of 
Sardinia, in Piedmont, is another object 
of the coalition. This must strike every 
one as a strange proposition to come from 
the court of St. Petersburgh ; the court, 
which after pledging itself to obtain an 
indemnity for his Sardinian Majesty, 
carried through the whole business of 
the German indemnities in active con- 
cert with France, and suffered the scene 
to be closed without any mention of that 
Prince's name ; the court which began in 
league with France, to parcel out Germany 
among its dependants, immediately after 
Piedmont had been seized by France, in 
violation of her pledge to Russia. No less 
singular is it to observe, that the prime 
mover of this claim in the King of Sardi- 
nia's favour is England, which gave him up 
without a struggle at the peace of Amiens ; 

c 



18 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

and then witnessed unmoved, the parti- 
tion of Germany. But the singularity of 
the interest displayed for Piedmont is com- 
plete, when we find that the third party 
in the league is Austria, who now comes 
forward in concert with the cabinets of 
St. Petersburgh and London, to avenge 
the King of Sardinia's cause against France, 
when a few months before she had been 
dragooned into the spoliation of Germany, 
by that very France, with the assistance 
of one of those cabinets and the connivance 
of the other. It is easy to perceive how 
little credit all those parties are likely to 
get with the rest of the world, either for 
their honesty or their wisdom — for their 
disinterested zeal in behalf of Piedmont, 
or their systematic views of the general 
policy of Europe. 

Moreover, it would be difficult to ima- 
gine any less determinate or specific 
scheme than that of a war, for the re- 
establishment of the Sardinian family on 
the continent, " with as large an augmen- 
(i tation of territory as circumstances will 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1Q 

permit*." While Savoy belongs to France, 
while the Italian republic is subject to her 
sovereign, and the Ligurian territory is at 
least controuled by her influence ; the 
mere restoration of dominion provides no 
security against the sudden resumption of 
that province as soon as France may find 
it convenient. This object, therefore, is 
as vague and indefinite as the general plan 
of rendering Holland independent, while 
Belgium and the left Bank of the Rhine 
belong to France. 

The bare statement of the next proposed 
object is sufficient to shewthat it belongs to 
the same class — "the future security of the 
kingdom of Naples." There is apparently 
something less vague in " the evacuation of 
Italy by the French forces." But if by 
Italy is meant Naples and the states of the 
church, the treaty of Amiens bound France 
to withdraw her troops from thence ; she 
had entered into the same engagement 
with his Sicilian Majesty, and had stipu- 
lated with Russia, in general, to respect 

* Treat, p. 9. Art. L. Letter C. 
C 2 



%% AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the independence of Naples. These obli- 
gations were fulfilled by France immedi- 
ately after the peace of Amiens, and until 
the commencement of the present war she 
had no troops in the Sicilian territory. 
When, however, she found it convenient 
to occupy it again, no obstacle was thrown 
in her way : So slender is the " security'* 
which Naples can derive, from France 
complying with such demands as the allies 
had proposed to make after a successful 
war ! But, if by the evacuation of Italy > 
the allies meant the recal of French troops 
from the Italian republic, we may observe, 
that this was a most futile object of war* 
The whole Cisalpine territory is substan- 
tially a province of France ; whether she 
rules it by French or by Italian troops. Sub- 
ject to her sovereign; governed by the 
constitution which she has imposed ; ad- 
ministered either by her emissaries or her 
creatures — that province, even if entirely 
freed from French armies, would continue 
under the influence of France, acknow- 
ledge her alliance, and receive her troops 
as soon as hostilities were renewed, So 



t 

STATE OF .THE NATION. 2 I 



nugatory i§ it to propose, as the object of 
an offensive league, the single, unsupported, 
ineffectual measure of recalling the French 
army from the Cisalpine. 

The last object of the allies, is only in 
appearance, more vague than those already 
considered. ff The establishment of an 
" order of things in Europe which may 
u effectually guarantee its security and 
¥. independence." Here, as in the former 
cases, we are left to guess at the particu- 
lars, and have no means of discovering 
how the general end in view is to be at- 
tained by the concerted plan of hostilities. 
This is the character of all the branches of 
the scheme, except only one, " the eva- 
cuation of Hanover,"— an object in itself 
so trifling, as not to merit consideration, 
among projects for the liberation of the 
world ; and placed, it should seem, at the 
head of these plans, rather in compliment 
to one of the contracting parties, than 
from its value in the eves of the rest. 

A league, then, of unparalleled expense 
and vast risk is concerted, without any 
precise object but that of beginning a war ; 



22 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

without any view more specific than a 
vague desire of curbing the power of 
France; without a plan more comprehen- 
sive than that of freeing from momentary 
oppression, a few detached parts of the 
French dependencies; with no preconcerted 
scheme for securing their independence, or 
for carrying into effect the general wish 
that has been formed to check French 
usurpation. — But, it may be asked, is the 
situation of Europe so hopeless that no 
means can be devised for accomplishing 
the grand objects which we have been 
rapidly surveying ? Must Holland be uni- 
ted in fate with Belgium, and the Cisal- 
pine decide the destinies of the south ?— 
The consideration of these matters belongs 
to a future stage of this inquiry. At pre- 
sent, it is enough to have shewn that 
those objects bear no relation to the mere 
act of commencing a hostile coalition ; that 
the fortune of war might drive the French 
troops out of Holland and Naples, without 
rendering those states less dependent on 
France; that the emancipation of Europe 
eould only be obtained from a war of this 



STATE OF THE NATION. 23 

description, in the most improbable event 
of its leading to the entire conquest of 
France ; and that the choice of instant hos- 
tilities, without giving any reasonable pros- 
pect of success, in prosecuting the general 
scheme, precluded all chance of paving the 
way to better times, by a gradual and peace- 
able arrangement. The only specific ob- 
ject of the coalition, then, was to make 
war upon France, and try the event. Let 
us next inquire, whether this object was 
prosecuted with such a degree of wisdom, 
as bestowed any title to expect that the 
event would be prosperous. 

3. In order to attack France with a fair 
prospect of success, it was indispensably 
necessary, that the different states of the 
continent should feel how much their real 
interests depended upon a diminution of 
the French power. By our inteferrence, 
indeed, it was possible that the moment 
of their recal to a true sense of policy and 
duty, might be somewhat accelerated. 
But no salutary or lasting conversion could 
reasonably be expected from such a sudden 
change as our intreaties or subsidies might 



24 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

work, before the natural course of events 
had prepared them for adopting a new line 
of conduct. During the whole of 1802, 
Russia was not only blind to the encroach- 
ments of France, she was actively assisting 
them ; she was leagued with that power 
in the new partition of Germany, which 
has been called the "Settlement of In clem* 
" nities" — in other words : France having 
despoiled several powerful princes of 
their dominions, was now pacifying them 
with the territories of several weaker states; 
and Russia, by a cordial support, enabled 
her to accomplish what the Germanic body 
in general viewed as an unparalleled vio- 
lation of justice. In the same operation, 
Prussia, who had lost nothing, was an 
active coadjutor ; and these three great 
powers were thus, so late as the middle of 
1803, leagued together, for the purpose of 
aggrandizing themselves or their dependants 
at the expense, partly of Austria and her 
allies — partly of other powers, who ha4 
been spectators of a contest, in which their 
weakness prevented them from engaging. 
This most unpromising state of things conti- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 25 

nued during almost the whole of 1803, and 
until a coolness began to arise between Rus- 
sia and France ; not on any solid grounds ; 
not because France had made new en- 
croachments — but rather from certain tri- 
fling and personal motives. Our clear 
policy was to have improved this change ; 
confirmed the alienation of Russia ; and 
attempted slowly to heal the wounds 
which her late conduct had an evi- 
dent tendency to inflict on Austria. 
But to push hastily at any active measures 
«! — to hurry on an intimate union of two 
powers, lately in a state almost hostile; 
or even to engage Russia suddenly to ex- 
change her alliance with France, for an 
open rupture, was in every view the height 
of rashness and impolicy. Far from pres- 
sing Russia towards so premature a con- 
duct, it was our interest to have restrained 
her until both her own time and the time 
of Austria was come ; and, instead of re- 
joicing, that the seizure of Genoa gave 
both those powers a new desire to resist 
the French encroachments, it was our bu- 
siaess to curb their sudden resentment, 



£6 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

until it could be displayed with effect ; 
and to retard the moment of their attack 
upon France, until their mutual relations 
were cemented and their resources were 
ripe for so dreadful a contest. 

Let us consider whether this has been 
our policy, The documents laid before 
parliament, defective as they are in vari- 
ous particulars, furnish a most imper- 
fect history of the late alliance ; but they 
contain evidence quite sufficient to convict 
us of having adopted and persisted in a 
line of conduct, the very reverse of that 
which has just now been sketched. 

In November 1804 * the negotiations 
between Austria and Russia were going 
on with a view to an offensive alliance, 
England must therefore have begun her 
operations at St. Petersburg!! long before 
that period, probably before the end of 
1803 A or immediately after the union be- 
tween France and Russia was relaxed. At 
any rate, it is certain that an alliance be- 
tween this country and Russia existed as 

Sr Aithur Paget 's Dispatch, Sup. Pap, p. 4. 



STATE OF THB NA HON. 2 " 

early as July is 04, and was the subject of 
common conversation during the course of 
that month. The British cabinet, there- 
fore, took advantage of the very first cool- 
at appeared between France and 
Russia, (chiefly on account of the Cue 
d'Enghien's death) to orfer subsidies and 
precipitate Russia towards a war. A sub- 
sidiary treaty was concluded Sweden 
also, at the beginning of December 1804. 
But, without the assistance of either 
Prussia or Austria, it was obviously in 
vain to think ot a continental war. Per- 
haps it was :i to think of succeeding 
in such a scheme, without the co-opera- 
tion of both those great powers. Was 
it wise, then, to begin by engaging Ri 
and Sweden as principals, and trusting to 
chance for obtaining as accessories, those 

3 ought to have been the princij 

It was for Austria that the st i was 

to be made, and by her exertions alone 

that it could succeed. Her resources were 

lear the shock of the war, or her e. 

: raked upon its issue ; yet we do 
not* » Austria, hut to Russia, orn 



$$ AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

we first apply to Austria— we find she is not 
ready, or not willing to begin the war for 
her own interests ; and therefore we go to 
Sweden and Russia, who happen at the 
time to be in ill-humour with France. 
This was surely not the best way of secur- 
ing the cordial union of Austria. 

We have already noticed the terms upon 
which Austria and Russia were at the 
beginning of the Tear 1803 ; but the jea- 
lousy which had subsisted from the affairs 
of Switzerland in the last war, and which 
the business of the indemnities inflamed, 
received its last aggravation in May, 1804, 
from the promulgation of the secret con- 
vention, Oct. 1801, between France and 
Russia. Austria now saw a neighbour 
whose ambition she suspected, and whose 
power she dreaded, acting in conjunc- 
tion with her natural enemy, as the sole 
arbiter of the south of Europe ; taking 
upon herself the guarantee of Naples, Sar- 
dinia, and Rome ; and stipulating for the 
general arrangement of the^ balance of 
Italy. Excluded by the successes of her 
enemy from all territorial power beyond 



STATE OF THE NATION. 2Q 

the Adige, she now saw herself cut out 
from all concern in Italian affairs, by the 
interference of her former ally. In :he 
temper of mind which such a discovery 
was calculated to produce, she found that 
Russia and France were involved in a sud- 
den quarrel. She plainly evinced her good 
dispositions towards the latter, by immedi- 
ately acknowledging the Chief Consul's 
new title, which Russia and Sweden pe- 
remptorily refused ; and she took this oc- 
casion of assuming a similar dignity to her- 
self, against which Russia and Sweden pro- 
tested* — And this was the moment chosen 
by the British cabinet for applying to Rus- 
sia as the arbiter, the saviour of Europe ; 
and to Sweden as the other great charn- 
pion of the same cause ! Surely, if any 
principle in practical policy ever deserved 
the name of self-evident, it is this, that 
our interest was by all means to avoid 

* See Talleyrand's and D'Oubril's notes of May 
16, July 21, and August 23, I8O4.— Imjtefia] a.;d 
Swedish notes to the Diet, August 84*t26, 1804. 



30 AK INQUIRY INTO TUt 

whatever might give umbrage to Austria « 
to court her most; who must always be 
our best ally ; and if we could not effect 
a cordial reconciliation between her and 
Russia, at least to beware of taking such 
a part with the latter, as must involve us in 
the consequences of the disunion *. 

Having, however, made common cause 
with Russia, our next object was to ob- 
tain, at any rate, the accession of Austria. 
Nor can there be a doubt, that we availed 
ourselves partly of the formidable influ- 
ence of Russia — partly of our subsidies- — 
partly of fallacious representations of our 
own strength, and the dispositions of 
Russia; to force the cabinet of Vienna 
prematurely into a rupture with France. 
In order to demonstrate this, we have only 
to consult the Treaties and Supplementary 
Papers. By the first separate article of 



* In the foregoing argument, it is not intended so 
much to state absolutely the sentiments of England, 
with regard to Russia, whose late conduct has been so 
pure and magnanimous, as to describe the feelings of 
Austria, and the deference which those feelings might 
have been expected to meet with from England. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 1 

the Treaty of Concert, England agrees with 
Russia to subsidize Austria, provided 
she shall take the field against France in 
four months *. This is a public article, 
and intended for the inspection of Au- 
stria. But there is a secret article f 
added, by which England engages not to 
refuse the benefits of the treaty to Austria, 
if she shall take the field during any part 
of 1805. This article was intended onlv 
to be used, if the threat contained in the 
former one should fail in bringing Austria 
forward. The two articles are of the 
same date. — Further, Lord G. L. Gower, in 
a dispatch dated Sept. 3, expresses his 
hopes that the Austrian cabinet " may be 
induced not to wait the issue of the pi^o- 
posed negotiations with France J," but to 
commence hostilities immediately. His 
hopes are founded on " the last dispatch 
from the Russian minister at Vienna;" 
where it appears, therefore, that war had 
not been resolved upon in the last week of 

* Treaties, p. 11 . . f Treaties, p. 20. 

X Supp. Pap. p. 16. 



St an mgtiiRr mto the 

August. Yet, at the very same time, the 
march of the Russian armies towards the 
frontiers of Austria and Prussia, was for- 
mally announced to the Austrian cabi- 
net * ; and as far back as July 1 6th, offi- 
cial notice was given that Russia intended 
to put her forces in motion by the middle 
of August f. It is clear, therefore, that 
Russia was determined to act offensively, 
whatever Austria might resolve upon ; 
and that this determination was used to 
quicken the cabinet of Vienna. According- 
ly we find, in the very able Paper of Aus- 
tria, entitled, " Plan of Operations J,'' 
the most decisive proofs of her unwilling- 
ness to come forward. A general view 
is taken of the relative situations of France 
and Austria, and the inference is drawn, 
" that the maintenance of peace till a 
more favourable juncture shall arise, 
seems to be infinitely desirable" The 
answer of Russia, which is indeed a paper 

* Supp. Pap. p. 6, 16. f Supp. Pap. p. 40. 

% Supp. Pap. p. 21. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 3 

of very inferior ability, combats those 
positions ; affects to view the situation of 
Austria as much more prosperous ; denies 
that any more favourable juncture can 
arise ; and concludes that Austria, " as- 
sured of the assistance of Russia and Eng- 
land, should not hesitate to renew the 
"war as speedily as possible *." In enume- 
rating the inducements held out to Au- 
stria, the cabinet of St. Petersburghcloes not 
fail to notice " the immense sums of mo- 
ney which England is ready to sacrifice," 
and the " powerful diversions which she 
will operate in Holland, Flanders, and 
Germany, perhaps even the regular inva- 
sion of France by her troops f ." And that 
Austria did listen to such hopes, we learn 
from her own minister at London, who 
mentions the delay of England to attack 
France in the North, as the first cause of 
the subsequent disasters J. 

Such then was the unwillingness of An- 



* Supp. Pap. p. 30. 1 Ibid. p. 29 & 30. 

X Ibid. p. 51 & 52. 



34 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

stria, and such the means employed to 
bring her into the late ruinous contest. 
— And truly when we reflect on the ex- 
hausted state in which the last war had 
left her ; when we consider the loss of her 
ancient provinces, best situated for offen- 
sive operations, and the various difficulties 
which opposed themselves to any attempt 
at calling forth the resources of her new 
acquisitions ; when we survey her finances,, 
involved in unexampled embarrassment, 
and her cumbrous administration, check- 
ing in every quarter the development of 
her natural strength; when, above all, 
we think of the universal dread of a new- 
war, which prevailed through every rank 
of her people, dispirited by a recollec- 
tion of the last^ and impressed with a 
firm belief in the ascendant of France ; 
when, to all this, we oppose the signal 
advantages of her enemy in every particu- 
lar ;— a compact and powerful territory, 
impregnable to attack, and commanding 
its neighbours from the excellence of its 
offensive positions ; an army inured to 



STATE OF THE NATION. 35 

war, and to constant victory ; an armed 
people intoxicated with natural vanity, 
and the recollection of unparalleled tri- 
umphs ; a government, uniting the vigour 
of military despotism with the energies of 
a new dynasty ; an administration, com- 
manding in its service all the talents of 
the state ; finances, unburthened by the 
debts of old monarchies, and unfettered 
by the good faith of wiser rulers ; finally, 
a military expedition of vast magnitude, 
at the very moment prepared, and appli- 
cable to any destination which the change 
of circumstances might require — when 
we contrast these mighty resources with 
the remnant of her strength which Austria 
had to meet them, we shall marvel but 
little at her backwardness to seize the pre- 
sent juncture for beginning a war, which, 
if unprosperous, must be her last. In a 
prudent delay she saw that every advan- 
tage might be expected; — an improvement 
of her domestic oeconomy ; a gradual ame- 
lioration of her political constitution ; the 
correction of those evils in her military 

D 2 



33 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

system, which had formerly proved fatal ; 
the change of conduct towards her fron- 
tier provinces, which the experience of 
last war prescribed ; the progress of her 
rich dominions, and numerous and vari- 
ous population in civility and wealth ; the 
confirmation and extension of her foreign 
alliances. On the other hand, most of the 
enemy's advantages were likely to be im- 
paired by delay ; many of them were pe- 
culiar to The present crisis ^ almost, all of 
them were of a temporary nature. The 
pursuits of commerce might temper his 
warlike and turbulent spirit ; the formid- 
able energy of a new government might 
yield to the corruption which time never 
fails to engender; and though kept quite 
pure, could not but relax during the in- 
terval of quiet ; the constitution was likely 
to become either more despotic and weaker 
for offensive measures, or more popular 
and less inclined to adopt triern ; for a na- 
tion always becomes a wiser and better 
neighbour in proportion as its affairs arc 
influenced by the voice of the commu- 



•STATE OF THE NATION. 3 7 

nity : The arts of peace must modify that 
system of military conscription which 
made every Frenchman a warrior : The 
remembrance of recent victories, would 
gradually wear away, both in the army 
and the nation : Allies might desert from 
better views of their interest ; dependant 
states might throw off the yoke, when 
they recovered from the panic that made 
them bend to it ; neutral powers^ might 
be roused to a just sense of their duty, 
when a successful resistance seemed prac- 
ticable, and the re-establishment of the 
Austrian affairs furnished a center round 
which to rally : The army destined to in- 
vade England would probably fail in the 
attempt, or at any rate might be occupied 
in making it: Factions were more likely 
to disturb the vigour of the government 
when the continent was at peace ; nay, 
the chance w^as worth considering, which 
every delay gave, of some sinister accident 
befalling the chief, whose destinies in- 
volved those of France herself, and whose 
power had not yet received its last coriso- 



38 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

lidation. — Every thing then rendered a 
delay as hurtful to the enemy as it was 
desirable to Austria, and her allies. If 
France had been called upon to chuse the 
juncture of her affairs, at which a new 
continental league should be formed against 
her, not only with safety, but with emi- 
nent advantage to her interests, she would 
have chosen the year 180 4 ; that the ope- 
rations of this league, after it had once 
been formed, should be delayed till the 
latter part of the year, she could scarcely 
have dared to hope. If Austria had been 
desired to name the crisis at which her 
present necessities, as well as the prospects 
of bettering her condition, most clearly 
enjoined an adherence to peace, she must 
have been blind, indeed, not to fix upon 
the same period ; and, if she had shut her 
eyes to her most obvious interests, it 
would have been the best policy of her 
allies to undeceive her, and chiefly of Eng- 
land, who had no stay on the continent 
but Austria. But the blindness was ours ; 
Austria was alive to her true interests, as 



STATE OF THE NATION. 3 9 

she knew her real situation ; and we un- 
happily prevailed upon her to seek certain 
ruin, by partaking of our infatuation. 

^4. We now come to examine with what 
prospects of assistance from Prussia the 
late attempt to deliver the continent was 
undertaken. Upon this part of the sub- 
ject several principles are self-evident. It 
is manifest that every effort should have 
been made, and even any reasonable sa- 
crifice offered, for the prospect of so in- 
estimable an advantage, as the accession 
of Prussia to the league* Without her 
co-operation, every chance of ultimate 
success was against the allies; with her 
aid it was scarcely possible their scheme 
could altogether fail. If she persisted in 
adhering to her neutrality, this was at 
least an additional reason for the delay 
which so many other circumstances con- 
curred to recommend. But, at any rate, 
it was the consummation of headlong im- 
patience to hurry on the execution -of the 
enterprize, before time was given to obtain 
a definitive answer from Prussia, whe 



40 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ther favourable or adverse to the views of 
the league. What shall we say, then, if it 
appears, that, far from waiting until Prussia 
had become favourably disposed, the alMes 
did not even suspend their measures until 
she had given a positive answer ; that far 
from waiting to ascertain whether Prussia 
meant to join them, or remain neutral, they* 
rushed into the war before they knew 
whether she was to remain neutral, or to 
take part with France !— The documents 
laid before parliament, defective in every 
branch of the details, are peculiarly so 
upon this important subject ; but they 
contain, nevertheless, sufficient evidence 
of the foregoing propositions, especially 
when coupled with the official communi- 
cations of the continental powers. 

In September, 1804, Prussia declared to 
Sweden her resolution to remain neutral, 
and in December she heard of the subsi- 
diary treaty between Sweden and England. 
A notice was immediately given by the 
court of Berlin, that the king of Prussia 
was determined to protect the neutrality 



m 



STATE OF THE NATION. A 1 

of the north, and his Swedish majesty was 
warned against adopting offensive opera- 
tions against France*. At the beginning 
of 1 805, therefore, the allies had no reason 
to expect much from the side of Prussia ; 
but this transaction neither prevented 
England from indulging in hopes of suc- 
cess at Berlin, nor from hurrying on mea- 
sures at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, as if 
there was no chance of failure. 

In the " Plan of Operations" proposed 
by Austria, we find mention made of " a 
great and important step which the Em- 
peror of Russia -has taken at the court of 
Berlin,' from the result of which " the 
allies are to learn how far they may reckon 
upon the co-operation or neutrality of 
Prussiaf." Neither the nature nor the 
success of this step is disclosed ; but that 
the allies, while combining their military 
plans, were ignorant of Russia's determi- 
nation, is proved both by the foregoing 
passage, and by the following particulars— 

P See Count Hardenberg's note, Dec. 24, 1804. 
f Sup. Papers, p. 2 5, 



42 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

In the Russian answer to the paper just 
now cited, it is stated that Austria, being 
assured of Russia, " will not be under any 
great necessity of maintaining a force to 
observe Prussia* " Here then is a con- 
siderable doubt expressed as to the inten- 
tions of Prussia, and all hopes of her 
co-operation seem to have vanished. But 
soon after, the uncertainty increases, and 
a hope of assistance is changed, first into 
fear, least she should oppose — and next 
into an expectation of her hostility. 

In the protocol of the conferences held 
between the Austrian and Russian generals, 
July 16, 1 805, for the purpose of arrang- 
ing the military operations of the allies, 
we find an express agreement, that the 
second and third Russian armies shall be 
" employed on the frontiers of Prussia, for 
the purpose of making demonstrations 
against her t." And in the treaty of 
Concert between Russia and England, 
there is an article (viii. Separate Art. J) 

* Sup. Papers, p. 30. f Sup. Papers, p. 42. 
% Tieaties, p. 17. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 43 

binding the parties to make common cause 
against any state (meaning Prussia) " which 
may, either by employing its forces, or by 
too intimate a union with France, pretend 
to x'aise obstacles to the measures of the 
league." 

Thus we find that the scheme was en- 
tered upon with the prospect of resistance 
from Prussia ; that this was, however, not 
ascertained, but that the measures were 
nevertheless pushed forward ; and that, 
when the details of the plan came to be 
settled before taking the field, the first 
service required of the allied powers was 
found to be " making demonstrations 
against Prussia ;" either to induce her to 
join the league, or to prevent her from 
opposing it. Nor were these calculations, 
however indefinite, altogether unfounded ; 
for it appears that, when the combined 
armies took the field, they were kept in 
check by Prussia a whole month. 

Count Stahremberg, the Austrian mi- 
nister, in a note upon the causes of the de- 
feats in Swabia, and the capture of Vienna, 



42 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ascribes these melancholy events in a great 
measure to " the advance of the second 
Russian army being retarded more than a 
month, by the first armaments which the 
cabinet of Berlin threatened to oppose 
to those of the court of St. Petersburgh*." 
It was not then till the second week in 
October, and after the disasters of the 
allies had begun, that they knew any thing 
certain respecting the dispositions of 
Prussia. 

The accidental circumstance of the vio- 
lation of Anspach, which no one could 
have foreseen, first determined Prussia not 
to attack the members of the league. 
Before that moment, they had reason to 
fear that she would not even be neutral, 
and they planned their defensive measures 
accordingly. But through the w r hole of 
their negotiations and arrangements they 
pressed forward in the dark. Far fromde- 
laying their attack till they had disposed 
Prussia to join them, they- began it with 

'p. Papers, p. 52. 



STATE OF THE NATION, 45 

the prospect of her hostility, though, even 
of that prospect, they did not take time to 
be fully ascertained. 

The conduct of Prussia suggests two 
important observations upon the proceed- 
ings of the allies. In the first place it 
appears that her warlike preparations kept 
the Russian armies in check for more than 
a month. Before the beginning of Sep- 
tember, therefore, the allies were convinced 
that, instead of her assistance, they had 
rather to reckon upon her hostility. Ad- 
mitting" that this important point was not 
ascertained before the Russian army began 
their march, it was at least established before 
the first movements of Austria, and before 
her rupture with France was irrevocably de- 
clared ; for th£ court of Vienna continued 
to hold a pacific language to the French 
government in its declaration of the third 
of September, and its armies did not cross 
the Inn till the seventh*. It is manifest, 



* See Second declaration of the court of Vienna — 
" The court of Vienna has no other motive than that 



40 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

therefore, that war was not inevitable for 
some time after the hostile views of the 
cabinet of Berlin were apparent, and that 
even the hasty steps which had been taken 
by the allies might still have led to no fatal 
consequences, if they had paused as soon 
as the unfavourable dispositions of Prussia 
were displayed. To all the measures 
of rashness and imprudence, however, 
which marked this unhappy confederacy 
from the beginning, the fatal error was 
now added, of throwing away the last 
chance of accommodation, when new 
obstacles to the success of the war 
daily arose ; of finally breaking the 
peace, at the very crisis when the hos- 
tility of Prussia rendered the war utterly 
hopeless. 

But, in the next place, when the senti- 
ments of the court of Berlin received a 
sudden change, from the violation of 

of maintaining peace and friendship with France, and 
securing the general tranquillity of the Continent." — > 
Also Proclamation, Sept. 21, 1805, of the Archduke 
Charles to the army in Italy. 



STATE OF THE NATION, 47 

Anspach, and when they became, upon 
the whole, unfavourable to France, if not 
favourable to the coalition, it seems won- 
derful that no attempt should have been 
made by England to avail herself of this 
happy revolution ; — not indeed for the vain 
purpose of inducing Prussia to join the 
league, which the very day before she had 
been prepared to oppose — but in order to 
use her new enmity towards France as a 
means of regaining the ground which the 
allies had lost by their rashness, and of 
submitting the whole dispute to Prussian 
mediation before it went further, at a time 
when France would have listened to what- 
ever came from Berlin ; while the forces 
of Austria were not irreparably injured, 
and the armies of Russia were still unim- 
paired. It never could be expected that 
Prussia would at once take the field, how 
much soever her dispositions might have 
been suddenly improved. Before she could 
prepare either her resolution or her forces, 
the French were sure to push their suc- 
cesses against the Austrians the more 



4S AN INQUIRY INTO TK£ 

strenuously that they had a prospect of 
opposition from a new quarter. Nq thing, 
therefore, was more obvious than the 
policy of obtaining some delay at least, if 
not a safe retreat from ,our dangerous po- 
sition, through the sudden good wishes o 
Prussia. But the same blind zeal for mere 
fighting prevailed, whiph had led to the 
occupation of Bavaria. The allies con- 
tinued in the field without any attempt 
to attain what alone could save them ; 
and England intoxicated with the chime-, 
rical hope, that the events of one day- 
would root out the policy which had been 
growing up at Berlin for twelve long years 
of various fortune, anxiously urged on the. 
work she had begun, and counted upon 
Prussia as a sure resource. 

It is indeed highly probable that thean~ 
cient jealousies of Austria and Prussia, awa- 
kened by the late transaction of the indemni- 
ties, opposed obstacles to any cordial union, 
even at this crisis of affairs, and might have 
prevented the measure of attempting an ac- 
commodation with France through Prussia, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



^9 



which circumstances now suggested. But 
this rivalry formed do part of our estimate 
when we entered upon the war. No steps 
had been taken, indeed no time had been 
allowed, for any attempt to overcome it ; 
and we have ourselves only to blame, if 
untoward circumstances, overlooked by 
our blind impatience to see the continent 
in arms, have eventually frustrated the cal- 
culations into which they did not enter : We 
£tave ourselves only to blame, if we formed 
a league which could not succeed without 
the cordial union of powers divided by 
long hatred and recent quarrels ; hur- 
ried the allies into critical situations, where 
perfect unanimity alone could save them ; 
and gave no time for those measures of 
conciliation, without which it was vain to 
expect even the semblance of cordiality*. 

* It h inconsistent with the plan of this inquirr to 
cite any authorities which are not official ; but a very ex- 
traordinary tra t ha, lately been puhli hedby Mr. Gentz, 
which, from particular circum tances, deserve- to be 
noticed. Its inferiority to all this gentleman s other 
writings is ?o striking, that nothing but the uncontra- 
dicted avowal of his name on the tif e page could have 
induced any one to think it the production ot his pen, 

£ 



50 .AN INGUIRt INTO THE 

5. Having now traced the fatal impolicy 
which gave rise to the late alliance, and 
precipitated the confederates into the war ? 
we shall direct our attention to the parti- 
cular errors that accompanied the opera- 
tions of the league. Of these the most 
remarkable, and the most extensive in its 
effects, is a strange want of concert which 
appears from the commencement between 
the two principal parties — England and 
Austria: England the prime mover and soul 
of the union, and Austria its main support. 

Among other singular assertions, it contains one 
which requires either a contradiction or acknow- 
ledgment by the members of the late cabinet — that 
a treaty was concluded . between Russia and Prussia 
before last December No such treaty has been men- 
tioned in the papers laid before parliament ; yet 
surely a full statement of its contents would have been 
much more decorous, than Mich an allusion to it as Mr. 
Gentz '• ere makev. He adds, that he is placed in situa- 
tions which enab e him to u .see into the secret move- 
ments of the different political springs, of which the 
events we now witness are the visible results "' — p. 28. 
Now as hi^ place of counsellor at war is merely nominal, 
(however creditable the title may be,)' and as he is not in 
the confidence ot the Austrian court, it is difficult to 
imagii c what situation he can fill, except he may have 
enjoyed the confidence of the kngli h cabinet. If he 
did -it a fo eigner was admitted to this confidence, there 
h room for inquiry ; and if a confidential agent has told 
the secret of a Prussian treaty, why $ that U-iil withheld 
Lorn parliament ? 



STATE OF THE NATION. 5 i 

It cannot fail to strike any one who 
peruses the documents laid before parlia- 
ment, that throughout the whole of the 
late negotiations, Austria has kept herself 
studiously aloof from any direct intercourse 
with this country ; until the moment that 
a subsidy is to be given, no communica- 
tion exists between the two powers. We 
have treaties with Russia and with Sweden, 
but not one with Austria. Whatever 
comes from Vienna, comes throtigh St. 
Petersburgh. Our correspondence with 
Austria is carried on by means of our 
Russian alliance ; our relations with the 
emperor, the ancient ally of England, and 
the main-stay of her continental influence, 
shrunk into a sort of appendage to our 
concert with the Northern Powers — the 
inventors of the armed neutrality, the 
executors of the German indemnities, and 
.the recent confederates of France. In 
order to be satisfied of the extent to which 
our alienation from Austria has proceeded, 
it is necessary to examine the whole of 
the treaties and dispatches that have been 
E 2 



62 AN iNsumy into ,th| 

made public. But we shall mention a 
few of* the most remarkable proofs, as f 
clue to the more ample investigation of 
this alarming topic. 

The uniform anxiety of Austria to ap- 
pear wholly unconnected with England, 
is one of the most singular features in 
the conduct of the late continental alli- 
ance. By an article * added to the Treaty 
of Concert it is stipulated by Russia on 
jthe part of Austria, that in case those 
two powers should, at the opening of the 
campaign, disavow their connexion with 
England, yet as soon as the war is fairly 
begun, they shall acknowledge the con- 
nexion. Thus the appearance of a con- 
cert with England, was so odious on the 
Continent at the time which we chose 
for stirring up the new coalition, that our 
confederates stipulate for permission to 
begin their operations by asserting a di- 
rect falsehood in order to conceal it. Fur- 
ther, when England agrees to subsidize 



* July. 24, 1805. Treat, p. 24, 



v 



STATE OF THE NATION. 5 3 

Austria, in case she shall come forward 
within a certain time, the stipulation is" 
made, not with the court of Vienna — not 
in consequence of the relations subsist- 
ing between that court and the cabinet 
of St. James's— but with the court of 
St. Petersburg!*, and " in consequence of 
engagements subsisting between Austria 
and Russia*." In the same spirit is the 
settlement of the plan of operations be- 
tween Austria and Russia, by diplomatic 
correspondence, and conferences of mi- 
litary counsellors ; from ail which Eng- 
land is carefully excluded ; nor, indeed, is 
she once mentioned in the course of them, 
except at the moment when subsidies are 
to be considered, and then some notice is 
taken of her j\ This anxiety to appear 
unconnected with England, is so remark-* 
able in the whole conduct of Austria, 
that even in the proclamation after the 
capture of Vienna, when the emperor is 

* Treaty of Concert. Sep. Art. Treat, p. II. 
| Treat, p. 32. Sup. Pap. p. 39 3 et scq. 



54 AN INQUIRY INTO THK 

encouraging his people with a view of the 
hopes which still remain, he enumerates 
u the great and unexhausted resources 
which he rinds in the forces of his high 
allies and friends, the emperor of Russia^ 
and the king of Prussia," and makes no 
allusion whatever to England, the main 
spring of the war *. 

But the anxiety to avoid the reality 
of such a concert as well as the appear- 
ance of it, until the moment that sub- 
sidies were required, is strikingly illus- 
trated by the total exclusion of the 
English minister at Vienna, from all share 
in the negotiations carried on with the 
Russian minister at the same court : and so 
wonderfully well were the cabinet of Lon- 
don gained over to second this plan, that 
they seem to have kept their envoy in 
utter ignorance of what was going on 
both at ht. Petersburg!} and Vienna, un- 
til every Gazette writer in Europe was 
acquainted with the whole business. 
This forms so singular and so instructive 

# Declaration of Brunn, Nov. 13. 1805. 



STATE OF- THE NATION. 5$ 

a feature in the 4-ate negotiations, that 
we must refer more particularly to the 
parts of the papers which illustrate it. 
It appears from the dispatches of Sir 
A. Paget, (June 5, June 22, July 0, and 
August 3, 1805*) that he was endea- 
vouring all along to discover the views 
of the Austrian cabinet, as well as he 
could by his own observation, and his 
conferences with Count Cobenzel. In 
his dispatch of August 2Q f , he informs 
our government that he has at length 
been put in possession by Count Coben- 
zel, of the negotiations carried on be- 
tween Russia and Austria during the last 
ten months ; and that about the same 
time, the same secret w^as communicated 
to him by Lord G. L. Gower. The rea^ 
son of his being at length intrusted with 
the transaction speedily appears : the 
court of Vienna conceive that it will 
be more convenient to treat directly 
through him about the amount of the 

* Sup, Pap. p. 1, 2, k 3. f Ibid. p. 4. 



56 AUT IKTQUIRT tXf6 f HE' 

Subsidies*, In his dispatch of Sept&ifr* 
ber 5, the same envoy states, that he has 
learnt from Count Cobenzel, that he may 
soon expect a communication relative to 
the British plans respecting Naples f. 
From the declaration of the Russian 
cabinet, August 7, it also appears, that 
the terms upon which England and 
Austria were to trea£ had been discussetf 
at Vienna, on the 7th of July, by the 
ministers of the emperor and the Russian 
envoy, while the British envoy, though 
upon the spot, was not even aware that 
any such intercourse was carrying oil J. 
But the most singular of all the proofs 
which these documents afford of this 
point, is contained in Sir A. Paget' s exr 
cellent dispatch of October 24, in which 
he enumerates with distinguished ability, 
the causes of the failure in Swabia. " In 
setfchfig the plan of the campaign," says 
he, " it must have been calculated that' 
previous to the opening of it the Russians 

* Sup. Pap. p. 14. f Ijd. p. 7. | Treat, p. 31 & 32. 



STATE OF THE NATION, 57* 

wmild have joined. This, in truth, how* 
ever false and extraordinary, was the cal- 
culation which was made. Upon what 
it was founded I cannot exactly say*.'* 
Now it happens that this calculation never 
was made ; on the contrary, both in the 
Austrian plan of operations and the Rus- 
sian answer to it f, the impossibility of 
the Russians arriving before the cam- 
paign should begin, and the necessity of 
the Austrians sustaining the first attack 
alone, is explicitly stated. The same ad- 
mission is made in the calculations of the 
military conference, held July 10, to dis- 
cuss the plan of the campaign J. There- 
fore, it is clear, that as late as the 24 th 
of October, our minister at Vienna was 
Utterly ignorant of the military confer- 
ences carried on in that capital, upon 
the measures of the coalition, as far back 
as the lCth of July, and of the diploma- 
tie correspondence upon the same subject, 

#*Sup* Pap* p, 1 2. f Id. p. 30. : Id. p. 40. 



5$ AN INQUIRY imo THE 

which had passed between the two im- 
perial courts at a still earlier period. 

This is a very serious charge either 
against the British cabinet, or their en- 
voy, or both. When the affairs of the 
league were discussed at Vienna, the pro- 
per person to attend the conference on our 
part was our envoy, and not the ambas- 
sador of Russia. Austria seems, indeed, 
always disposed to prefer treating with 
Russia ; but our envoy ought at least to 
have been fully informed of the intercourse 
that subsisted, especially after Austria 
consented to hold a direct communication 
with him. If he was unworthy of such 
confidence, he was unworthy of his post, 
and the blame of the cabinet, which kept 
him on so important a station during so 
critical a juncture, is aggravated tenfold. 
If he had from any cause become disa- 
greeable to the court where he was sent to 
reside, he was not the person to represent 
the mover of the new league in the coun- 
cils of the chief confederate; and the 
English cabinet instead of retaining hi*n 



STATE OF THE NATION. 5g 

at such a post, to the extreme detriment 
of the common cause, should have re- 
placed him by a person against whom 
similar objections did not exist. But 
we are far from suspecting that this 
was the case : It remains then, for the ca- 
binet who superintended this strange ne- 
gotiation, to explain the reason of their 
unwillingness to confide in their own 
agent, and the aversion of the Austrian ca- 
binet to communicate with him. 

When we survey the whole machinery 
then, by which the grand coalition was to 
be moved and regulated, we discover 
nothing but weakness and confusion — a 
total want of strength in the materials; of 
skill in the arrangement of the parts ; of 
harmony in their movements. England, 
the main-spring of the union, is not suf- 
fered to communicate directly with Aus- 
tria the great moving power; while the 
intercourse with such a petty member of 
the system as Sweden, is constant and 
intimate. Russia, calculated by nature to 
operate as a grand auxiliary to Austria^ 



00 AN INQUIRY INT© THS 

is first made the centre of the movement, 
and then the balance and director. The 
instruments of communication employed 
by England, are either distrusted by her- 
self or by her allies, with whom they are 
nevertheless stationed to the exclusion of 
fitter instruments, and the increased de- 
rangement of the machine. But above all, 
though England furnishes the sinews of 
the war, and originates the whole opera- 
tion, she is not allowed a single voice in 
directing or controuling it; she is excluded 
from all influence over the operation after 
it is once resolved upon ; studiously re- 
pressed at all times, except when the 
wheels cannot move without her assistance, 
and even then only permitted to interfere 
with her services, and compelled to ab- 
stain from advice. 

Nov/ it may probably be stated that the 
powers of the continent Would not coa- 
lesce with us on any other terms; that 
from dislike of our active interference in 
continental afFairsy-they refused to involve 
themselves in a more close connection with 



STATE OF THE NATION. 6 1 

lis than the necessitous state of their fi-* 
iiances required ; that from dread of of- 
fending France before the scheme was ma- 
tured, they would not acknowledge the 
extent of their intercourse with us ; that 
from these motives they refused to give us 
any share of influence in arranging the 
measures of the league, and even declined 
admitting us to an intimate knowledge of 
their concerted scheme. — We believe 
there may be much truth in this statement, 
and that it will contain a just account of 
the matter, if to these motives of repug- 
nance, we add a great distrust of our politi- 
cal wisdom in continental affairs ; and per- 
haps some doubts of our good faith, arising 
from our conduct in former wars. But the 
existence of these prepossessions against us, 
is the very reason why this juncture should 
not have been chosen for a new coalition ; 
and whatever may have been the motives, 
the repugnance of Austria and Russia to 
ally themselves with us, was a sufficient 
argument against pressing the formation of 
a league. Austria would not give us bet- 



62 Afo 'INQUIRY INTO THt 

ter terms, you say-— That is no reason fof 
making a confederacy upon bad terms, but 
a perfectly good reason for waiting till 
better can be obtained. There was no ab- 
solute necessity for making war on France 
in the summer of 1805. It is to be hoped 
we were not in such fear of invasion, as to 
buy the short respite of a diversion at any 
price : There was no pressing occasion, so 
far at least as the country was concerned, 
for having a continental campaign finished 
before the session of parliament began : It 
is to be hoped that our representatives 
would have granted supplies without the 
stimulus of a war in the circle of Austria ; 
and a confidence in the wisdom of govern- 
ment might have kept them in good hu- 
mour, without the fearful amusement of 
battles between French and German 
armies. After we had unwarily begun a 
new coalition, we might have paused when 
we found the obstacles to its success so 
insurmountable. There was no fatality to 
make us persist in arming the continent, 
when we perceived that the powers of 
Qermany would neither unite together nor 



STATE OF THE NATIOX. C3 

confide in us. We should have sacrificed 
nothing but our temerity, and lost nothing 
but our too sanguine hopes, had we put 
off the execution of our rash design, when 
we discovered that Austria would not treat 
directly with us ; that she durst not avow 
our friendship, until Russia came up to pro- 
tect her from the consequences of such an 
admission ; that the cabinets of Vienna 
and Berlin, could not be brought to forget 
Silesia and the Indemnities. It was an 
ample ground for refusing to complete the 
league, that the allies would give us no 
voice in forming the plans of the cam- 
paign, or even in arranging the system of 
the war; that they for the first time re- 
cognised the enemy's favourite policy of 
excluding us from the continent, and 
would not hear a whisper from us until the 
moment when our money was wanted. 

But every part of our conduct is marked 
with the same deplorable impatience which 
prompted the first step. Having in our 
rashness resolved to make a league, not- 
withstanding . the unfitness of the times.. 



Q£ A& INQUIRY INTO TS*£ 

the same temerity made us persist in ottf 
scheme, in spite of the backwardness and 
distrust of our allies. We hurried ori 
matters to a new coalition, at a moment 
when the enemy alone could lose by a delay ; 
and pressed forward the coalition to a new 
war, when our allies, spiritless and ineffi* 
cient in themselves, would neither suffer 
us to participate in the formation, nor in 
the knowledge of the common schemes. 
<c Make war" — was our cry — " successful- 
ly if you can, but make war. — League 
against France— wisely and cordially if posr 
sible, with such a union among yourselves 
and such solid help from us, as may give 
some small chance of safety, if not of ad* 
vantage — but at all events league against 
France.*' Thus a coalition and a campaign 
were the only objects in the contemplation 
of our government, and they fatally attainr 
ed their wish ; they got up the concert of 
St. Petersburgh, and the invasion of Bavaria. 
There was a convention and a war, howr 
ever, which they 'did not bargain for ; the 
enemy was as rapid in completing the pier 



STATE OF THE NATION. 65 

ture as they had been in preparing the 
canvas ; the finishing, too, for so hasty a 
performance, was wonderfully harmoni- 
ous with the original design — he gave them 
in a few weeks the conquest of Austria. 
and the treaty of Presburg. 

6. We now proceed to follow the na 
tural development of the errors which 
presided over the formation of the league, 
and mingled themselves in its composition. 
To the total exclusion of England from 
her just and natural influence in the ar- 
rangement of the war, the disasters which 
followed may in a very great degree be 
ascribed. We shall enumerate a few of 
the faults committed by the allies, which 
our interposition might effectually have 
prevented, and of which we must share the 
blame if we could have interfered and 
did not. 

(l .) To some it may perhaps appear ex- 
travagant to maintain, that England should 
have interposed her voice in the nomina- 
tion of the Austrian generals. Yet it is 
certain that upon former occasions she 

F 



6Q AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

used this privilege, and that she has fre- 
quently named the commander of an en- 
terprize to which, besides her subsidies, she 
contributed in a very limited proportion. 
How attentively Russia was listened to on 
this point, we have clear evidence in the 
" Protocol of conferences." The Russian 
court expressly refuses to place her troops 
under the command of any one but an 
archduke *. There was no risk of England 
making such a stipulation : on the con- 
trary, had she been allowed to concert 
upon this important matter, it would have 
been her duty to enforce the sacrifice of so 
absurd a condition. Were France to have 
such a connection with any of her allies as 
we attempted to form with Austria and 
Russia ; were her interests closely involved 
with the success of the common opera- 
tions ; were she engaged to give for the 
troops employed, at the rate of twelve 



* Sup. Pap. p. 4 1. Not meaning the Archduke 
Charges — but in the case of his being indisposed, 
providing that none but an Archduke shall succeed 
hiai 



TATE OF THE NATION. 67 

pounds ten shillings per man yearly, that 
more than treble the amount of their pay — ■ 
can we doubt that she would insist upon 
a voice, in the great question of crmsing 
to whose talents and fortunes, the fate of 
the enterprise should be committed ? The 
choice of general Mack was in every respect 
singularly injudicious ; from the authority 
of Sir A. Paget, we learn that he was ex 
tremely disagreeable to the archduke. He 
prabably owed his appointment to court 
intrigue ; but the archduke's strong pre- 
judice against him, whether founded upon 
experience of his character, or upon mere 
personal dislike, if that illustrious prince 
can be suspected of such a motive, was an 
insurmountable objection to his employ 
ment. He had formerly been eminently 
unsuccessful in Italy. Those who served 
with him in Flanders thought meanly ot 
his talents. That he was a man of mili- 
tary detail, an excellent quarter-master-ge- 
neral they admitted : that he understood his 
art in theory too, and could combine a good 
military plan, was not denied. But the 
f 2 



68 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

best judges in our own army, believed him 
to be devoid of that versatility of genius, 
which enables a commander to vary his 
preconcerted schemes with the sudden 
change of circumstances ; they even knew 
him to be deficient in that presence of mind, 
which gives a leader the command of his 
personal recourses, under an unexpected 
turn of affairs ; in other words, he was 
understood to have precisely those defects 
which most completely disqualified him 
for opposing the captains of France. This 
opinion of general Mack was stated by of- 
ficers of high rank and great respecta- 
bility in the British army, long before the 
surrender of Ulm. If our cabinet knew 
it and neglected it, their culpability was 
great : but still more have they to answer 
for, if they were ignorant of what might 
so easily have been ascertained. 

(2.) A grand error was committed by 
the Austria ns in passing the Inn, and 
carrying the war at once into Bavaria, 
before the Russians were near to support 
them. This has been fully exposed in 



STATE OF THE NATION. CQ 

Sir A. Paget' s dispatch of October 24*; 
and had he been admitted, like the Russian 
envoy to the conferences at Vienna, we 
are entitled to presume, that the influence 
of England would have been exerted to 
recommend a wiser plan. But it is not 
merely in this point of view that England 
should have interfered to modify the plan 
of the campaign, The violation of the 
Bavarian neutrality, with the circum- 
stances of injustice affirmed to have at- 
tended it, would have called imperiously 
for the interposition of an ally, who, from 
her disinterested views, was the proper um- 
pire between those neighbouring powers, 
and whose pure principles of continental 
policy were committed by the oppressive 
measures of her confederates. * 

The suppression of evidence prevents 
us from ascertaining the precise extent of 
the injustice done to Bavaria. The ac- 
count given by the elector, is in a material 
degree at variance with that of the Aus- 
trian government. The fc rmer states his 
desire to remain neutral, 2nd asserts that 

* Sup. Pap. p, 11, 



7<> AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

Austria rendered (his impossible, by sud- 
denly demanding an incorporation of the 
Bavarian with the imperial troops ; refus- 
ing to hear of any alternative but the im- 
mediate dismission of the whole Bavarian 
army ; and instantly following up these 
violent demands with seizing the electoral 
dominions *, 

The emperor, on the other hand, af- 
firms, that his Serene Highness had re- 
solved to join France ; that prompt measures 
were requisite to prevent this step — and 
that the Elector behaved with great dupli- 
city while he was maturing his plan ;\ Bat 
it is distinctly admitted by the emperor, that 
without previously preparing the Elector, 
or attempting by negotiation to engage him 
in the league, a requisition was suddenly 
made of his assistance, and of the junction 
of his army with the allies. It is proved 
by a dispatch of Sir A. Paget J, that the 

* Historical representation of the Elector Palatine, 
Sept. 29, 1805. 

f Answer 6f Austria, Oct. 16. 

% Sqp. Pap. p. 7. The dispatch is date:! Sept. 5, 
Before it could possibly be known at Vienna what 
answer was to be given to the proposals of the Prince. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 7 1 

Emperor sent Prince Swazemberg, Sep- 
tember 3, to intimate the march of his 
army through Bavaria*. The Emperor ac- 
knowk-dges* that this prince was the 
bean r of his first proposal to the court of 
Munich, where he arrived on the 6th — 
that the Elector's answer was not given 
till the 8th, before which time all the 
irrangements for seizing Bavaria had 
•finally been made. 

Now it is manifest that, if the plans of 
the electoral court were doubtful, or if 
they leant towards neutrality, as the 
Elector states, this conduct of -Austria was 
at once impolitic and unjust. But if the 
politics of that court were so decidedly 
French, as the Emperor asserts, then the 
sudden attack of Bavaria was the very 
worst expedient which could be devisee! 
for gaining her over to the alliance, and 
counteracting the influence acquired by 
France in the court of Munich, from the 
affair of the indemnities. In rearing up 

* Austria Answer of 0£t. 16. 



/2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

that influence, Prussia had been chiefly 
instrumental — England had suffered it — 
Austria had but feebly opposed it. Its 
effects were likely to be felt for at least 
fifteen months after its establishment, and 
the confederates rashly hurry into a new 
war, where that influence must be highly 
detrimental, without making any prelimi- 
nary attempts to counteract it, and before 
time has been given for its wearing away. 
At any rate the errors and improprieties 
of the manner in which Bavaria was at- 
tacked, were obvious, and England kept 
aloof at the moment when her councils 
or influence might have rectified them. 

(3.) The arrangements of the campaign 
between the Austrian and Russian envoys, 
as detailed in the Protocol of conferences*, 
are evidently founded upon the most unac- 
countable mistakes with respect to the 
operations of the French troops. The 
combination proceeds on the supposition, 
that a Russian army marches nine German 

* Sup. Pap. p. 36, ct se^.— See particular^ p. 46. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 73 

miles in four days at an average, or some- 
what more than ten English miles a day; 
and upon the supposition also that a French 
army will march at the very i; e 
rate. It was imagined, then, by those 
generals, who had so often been opposed to 
the French, and so constantly been beaten 
by their rapid movements, that they could 
march no more than ten English miles a 
day ! — It was conceived that a French 
army, unincumbered by baggage and 
heavy artillery, would march through their 
own territory — through Flanders — the 
country in the world best adapted to the 
movement of troops, as slowly as the 
cumberous armies of Russia could drag 
their way through strange and difficult 
countries — through the forests of Poland, 
and the mountains of Silesia ! The event 
proved how grievously those planners of 
the campaign had erred. From Bou- 
logne to the right bank of the Rhine, 
the French army spent only three weeks 
instead of five, the computed time; in 
a fortnight more the fate of the cam- 



74 , AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

paign in Swabia was decided. It had 
been agreed that the Russians and Aus- 
trians should join on the Inn, and there 
wait for the French, who, it was calcu- 
lated, would take sixty-four days to march 
thither from Boulogne, besides six days 
to put themselves in motion, and ten which 
were allowed for the priority of informa- 
tion. How long the French took to give 
their orders for beginning the march, we 
know not precisely — six days they certain- 
ly did not consume in this way. But one 
thing is too surely proved, that they ar- 
rived at the Inn, after completely destroy- 
ing theAustrian armies, a fortnight sooner 
than the estimate supposed they could 
arrive in order to begin the campaign. 
Nor is this reasoning from the event un- 
fair in the present question; that event is 
by no means unparalleled in the history 
«;f the French tactics. Had the Russian 
1 Austrian counsellors any right to make 
feucli calculations of the French move- 
ments r Could England have failed to 
oppose blunders on the face of the matter 



STATE OF THE NATION. 75 

so enormous, if she had been permitted to 
partake in the consultations, upon the 
common cause, at Vienna ? 

(4.) But although such errors as we have 
been contemplating had not entered into 
the details of the campaign, there was a fun- 
demental omission in the concerted plan, 
which must have proved fatal to the suc- 
cess of any attempt against France. No 
measures were taken beforehand for the 
occupation of Switzerland, or the encou- 
ragement of the Austrian interest in that 
country ; and one of the first acts of the 
court of Vienna, when the war com- 
menced, was an acknowledgment of its 
neutrality *. It is manifest, that, if the war 
was not offensive against France, it had 
no object : and few points seem now to be 
more clearly ascertained, than the impossi- 
bility of making any successful attempt to 
penetrate into that country on the north 
of the Alps. The vulnerable part of the 
French territory, is that which can only 

* Sup. Papers, p. 9 and 10. 



7 6 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

be commanded by the possession of Swit- 
zerland, Franche Compte — an open coun- 
try, naturally weak, entirely unprovided 
with strong places or works of art, leading 
by a short march into the very heart of the 
empire, surrounded by several of the 
provinces best affected towards the cause of 
royalty and the league. If France wished at 
am tim Y to commence offensive operations 
against Austria, the occupation of Switzer- 
land might be necessary for their success; not 
only from the command which that country 
has of the communication between Ger- 
many, as well as France and Italy, and 
from its commanding posture towards the 
Austrian possessions , but also because, if 
not occupied by France, it must either be 
seized by Austria, to the incalculable danger 
of Franche Compte, or remain neutral, to 
the great and hazardous diminution of the 
French line of attack. But if France 
changes her usual mode of invading Aus- 
tria, and pushes on with her main army, 
not in Italy but Swabia, while the posses- 
sion of Lombardy and the Genoese, and 



STATE OF THE NATION. J J 

the command of Lower Italy allows her 
to support that operation by an army on 
the Adriatic ; it is certainly of less conse- 
quence that the neutrality of Switzerland 
should narrow her line of attack ; and she 
gains more by the certainty of avoiding 
any danger from that quarter, than she 
loses by the sacrifice of one additional 
point of invasion. On the other hand, if 
France is to act only on the defensive, the 
neutrality of Switzerland is absolutely ne- 
cessary for her safety. If that country is 
rendered impassable, all fears for the only 
valuable part of France are removed. If it 
is left open to Austria, while her armies are 
making advances from Lombardy, through 
Piedmont and the Genoese, and by threat- 
ening an attack upon the southern depart- 
ments of France, are drawing the French 
troops towards the Mediterranean, and 
forcing them to fall back upon France, not 
by the side of Switzerland, but by the Col 
di Tende and the Var ; and while the armies 
on the Rhine are supporting the southern 
operations by defending Germany, or even 



PB AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

threatening Alsace > the occupation of Swit- ; 
zerland by the allies* must give the enemy 
a line of weak country to defend, from 
Hunningen to Lyons, in an arch of which 
the allies have possession of the cord. 
The grand fault of the directory in 17QQ, 
was their first neglecting to secure, and 
then themselves violating the neutrality 
of Switzerland : they occupied it, and 
when their inadequate means of attack 
compelled them to resume the defensive, 
France was exposed in consequence of 
Switzerland not being neutral, to such 
imminent danger of a formidable inva- 
sion, that nothing saved her but the vio- 
lent remedy of calling out the second 
and third conscriptions. 

The neutrality of Switzerland, then, is 
of all points the most important to France, 
whether she wishes to carry on a defen- 
sive war, or to attack in a single point on 
the North of the Alps. So sensible of 
this were the French government, and so 
well aw^are of the error which had almost 
proved fatal in 1 7QQ, that their first anxietv 



STATE OF THE NATION. fQ 

on a near prospect of war, was to estab- 
lish the Swiss neutrality. To this the ca- 
binet of Vienna unhappily consented ; 
forgetful of the evils which must result 
from such a step in all offensive opera- 
tions against France, and of the impossi- 
bility of securing that neutrality against 
the French one moment longer than thev 
might find it beneficial to their own 
cause. Although, therefore, the begin- 
ning of the campaign had not proved fatal 
in consequence of other errors ; although 
France had then been foiled, and the 
Austrians had been required to follow 
up their first successes in Germany or 
Italy, by carrying the war into France ; 
the neutrality of Switzerland would have 
destroyed every chance of pursuing the 
offensive with success, by reducing the 
French frontier to the strong country be- 
tween the Lake of Geneva and the mouth 
of the Var, the impregnable bastion of 
Holland, and the iron wall of the Ne- 
therlands and Rhine. When we find 
such a grand omission as this in the com- 



80 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

binations of the allies, we are intitled to 
maintain that the addition of one other 
counsellor would have supplied it ; and 
that counsellor ought to have been Eng- 
land, the soul and support of the con- 
federacy. 

But the conduct of England relative to 
Swiss affairs, was indeed unfortunate in 
other respects. She seems to have joined 
with the allies in misconceiving at all 
times the importance of the Alpine terri- 
tory. Her treatment of the cantons 
when France invade 1 them in 1802, and 
the misfortunes which befel her allies in 
those countries, through the unskilful- 
ness of the English agents, during the 
whole of the last war, will not soon be 
forgotten bjr the Swiss. But a more re- 
cent impolicy on our part, has thrown 
away all the advantages which the coali- 
tion might still have expected from the 
tried valour of that people, and their un- 
conquerable hatred of France. We 
granted pensions to many of the Swiss 
officers who had entered our service dur- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 8 I 

ing the last war, and always on the ex- 
press condition that they should not reside 
in Switzerland*. These brave men, 
whose influence with their countrymen 
was powerful ; whose fidelity to our cause 
had never been suspected ; who only 
panted after the moment when their rage 
against France might once more shew it- 
self at the head of their peasantry, were 
thus deprived of the only means by which 
they could maintain their personal autho- 
rity, and support the good cause in their 
own country. Had they been allowed to 
receive at home a pension, earned by the 
utter ruin of their fortunes in our service, 
and not forced to earn it over again by 
submitting to banishment'; and had a si- 
milar bounty been extended to the other 
reduced officers, who were left at the 
peace without means of subsistence, un- 
less they entered the French or Helvetian 
service ; the means would have been pre- 

* This fact will not be denied by any agent of the 
English government. 



X $2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 



pared — in generosity and prudence pre- 
pared — of rousing the whole Alps from 
Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to 
France, as- soon as the war should break 
out ; and the allies would then have had 
some prospect of invading that powerful 
empire, on the side where alone it can be 
attacked. It must, however, be admitted, 
that such a conduct on the part of Eng- 
land would have been anomalous, and 
sufficiently inconsistent with the rest of 
her foreign policy. To have looked for- 
ward beyond the next year; to have taken 
measures in silence for the slow prepara- 
tions of distant events ; to have gradually 
disposed the minds of a people in our fa- 
vour by kind treatment, for which no 
immediate return was expected, or won 
them by any other means than a mani- 
festo from a commander at the head of a 
paul try force ; to have laid plans of war 
beforehand which should not for some 
time burst into view, with glare and 
noise ; out of our millions to have given a 
few pounds for the support of our firmest 



STATE OF THE NATION. 83 

friends, ruined in our cause ; to have 
spent what we did give, in a manner 
grateful to them, or really beneficial to 
our interests; in our countless subjsidiesj 
to have had a single guinea bestowed, 
which should not be repaid by the defeat 
of the receiver immediately, and his u 
ter ruin, at six months credit — all this 
would have indicated a strange, unac- 
countable deviation from the system 
which has been unremittingly at work, 
since the treaty of Pilnitz, by day and 
by night, during war and during truce, 
in aggrandizing the proud, and crushing 
the humble; and which has at length, by 
the most persevering constancy of opera- 
tion, happily compleated the ruin of our 
allies, and triumphing, it must be confess- 
ed, over various and mighty obstacles, 
established our enemy in universal em 
pire. 

These four capital errors in the ar^ 
rangement of the late war, are, we think, 
either to be ascribed to England not having 
been consulted, or else to her having par- 

g 2 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 



taken in the infatuation of the allies. But 
it will be said that those allies would give 
her no voice in such matters as the choice 
of a general, the march of troops, and 
the plan of a campaign; and that they 
would have persisted in adhering to their 
own errors/ even after England should 
have pointed them out. This is not im- 
probable ; but it only shews for the hun- 
dredth time, that things were not ripe for 
a new war. If Austria persisted in pre- 
ferring a general, from court favour, to 
the great prince who had twice saved the 
monarchy ; if she insisted on calculating 
her plans upon the supposition that 
French armies can only move ten miles 
a-day through Flanders ; if she shut her 
eves to the value of Bavaria, and refused 
to learn the paramount importance of 
Switzerland in any war against France — 
then it was manifest that nothing could 
be hoped for, and that Austria had not 
ed to a sense of her interest! 
nor felt her real situation. It was the 
proA inee of England to prevent her from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 85 

beginning a league for which she was so 
ill prepared. It was madness in England 
to hurry on the continent to a war, which, 
if unsuccessful, must be its last struggle 
for independence, in circumstances that 
made it madness to hope for success. 

7. It remains to inquire what direct 
assistance Great Britain afforded to the 
coalition which she had formed — how far 
her co-operation with the measures of 
hostility, was either well-planned or well- 
timed. 

An expedition was prepared for the 
north of Germany, at a time when the 
cause of the allies might have been mate- 
rially aided by a diversion either in Holland, 
or the north of France, and the country of 
Hanover was chosen as the scene of our 
operations. It is needless to remark, how 
very trifling the benefit of such a scheme 
was to the advantage of making a pow- 
erful diversion at the beginning of the 
campaign. Admitting that Hanover should 
be occupied altera short defence — the most 
critical moment for distracting the French 






86 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

force was thrown away, and our allies 
had a right to complain that our co-opera* 
tion was limited to an object purely 
British, while they were risking their ex- 
istence for the independence of the con- 
tinent. 

When the army of invasion left Bou- 
logne almost defenceless, surely we might 
have made an attempt upon its works, by 
landing a force ; and had some chance of 
destroying the flotilla which has given so 
much uneasiness to this country, but 
which is chiefly to be dreaded as it will 
always form a popular ground of objection 
to a peace with France. The enemy had 
withdrawn his army suddenly, and the 
first step which he was likely to take was 
to supply its place by marching from the 
interior new troops, better fitted for gar- 
rison duty than for the service of the fields 
The opportunity, therefore, of attacking 
Boulogne was transient, and must be 
seized at once. Our government, engaged 
in projects of new arms, and fireworks,, 
and arrows, and the other resources of the 



STATE OF THE NATION. $7 

ehymical method of war, allowed an op- 
portunity to pass by which assuredly will 
not soon return. 

But, when an expedition was resolved 
on to Germany, means were taken to 
defeat its utility and narrow its chance 
of success as far ^s possible. The de- 
parture of the army from Boulogne took 
place in the beginning of September, and 
our troops did not arrive in Hanover be- 
fore the middle of November. This delay 
is most unaccountable. The moment that 
the invasion was put off, our forces should 
have been ready to set sail : the prepara- 
tions should have been made before that 
time, because we knew perfectly well, that, 
as soon as the war broke out, the Boulogne 
army must leave the coast. But, besides 
forcing the continent to begin the attack 
unprepared, it appears that the war, of 
which we were the planners and insti- 
gators, found us after all our negotiations 
still less prepared than our allies. Accord- 
ingly the armament lost the fine season, 
and sailed, as British expeditions generally 
do, in a month when storms must be 



88 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

expected. Some pf our best troops were 
lost ; the rest arrived in time to make a 
shew of retaking Hanover, after every 
chance of doing any thing more than de- 
fending that electorate was gon£*. The 
allies saw that nothing could be gained tq 
the common cause by such an operation ; 
and Austria has since ascribed part of the 
general disasters f to our delay in making 
any diversion. 

But still worse contrived was our co- 
operation in Italy. Had the English and 
Russian army in the Mediterranean landed 
in Lombardy, or the Venetian territory, sq 
as either to join the Archduke (a benefit in- 
calculable to troops commanded by in- 
ferior generals J) or to hang upon Mas-. 



i * See General Don's Proclamation, Nov. 20,1805. 

f Count Sathremberg's note, Sup. Pap. p. 52. 

j It cannot be reckoned any disrespect to the meri- 
torious officer at the head of the allied army, to 
presume that great advantage would have arisen from 
his not opposing the ablest general of France, without 
the assistance of Prince Charles. General Craig's 
services in the East are certainly very eminent ; but 
the Mahrattas, with all the improvements which they 
have reaped from our East Indian policy, are still a 
very different enemy from the French, and General 



STATE OF THE NATION. 8Q 

sena's rear ; the best effects might have 
followed. The inferiority of the Austrians 
in point of force was clearly the cause of 
their not making he^ad against the enemy 
in that quarter : still greater was the dis- 
parity of numbers after the defeats in Ger- 
many caused the Archduke to detach a 
large body of his army to reinforce General 
Mack*. That was the moment when the 
assistance of twenty thousand English and 
Russians was likely to be of eminent ser- 
vice : but, instead of adopting this plan, 
we landed an army in Naples, than which 
no measure could be more injudicious. 

We affected to defend the King of Naples, 
yet we forced him to give our troops ad- 
mittance immediately after he had solemn- 
ly engaged himself not to admit any 
English or Russian forces into his territo- 
ries, or any ships or war into his portsf. 
In return for this strict neutrality which 

Craig would unquestionably have round the Italian 
campaign a new scene. " I.unge alius Italics 
quam India , per quam temulenta agmine commissa- 
(fundus incessit, visus illi ha hit as esset, salt us Apu- 
lia et monies Lucanos cement W '—'] lit. Liv. ix. 17. 

* Sir A. Pagcfs disparch, Sup. P.p. p. 21. 

f Treaty of Portia, Oct. 8, 1805. 



Q0 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

he promised to observe, France withdrew 
her troops from his dominions. As soon 
as they were gone, England compelled him 
to break his engagements, and to receive 
her army. But admitting that the measures 
were not compulsory on our part, we 
ought to have respected his neutrality, if 
he himself did not ; and, knowing his 
engagements with France, we ought to 
have taken no advantage of any disposition 
which he might betray to break them. 
Indeed we gained nothing by this rash and 
unjust conduct. The French army was 
gone at any rate, and Naples freed for 
the present. We did not venture to land 
an army until every thing had been done 
which could be gained by a victorious ' 
campaign. The French troops were sure 
to return as soon as the affairs in the north 
should be settled, and then we must fly 
as speedily as possible. A landing in the 
Adriatic, and a junction with the Arch- 
duke, would have had the effect of freeing 
Naples from the French, had they been 
willing to remain there, just as cer- 
tainly as landing in the bay of Naples. 



STATE OF THE NATION. Q\ 

By pursuing the former plan, effectual 
service would have been performed in the 
north, besides the liberation of the south. 
The latter plan, which unhappily we 
adopted, without doing any good to the 
Archduke, only protected Naples so long 
as it was the interest of France to with- 
draw her troops, and kept a large army 
unemployed, so long as it was the interest 
of the allies to have every soldier in their 
service brought into the field against the 
enemy. The occupation of Naples, then, 
after the French had left it, could never 
assist the campaign in the north . If the 
allies were successful in that quarter; 
Naples was freed at any rate. If they 
were unsuccessful, our army could not 
long defend it. We managed with our 
usual skill to unite all disadvantages in one 
plan : we hurried on one ally to the ruin 
which has since befallen him, for the pur- 
pose of rendering our army useless at a 
time when another ally might have been 
saved by its co-operation. So uniform, 
so harmonious in every quarter have been 



Q2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

the schemes of England throughout the 
late coalition ! — And can we wonder that 
pur affairs have been ruined amidst the 
waste of our resourses, and the squander 
of our opportunities, when we have been 
consistent only in impolicy, lavish of every 
thing but vigour, and strenuous in pursu- 
ing all varieties of plan, all sorts of system, 
except those which border upon pru- 
dence and wisdom ? 

It remains before closing the melan- 
choly history of our misconduct, that some 
notice should be taken of the strange pro- 
ceeding adopted by his majesty's late mi- 
nisters, in .publishing dispatches relating to 
some of the most delicate subjects imagin- 
able. • 

The treaties laid before parliament are 
not given entire : several articles are sup- 
pressed ; but one is inserted for the avowed 
purpose of binding the contracting parties 
to act in a certain event contrary to their 
public declarations *. Why a stipulation, 
which convicts the parties of deliberately 

* Additional Art. July 24— Treat, p. 24. 



STATE OF THE NATION. Q3 

laying the grounds of a positive falsehood, 
should not have been kept concealed, as 
well as other separate articles*, it would 
be difficult to determine. How far Russia 
and Austria will approve of the disclosure, 
it is easy to conjecture. There is the 
same indiscretion in publishing a secret 
article, binding England to subsidize Aus- 
tria and Sweden, if they came forward 
within ten months — w r hen the treaty itself 
threatens to withhold all subsidy, unless 
those powers take the field within four 
months t. It is obvious, that, for the fu- 
ture, all such threats from Russia and 
England will be of no avail ; their precise 
meaning is now ascertained. It is proba- 
ble, too, that the Austrian cabinet will not 
be much pleased with the publication of 
Sir A. Paget's dispatch of 29th August, in 
which he states, that Count Cobentzel had 
insinuated to him, that the language of the 



* Articles 3,7, 9, and 10, are suppressed, possiblv 
more. 

f Compare first Separate Art. (public) with second 
ditto (secret) Treat, p. 11, 20. 



Q4 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

Emperor would be heightened or lowered 
in proportion as he should be subsidized 
by England *. 

We may also form some conjecture 
of the Archduke Charles's feelings, when 
he finds himself held up to the world, by 
the official papers of the English cabinet, 
as the slave of ill-temper and jealousy ; 
fearful of reinforcing the army of his 
rival ; taking umbrage at such reinforce- 
ments being given, when the fate of the 
monarchy depended on it : and this ri- 
val too — the object of all this jealousy 
and umbrage in the mind of Prince 
Charles of Austria — General Mack! — 
When Sir A. Paget gave such informa- 
tion to his court, he only repeated lightly 
\\ hat he had been told falsely ; but surely he 
never expected that his communication 
would be laid before Parliament as a public 
docu ent. Count Rasumofski, too, when 
lie transmitted his free strictures on the 
cabinet of Vienna to his court, did not 
probably conceive that our government, 

* Sup. Pap.p. 4. f Ibid. p. 11 and 1?, 



STATE OF THE NATION. QJ 

getting notice of them through their mi- 
nister at St. Petersburgh, would publish 
them to all the world. It is possible, that 
he may feel it rather unpleasant to com- 
municate with a ministry who are now 
aware of his contempt for their character*. 
The same ambassador is convicted of hav- 
ing deceived our minister at Vienna, as to 
his knowledge of the Russian army's des- 
tination. Sir A. Paget' s dispatch of Sep- 
tember 5, states that Count Rasumofski 
knew nothing about itf, but the Protocol 
of Conferences proves that in July he knew 
the whole matter +. The publication of 
the Protocol, too, clearly proves that the 
allies had reason to reckon upon the co- 
operation of the Neapolitans, as soon as 
their army should land from Corfu || ; and 
this information, thus communicated to the 
French government, would have ensured 
the total ruin of the Sicilian court, if the 
more active efforts of our friendship had 



* Sup. pnp. p. 16. f Ibid. p. 7. 

X Ibid. p. 43, 1| Ibid. p. 43 & 44. 



g6 an inquiry into the 

not already effected that object in a more 
direct way. 

It was not enough, then, that our fatal 
activity accomplised at last the subjuga- 
tion of the continent ; that our allies were 
by our exertions brought to utter discom- 
fiture ; we must hold them up to contempt 
after the struggle is over, by divulging se- 
crets which the most limited discretion 
would have respected. Not content with 
sacrificing the foreign interest of England, 
by the compendious events of one short 
campaign, we must cut it up by the roots, 
and prevent its ever growing again, by 
taking such steps as may naturally beget 
distrust and alienation ; by ruining in the 
eyes of Europe, our character for discretion 
and good faith, which had survived the 
wreck of so many continental leagues. 
And to what purpose have those disclosures 
been made ? Whose cause have they 
served? Which of the measures that 
produced the downfal of Austria have 
they elucidated ? Which of the British 
statesmen who planned those measures 



STATE OF THE NATIOK. 97 

have they exculpated ? To thoughtless- 
ness alone can this conduct be imputed, 
or to the fatuity of despair ; to the un- 
heeding temerity, the impatience of rest, 
which devised and directed the third co- 
alition ; and the despair which those 
always feel most under disappointment, 
whose hopes are the most extravagant, and 
whose resources are the most paltry. 

Frorrr contemplating the progress of our 4 
late fatal misconduct, it is difficult to avoid 
casting behind us a look at the better 
times of English history ; when the affairs 
of this country were administered by the 
vigour of Cromwelli or her fortunes and 
the liberties of Europe entrusted to the 
sagacity of William ; when the name of 
England was dreaded on every sea, her 
alliance courted as the badge of honour^ 
and the pledge of safety in the remotest 
parts of the continent, and her protecting 
wisdom revered by all the nations, as their 
common shelter from oppression. How 
mightily have things been since changed I 
How little is that England now to be re- 

H 



§8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

cognized ! How plainly may the revolution 
in her destiny be traced to the alteration of 
her conduct ! It is indeed highly instruc- 
tive to pause for a moment, and contrast 
the policy which gave birth to the con- 
quest of Germany, with that which, after 
preparing the grand alliance, was deve- 
loped in the victories of Marlborough, and 
ended in the subjugation of France. From 
such a comparison we may learn why the 
event was so different. 

The overgrown power of Louis XIV, 
was ably but unsuccessfully resisted 
by the allies, during the war which 
ended so favourably to France in the peace 
of Nimeguen. After that treaty, his inso- 
lence knew no bounds, and scarcely a 
month passed without some aggression, 
"which would have amply justified a 
renewal of the war. But William, then 
the soul of the alliance, exerted all his 
influence in repressing any premature op- 
position; wiselyjudging that thejustice of a 
war — the extentof the provocation— is only 
half the question ; and must always be sub- 
ordinate to the prospect of succeeding by 



STATE OF THE NA1I0N. 

an appeal to arms. In a few years, Spain 
rashly began hostilities, which William 
having in vain tried to prevent, endea- 
voured by all prudent means to assist. He 
applied to every court in order to com- 
bine a new alliance : but finding that the 
time was not come, he continued to pre- 
pare measures, which he knew must lead 
to a happy result at a future period. As 
he foresaw, the usurpations of the 
French king, and his religious persecuti- 
ons, in a few years excited a universal dis- 
position to oppose him, and waiting until 
this spirit had reached its highest pitch, he 
availed himself of it, to form the league of 
Augsburg, which united the catholic as 
well as protestant interests of the empire, 
in one common cause against France. In 
1581, he might have gained one of the 
rival parties, but he knew how inadequate 
such support would prove to the exigences 
of the occasion. - He waited until the 
course of events had prepared both the 
contending interests, the Austrian and 
Prussian factions of those days, and he 
n 2 



1 00 AN ENQUIRY INTO TH£ 

succeeded in uniting them all under his 
standard. The whole Empire was now- 
combined against France ; Spain and Hol- 
land acceded to the league ; Savoy soon 
after joined it ; Sweden and Denmark 
warmly favoured the cause ; and the court 
of Rome itself, was by the able negotiations 
of William, induced to support a contest 
most essentia! to the Protestant Church. 
This great confederacy was animated with 
one spirit of resistance to France, and sub- 
mission to the counsels of their leader. 
All Europe was cordially united In the 
league, with the exception of England : 
and yet, on this single account, William 
delayed putting the allies in motion, not- 
withstanding the continued insults and 
increasing agressions of France : he waited 
until he had undertaken that enterprise 
which secured the liberties of this country, 
and which enabled him to complete the 
alliance for restoring those of Europe, It 
was not till after he had effected the Revo- 
lution, and could add England to the 
league, that he allowed the confederates 



State of the nation. 1 01 

to take the field ; and then, he continued 
to be the mover of the whole operations* 
not by manifestoes or subsidies, but by 
active assistance, and by superintending in 
person at repeated conferences of the com* 
bined powers, the whole arrangement of 
their plans for the war. By the success 
of this system the tide was at length turned 
against France ; and though the peace of 
Ryswick still left her a formidable neigh- 
bour, it succeeded in repressing her en- 
croachments and securing the independ- 
ence of other states, which, since the peace 
of Nimeguen, she had been constantly 
attacking. " There was not one of the 
allies, (says Bishop Burnell),who complain- 
ed that he had been forgot by him pr 
wronged in the treaty : Nor had the desire 
of having his title universally acknowledg- 
ed, raised any impatience in him, or made 
him run into this peace with any indecent 
haste."* 

His moderation and good sensein making 
the best peace he could, notwithstanding 

* History of his own Times, ii. in, 



102 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

his rooted antipathy to France was equally 
eminent. u The terms of it," says Bur- 
net, " were still too much to the advan- 
" tage of Prance; but the length and 
*' charge of the war had so exhausted the 
'* allies, that the king saw the necessity of 
" accepting thebest conditionsthat could be 
it got*." He well knew that the next war 
must complete the victories which his policy 
and prudence had begun to atchieve. His 
measures were accordingly planned with 
a view to new resistance ; and after his re- 
sources, and those of his allies had been 
recruited by an interval of quiet, they 
revived the league, under the well known 
name of that Grand Alliance, which led 
though a series of brilliant exploits to the 
utter humiliation of the common enemy. 

To complete the contrast between the 
character of this great Prince's policy, and 
that which produced the late continental 
war, it would be necessary to detail the 
whole particulars of his public life. It 
3iay be sufficient to finish the parallel at 

* History of his own Times, ii. 117* 



STATE OF THE NATION. 103 

present attempted, if we add, that he was 
eminently distinguished by a certain slow- 
ness to passion in his closet, as well as by 
uncommon ardour in action ; that his judg- 
ment was prompt and alert, in proportion 
as his temper was cold. His schemes con- 
ceived in sobriety of mind, were calculated 
to attain some great and solid end, and not 
to strike the vulgar by their gaudiness. 
Their execution was delayed until the mo- 
ment when success was most likely — not 
adjusted to the time when popular applause 
might be grateful, or convenient for other 
purposes. In planning them he was close 
and reserved ; but when he had matured 
them, and when his time came, there was 
no wavering, no procrastination, no vapour- 
ing of hopes ; finally, after the threat was 
made, not one moments' delay of which 
the enemy could avail himself ; the noise 
never went before the stroke. 

It is remarkable how universal the contrast 
to which we are alluding, is observable even 
in minute particulars. " He was," says 
the Historian, " an exact observer of men 



/ 



104 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

and things, but he did not descend even 
to the humours of his people, to make 
himself and his notions more acceptable to 
them. He knew all foreign affairs well, 
and understood the state of every court in 
Europe very particularly — he instructed his 
own ministers himself— his only two far 
vou rites, Portland and Albemarle, were men 
in all respects, of opposite characters, agree- 
ing only in secrecy and fidelity -."* It was 
by such a system, and so eminent a capa- 
city for affairs, that this illustrious person 
laid the foundation in Europe, of that in- 
dependence from French dominion, which 
his successors reared up. The fabric was 
indeed strong, and has withstood many 
shocks : but, like all the works of man, it is 
made of perishable materials ; and new 
systems having gained ground under states- 
men of opposite characters, it may now 
justly be questioned, whether there yet 
exists a wreck of what king William be- 
queathed. 

* Burnetii. 176 and 177= 



STATE OF THE NATION. 105 

We have now completed the examina- 
tion of the late continental policy of Eng- 
land, and have been enabled, from a re- 
view of the facts presented by the official 
documents, to estimate the merits of those 
who conceived and ' prosecuted that fatal 
system. Many of the errors which we 
have noticed, are only extravagant forms 
of mistakes not' unknown in the past history 
of the country; and the fruits of a policy 
radically defective as to external relations, 
which has long been growing up to matu- 
rity. The details of such misconduct are 
not uninstructive. They expose, by exhibit- 
ing an extreme case, the evils of the gene- 
ral principles; demonstrate the necessity of 
administring a remedy; and lead us to- 
wards the quarter from whence it may be 
obtained. This inquiry, too, has occasion- 
ally opened to us such views of the situation 
of the Continent, as may suggest the absur- 
dity of expecting any improvement in its 
fortunes for a lono; course of vcars. The 
arguments which have been urged to shew 
ihe folly of pressing forward towards 



106 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

anew league in 1805, operate with mani- 
fold force after the fatal changes which 
have ushered in the present year, and have 
flowed from the errors of the last. We are 
thus prepared for the remaining part of the 
discussion — the present state of continental 
affairs, and the new, and necessarily mo- 
derate and pacific system which it pre- 
scribes to this country. 

Having, therefore, fully explained to 
what causes England and Europe owe the 
misfortunes which have lately happened, 
we now proceed to take a view of the ex- 
tent of those misfortunes. 

II. Consequences of our late 
Foreign Policy. 

I. The actual changes of dominion 
which the third Coalition has already pro- 
duced, are in the highest degree alarm- 
ing-— whether we consider them as losses 
to Austria or gains to France. 

At the last peace, the Venetian territory 
had even been imagined by some to be a 



STATE OF THE NATION. 10? 

fair compensation for the loss of the Ne- 
therlands. In several points of view, its 
importance was certainly of the very first 
rank. Besides a large extent of the most 
fruitful country, a population of nearly two 
millions, and a revenue of a million ster- 
ling ; it gave Austria a line of sea coast, 
studded with excellent harbours, in the 
immediate neighbourhood of those rich 
provinces, which had long been checked 
in their progress, by their scanty means of 
foreign commerce. The acquisition of 
Venice easily rendered the power which 
also possessed the extensive dominions on 
the north of the Adriatic, mistress of that 
sea. The country to the East of the Gulf, 
was valuable in case any views might here- 
after be formed respecting Turkey; — or 
might become necessary from the policy 
of other states in relation to that defence- 
less neighbour. The footing which the 
Venetian territory gave Austria in Lom- 
bard y, added to her dominions in the 
Alpine Country, served to retain somewhat 
at least of her former sway in the affairs 



IOS AN INQUIRY mro THE 

of Italy; gave her a certain security against 
any further changes being attempted by 
France in that quarter; and secured, when 
an opportunity might offer, the means of 
jegaining the ascendant she had once pos- 
sessed in those fine countries. All these va-^ 
iuable possessions are now lost ; and all the 
prospects of which they were the founda- 
tion — the hopes of external influence, and 
the more solid expectation of domestic im- 
provement, are vanished for ever. France, 
or her dependency, the Italian Republic, 
has completed the conquest of Lombardy* 
From the Gulf of Genoa to the Gulph of 
Istria, all is French. 

To estimate how much France has gain- 
ed by the acquisition of the Venetian pro- 
vinces, it is only necessary that we should 
reflect on the importance of those terri- 
tories to the Italian Republic, from their 
position, and the facilities which they af- 
ford of increasing the naval power of the 
enemy. The commerce of Venice, now 
very considerable, and only checked since 
the revolution by the impolitic preference 



STATE OF THE NATION. 109 

given to Trieste, will increase rapidly, 
when at least equal exertions are made to 
encourage it. At present it does not occupy* 
less than 400 vessels belonging to the port 
of Venice alone. In its better days the 
number of these was tenfold. The naval 
arsenal of that city is famous, and the neigh- 
bouring harbours perfectly well adapted to 
the purposes of trade. The coast of Dalma- 
tian with the islands, possesses perhaps more 
line ports, with strong fortifications, than 
any in the world. Nona, Zara, Sebenico, 
Trail, Spalatro, Caste! Nuovo, Matero, 
Lesina, Corcyra — are but a few of the har- 
bours impregnable to attack, and command- 
ing every commercial advantage, which 
have now fallen into the hands of the Cis- 
alpine and its masters. It is unnecessary 
to state how prodigious an accession of 
trade and force this must, in a short time,, 
secure to France; and how paramount it 
must render her superiority in the Medi- 
terranean. Whether we now attempt to 
defend Sicily, or avert the down foil of 
Turkey and the seizure of Egypt, we 



110 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

shall feel the consequences of the treaty 
of Presburg in every operation of the 
war. 

The loss of the Tyrol, and its annexation 
to the new kingdom of Bavaria, is, though 
not from the superior territorial value of 
that province, yet certainly from its rela- 
tive situation, of still greater detriment to 
Austria than her sacrifices in Italy. The 
natural strength of the country, the loy- 
alty and valour of its inhabitants, and the 
skill which their mode of life gave them- in 
the warfare adapted to mountainous coun- 
tries, made the Tyrol altogether invaluable 
as a barrier against the invasion cf the he- 
reditary states; had the house of Austria 
but learnt the right use of those resources. 
Unhappily, there prevailed a constant jea- 
lousy of the Tyrolese, and an inclination 
to check them in those pursuits which 
were their most favourite occupation, and 
which formed the habits, of all others most 
necessary for the successful defence of their 
country. Even in a war which threatened 
the throne of the monarchy, the same 



STATE OF THE NATION. Ill 

evil policy continued to curb the exer- 
tions of this high spirited people; and, 
after weakening, during peace, by ab- 
surd restraints, the force which they could 
have opposed to the enemy, the court of 
Vienna, now, at the moment of invasion, 
persisted in refusing to avail itself of their 
services. In several places, the peasantry 
were deprived of arms, and checked by 
the army, least they should defend their 
mountains irregularly, while the old tac- 
ticians were retreating from the strongest 
holds, according to rule. Frequently, in 
spite of all resistance from their own mas- 
ter, these brave and skilful mountaineers 
made out the point of being allowed to 
fight; they generally made a successful 
stand, sometimes gained signal advan- 
tages over the French troops, while all 
their exertions were systematically thwarted 
by the Austrian commanders. But it is 
manifest, that while the province remained 
under the dominion of Austria, she might 
at any time have turned it to full account, 
by reforming so obviously pernicious a 



112 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

system of management. During a short 
interval of peace, she might organise its 
natural force so as to render it quite im- 
pregnable ; and then, whatever successes 
the enemy might, on any future occasion, 
gain in Lombard y and the Frioul, or on the 
Danube, his progress was effectually check- 
ed by the natural garrison which he left 
behind him ; which must be taken, not 
turned ; which preserved unbroken the 
communication with Italy and with Swit- 
zerland ; which must always, if properly 
managed, have been the main theatre of 
any war, where Austria acted on the de- 
fensive. Such were the incalculable ad- 
vantages, in a defensive, point of view, 
which Austria lost by the cession of the 
Tyrol. 

If we keep in mind the remarks formerly 
made upon the importance of Switzerland, 
we shall be enabled to perceive still further 
advantages for defence, which Austria has 
lost in the Tyrol, and to estimate the ex- 
tent of this loss in an offensive point of view. 
The complete establishment of France 



STATE OF THE NATION. US 

in Lombardy and the Genoese, would of 
itself have augmented the dependence of 
Switzerland upon her power. But though 
the passes on the West and South would 
have been open to her, while the Tyrol and 
the Voralberg remained in the hands of 
Austria, the Swiss might always reckon up- 
on her powerful support; their country 
might be defended by its native forces 
against the inroads of the enemy from the 
other sides*, until assistance was poured in 
from the East; even if overpowered, their 
natural allies "might still hope to effect their 
liberation, by attacking from that quarter 
the French who should have established 
themselves in the Alpine territory, as was 
done successfully by the Rhinthal and 
Engadine in 1799: and at all events, the 
subjugation of Switzerland would not have 
proved altogether fatal to Austria, when she* 
had the strong outwork of the Tyrol on 

* There are only four passes into Switzerland, 
from the French side, and seven from the Italian. 
The Swiss could easily defend these for a month of 
$tfc week*, 

t 



i|4 AK INQUIRY INTO THE 

that side, both to oppose the new position 
of the enemy, and to interrupt the commu- 
nication between his Italian dominions and 
the new acquisitions in the North, which 
the occupation of the Alps might give him* 
But still more important, for offensive pur- 
poses, was the communication which the 
Tyrol afforded between Austria and Swit- 
zerland. The Swiss were beyond any other 
people hostile to France. Of this hatred 
they had given undoubted proofs in the 
last war; their skill in defending their own 
passes was truly wonderful; and no instance 
is on record of successes equal to theirs, won 
by individual dexterity and courage over 
numbers and discipline. While this cha- 
racter continued to adorn that virtuous and 
unconquerable peasantry, there was always 
a prospect of their making such a resistance 
to France, in the event of a wisely arranged 
scheme of invasion, as might enable Austria 
to come up, and thus attack the enemy 
upon his most vulnerable side. Even if 
she unfortunately preferred the plan of in- 
vading France by the Rhine or the Var, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 115 

and for that purpose wished to secure the 
neutrality of Switzerland; the possession of 
the Tyrol enabled her to do so; because it 
gave France some inducement to acquiesce 
.in that arrangement. All the advantages, 
then, which were most important to Au- 
stria, whether she intended to attack France, 
or to defend herself by means of Switzer- 
land, depended entirely on her possessing 
the Tyrol. — With the Tyrol she has now 
lost them for ever. Switzerland is com- 
pletely surrounded by France and the 
French dependencies; cut off from the only 
power which could enable her to stand out 
for a moment against her enemy ; delivered 
up without the possibility of resisting; pre- 
vented from ever being employed in the 
invasion of France; but ready at any time 
to be used as the means of finally reducing 
Austria. In this employment of Switzer- 
land, the Tyrol will not only be no hin- 
drance; it will be made to assist. The pea- 
santry of that country will be organised 
according to their aptitudes, physical and' 
moral; their privileges will be extended 
i 2 



116 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

for the purpose of gaining their assistance 
against their former oppressors, and of ren- 
dering their exertions more powerful; and 
Austria will at length discover the value of 
the Tyrol, by the services which it may 
render to her invaders. 

The loss of the Venetian and Tyrolese 
territory, with the confirmation of the 
French power over Switzerland, has now 
completed the dominion of France over 
the whole of Italy. Every avenue to that 
country is finally closed against Austria 
and commanded by her enemy with 
undivided authority. From Dalmatia and 
the confines of Turkey, round to Stras- 
burg, prance has drawn a line of strong 
possessions, by which she completely hems 
in Italy; cuts her off from every commu- 
nication with the rest o£ the world ; and 
opens to her the closest intercourse with 
herself. Her sway being so absolute, here, 
it is natural that she should lose no time in 
exercising all the rights of sovereignty. 
Accordingly, she models at pleasure the 
kingdom of Etruria; augments the Cisai- 



STATE OF THE NATION. H7 

pine ; disposes at will of the court of Rome; 
and dethrones, by a common regimental 
order, the royal family of Naples; for which 
iast proceeding England, be it remembered, 
took care to furnish also the pretext, after 
having given the power of accomplishing it. 
Thus has the grand strife between France 
and Austria at ]ength been settled, by the sur- 
render of Italy, more absolute and uncondi- 
tional, and in a far greater extent, than the 
courtiers of Charles, of Francis, or of Lewis, 
■ever dared flatter their masters to expect 
France has now become sole mistress of that 
splendid country, from the Alps to the 
streights of Messina — its position, which do- 
mineers over the Mediterranean ; its mighty 
resources; the fruitfulness of the garden of 
Europe ; the bays, and rivers, and harbours 
which open to its produce the uttermost 
ends of the earth; the forests which varie- 
gate its surface, and only break the conti- 
nuity of culture to augment its powers, by 
preparing for this favoured land the domi- 
nion of the sea; the genius and fire of its 
.numerous people; the monuments of art; 



118 AN INQUIRY INTO TH£ 

the remains of antiquity; the ground on 
which the glories of their Roman ancestors 
were atchieved ; — all are now in the hands 
of the nation in the world best able to im- 
prove them — to combine them — to make 
them aid one another; and, after calling 
them forth, to the incalculable augmenta- 
tion of her former resources, ready to turn 
them against those, if any such shall remain, 
who still dare to be her enemies. 

The other changes of dominion effected 
by the treaty of Presburg— the emperor's ces- 
sion of his possessions in Suabia*, and his sub- 
mission to the further spoliation of the Ger- 
man empire-f ;— though important in them- 
selves, and sufficient, in any former period, 
to alarm all Europe for their consequences; 
sink into insignificance after the entire sur- 
render of Italy, which we have been con-* 

* These are chiefly the Burgaw, the Brisgaw, 
and Contance. The whole loss of Austria has been 
estimated at 1297 square geographical miles ; 
2,716,000 subjects, and 1,600,000/. sterling of 
yearly revenue ; of which three fourths have been, 
given to the Cisalpine. 

f The seizure of Augsburg and BorndorfF. 



• STATE OF THE NATION* 11§ 

templating* All those changes have one 
simple view — the diminution of the Austrian 
monarchy; its separation from France by a 
number of petty kingdoms dependent on 
the French power; the transference of the 
Emperor's influence in Germany to his 
enemies; and his confinement to the poli- 
tics of the East of Europe; where, also, he 
is closely watched by France and her crea? 
tures. Nor does it make any difference 
upon the relative situation of the powers, 
that the sacrifices of Austria have been 
made to aggrandize the dependants of 
France, and not France herself. Thai 
overgrown empire could not expect ta 
keep together more nations and countries 
than it already counted within its limits** 
The only feat which the French power has 
not attempted, is the conciliation of those 
peoples whom it has conquered; the only 

* — " 2uibus non lex , \ion mos, non lingua com? 
munis ; alius habitus, alia vestis., aliaarma, alii ritics 9 
alia sacra , alii prope Dei essent : ita quodam ano vin* 
culo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nee inte ipsos, nee adver* 
susducem seditio extiterit" — Tit. liv. xxviii. 12, 



J 20 AN INQUIRY INTO TH2 • 

difficulties which it has not mastered, are 
those that natural boundaries present. France, 
therefore, finds it more easy to complete 
the incorporation of Europe by some inter- 
mediate process, which may assimilate its 
heterogeneous parts, and prepare them for 
a lasting, as well as an intimate union. In 
the mean time, her sway over the princi-? 
palities and powers, whom she calls into 
existence, is absolute and certain ; her inr 
fluence is hourly gaining ground. Should 
the course of events maintain the nominal 
separation of ttiose dependent kingdoms* 
they may, at some future period, revolt 
from her federal empire ; but, for years to 
come, they are as subservient to her pur- 
poses, as if they had no separate names. 
Hadshenot acted upon such principles; 
had she taken more to herself at Presburg; 
she would have resembled the allies whose 
impolicy has laid Europe at her feet : she 
would have seemed to gain more, but she 
would not have been the formidable neigh- 
bour which a deeper policy has made her. 



STATE OF THE NATION, 121 



2. But the calamities of Austria are not 
to be measured by the cessions that have 
been wrung from her. The unhappy- 
events of the Coalition War have had a 
more extensive and deep rooted influence, 
than can appear in the articles of any 
treaty which may have been made to ter- 
minate actual hostilities. There are certain 
effects of conquest, certain symptoms of 
subjugation, which escape the art of the 
diplomatist, and cannot be expressed i>i 
public instruments. In a little month, the 
finest army in the imperial service was an- 
nihilated without striking a blow. From 
the Rhine to the heart of the hereditary 
states, the French marched on with one 
uniform success, and had not even to fight 
their way. The progress of their forces 
through the best defended countries of the 
Emperor, resembled a regular movement 
through a subject and peaceable state. Every 
thing gave way before them, as if both ar- 
mies were governed by the same word of 
command; and the Austrian cabinet can 



122 AN INQUIRY 1OT0 THE 

only account for the defeat of its troops by- 
stating, that two grievous errors were com- 
mitted; one, in expecting the enemy would 
respect the Prussian neutrality, when it 
stood in the way of a decisive victory; the 
other, in being deceived by his bare asser- 
tion, and allowing him to enter the metro- 
polis*. The fruit of these rapid and easy 
conquests was the possession of Vienna. 
Nor did the progress of the French arms 
stop there. Prussia, unmoved, saw France 
surrounding her on every side, by the com- 
plete reduction of Germany; she allowed 
the conquerors to march on in all directions, 
to drive the Emperor from his capital, and 
pursue him out of the Empire. At last, on 
the verge of his hereditary dominions, a 
general engagement takes place, the first 
and the last of this eventful campaign, in 
which the battle has indeed been to the 
skilful, not the strong; which, from the 

* See Count Stahremberg's Note, where he states 
these two mistakes of General Mack and Prince 
Aversberg, as fundamental causes of the defeats.— 
Sup. pap. p.- 5.2. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 1*23 

beginning to the end, has been one con- 
stant illustration of the weakness of mere 
physical force, and the omnipotence of 
talents. Is it possible that such things 
should speedily be forgotten? Where is 
the nation so stout hearted as not to feel 
disasters like these? The very sights of un- 
exampled humiliation to which the people 
have been witness; the strange evems which 
within a few weeks have brought the Austrian 
monarchy so low; must leave an indelible im- 
pression on their minds; and prepare them 
for new defeats, while they efface the me- 
mory of past victories. * Nee quhquam 
adeo rerum human-arum inimemor, quern non 
commoveret ilia fades , Romanum principem et 
generis humani paullo ante dominum, relietdr 
j'ortunce sxut sede, per populum, per urbem, 
exire de Imperio- — nihil talc viderant — nihil 
audierant*." If to the state in which their 
defeats have left the spirit of the Austria ns, 
we oppose the natural effects of their new 
victories upon the minds of the French, 

* Tacit. Hist. lib. iii. cap. 68. 



124 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

we shall be able to estimate how far the 
recollection of this memorable war leaves 
the balance in favour of the conquerors, 
beyond the mere changes of territory 
which it may have occasioned. There is, 
indeed, no closing our eyes to the extent 
of the misfortunes entailed upon Europe 
by the projectors of the late coalition. We 
must not deceive ourselves. The house 
of Austria is completely humbled ; she 
must receive the law, not from Vienna, 
but from Paris ; she has sacrificed much ; 
but more she must be prepared to surren- 
der if required, rather than run the last 
of risks, that of a new war. Whatever the 
sacrifice demanded may be, she must 
make it — whether treasure, or alliances, or 
dignities or territory, or what is worst of 
all, principles. If the enemy require her 
to join him in attacking Prussia, or turning 
against Russia, or sharing the plunder of 
Germany, or dividing and pillaging the 
Turk ; she cannot now balance. Agitur 
de imperio, France has Italy and the Tyrol ; 
the -people of Austria are crushed ; the 



STATE OF THE NATION. 123 

French are exalted and exulting. What 
though the treaty of Presburgh has bound 
them together by no secret articles, and 
that its public stipulations still leave to 
Austria the semblance of a great monarchy ? 
Italy and the Tyrol are French, and the 
campaign of 1805, lives in the recollection 
of both French and Germans — Do we not 
know that the only extensive or durable 
conquests have been made gradually; that 
in treating with a humbled enemy, you 
raise him by exacting too harsh conditions ; 
that the wisest policy is to take something, 
and by the present, to pave the way for 
future gains. One only chance of retaining 
even the name of independence, now re- 
mains to our unfortunate ally; she must 
listen no more to such counsellors as hurried 
her into the late alliance in spite of her 
better reason. By skill and strength shQ 
may possibly preserve some part of what is 
left, and improve it in peace. If she once 
more forsakes moderate counsels, she is 
undone. 

Nor is it Austria alone that has suffered 



126 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

by this unhappy coalition. The new vic- 
tories of France; the actual aggrandisement 
of her empire ; the subjection of her rival; 
and the dread of her invincible arms ; have 
now rivetted the chains of the continent. 
No one ever supposed that the state of; 
things as settled at the peace of Luneville, 
was to last longer than the necessities which 
made the different powers submit to the 
conditions then imposed. As soon as their 
strength should be recruited, and their sen- 
timents united against the French yoke, 
we had a right to. expect that attempts 
would be made to throw it off. Time, only — 
a prudent delay, and a judicious choice of 
the proper moment, was required to render 
such a resistance effectual. But all this 
prospect is now vanished ; the chance is 
thrown away, and the only hope is gone 
which Holland, and Switzerland, and Italy 
had of once more knowing independence. 
Henceforth the' object of these unhappy 
states must be not to oppose France, but to 
moderate, if possible, the violence of her 
oppressions. They have England to thank 



STATE OF THE NATION. 127 

for this reverse of prospects, and it is pro* 
bably the last favour they will receive at 
her hands. 

3. If from these effects of the late war 
upon the state of the continent, we turn to 
a view of its effects upon our own indi- 
vidual interests, we shall find, that we 
have suffered, as is most just, a great share 
of the common loss. Besides the injury 
which England ultimately receives from 
the disasters of the rest of Europe, she 
is more immediately affected bv the a«- 
grandizement of her enemy, from the 
increased danger of invasion to which 
it exposes her. The fate of the third 
coalition has in several ways augmented 
this danger; multiplying both the chances 
of the attempt being made, and increas- 
ing the probability of its success. 

Nothing is more common than to hear 
thoughtless persons talk lightly of such 
dangers. They trust that the loyalty and 
courage of the country would carry it 
through greater perils than France has in 
store for us. The French have never yet 



128 AN INQUIRY INTO TH£ 

been engaged with a nation of Freemen* 
They would find us made of different ma- 
terials from the Germans. They might 
over-run the country and take London ; 
but London is not England, and they 
would soon be extirpated. Such well 
meaning persons seem even to be afraid 
least no attempt should be made ; least they 
should not have an opportunity of conquer- 
ing upon British ground. u Let the ene- 
my come, say they, we desire nothing more, 
and not a man of his force shall escape." 
— But it is much to be feared that this zeal, 
so laudable in itself, *' is without know- 
ledge. " With every disposition to exalt 
the valour of Britons, and to augur well of 
their efforts in defence of the greatest bless- 
ing which any people enjoy; we may be 
permitted to dread the event of a contest 
between courage and skill. Nor was the 
difference between the two ever so strongly 
marked as since the experience of the late 
campaign. It is no disrespect to our troops, 
and their commanders, to question whether 
their native talents are sufficient to supply 



STATE OF THE NATION. 129 

their want of experience, and to wish that, 
until measures are taken to improve them 
in their art, there may be no trial of gene- 
ralship between them and the conductors 
of the late German campaign. That the 
country could be ultimately conquered, 
we cannot indeed for a moment allow our- 
selves to believe ; but there are other evils 
attending an invasion, besides the greatest 
of all evils ; there are injuries short of utter 
ruin which a nation may receive from it. 
We know nothing practically of w r ar in 
this happy land : we have heard of its 
effects, and read of battles at a great dis- 
tance ; but we know it not from experi- 
ence/ and it is~well we do not. Never was 
a country worse calculated for being the 
scene of military operations, for having the 
hazardous issue of war tried within its 
bounds. With its wealth, its crowded 
population, its multitude of artizans and 
traders, its paper circulation, its public 
debts, its commercial credit; with the vari- 
ous factitious qualities of a nice and com- 
plicated system of most artificial society ; 



ISO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

and above all, without any experience 
whatever of a campaign on its own ground — 
how frightful to contemplate the mischiefs 
which so unusual a convulsion must occa- 
sion, admitting it should end in the total 
defeat of the invader ! It is clear, that no 
wise man will desire to see such an experi- 
ment tried, and that however it may end, 
the attempt would of itself be an enormous 
evil. 

Now the risk of this pernicious attempt 
being made, is greatly augmented by the 
late defeats of our allies. Before the new 
coalition, the enemy, at whatever time he 
might attempt to execute his favourite pro- 
ject, had always to apprehend great dan- 
ger, from his continental neighbours seizing 
the opportunity of his forces being occupied 
in England, and attacking him at a prodi- 
gious advantage. Every year that the at- 
tempt was delayed increased the magnitude 
of this risk; and had he deferred it a few 
years longer, the certainty of the continent 
being recruited and ready to attack him 9 
should he give them so fair an occasion* 



STATE OF THE NATION. 131 

would probably have made him finally 
abandon the scheme. But we have taken 
care to relieve him from all such embar- 
rassment. He has now nothing to appre- 
hend from continental wars. We have 
purchased a miserable respite from our 
alarms, (for in spite of our boasting we were 
the dupes of our fears) at the expence of 
whatever solid benefit we might have foiftid 
in a coalition able to assist us at the moment 
of real danger. Another check upon the 
French government was, the fear of the 
odium which would have attended a failure 
in the threatened project. So great a 
source of hope was this consideration with 
some, that they believed it would for ever 
prevent the attempt. But this too is entirely 
at an end. The Swabian and Moravian 
campaigns have raised the French Chief so 
high in the eyes of his subjects — have given 
him such an unexpected accession of popu- 
larity, and so signally increased the fame 
of his arms, that he may now with perfect 
safety try whatsoever his ambition or his 
caprices shall dictate. He may bury ano- 
k 2 



132 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ther army in St. Domingo, or squander a 
huadred thousand lives in Ireland, or even 
risk their entire loss at sea for the chance of 
some part of the armament landing ; all 
will be forgotten by a people so elated 
with recent triumph, or if remembered will 
be chearfully forgiven to the conqueror 
of Austerlitz. Formerly, he dared not 
think of failing in the projected invasion ; 
he could only contemplate its success. 
Now he may be content with taking his 
chance of conquering, and ensuring the 
certainty of injuring us. That he should 
make thisattempt then, in every way so hurt- 
ful to our interests, is become infinitely more 
likely, since the wretched policy of Eng- 
land, by effecting the subjugation of her 
continental allies, and compleating the 
achievements of her enemy, removed the 
two great impediments which stood in his 
way. 

It is equally manifest that the danger of 
this attempt proving successful, or at least 
the probable amount of the injury which 
we may receive from it, has been greatly 



STATE OF THE NATION. 133 

augmented by the unhappy fate of the 
Continent. Not only has the discomfiture 
of the coalition enabled France to embark 
a much larger proportion of herdisposeable 
force in the enterprise ; the recent suc- 
cesses of her arms must produce a very 
sensible effect on every man in her service. 
The confidence in their superiority which 
always animated French soldiers, is now 
greatly augmented ; and they have to -op- 
pose men who know little of war, but what 
they have heard of in the history of the 
French conquests. The service of the 
late campaign too, was peculiarly well 
adapted to discipline new troops, and to 
increase the proportion of good soldiers in 
the whole army. 

But while the result of our impolitic 
measures has thus strengthened in every 
respect the hands of the enemy, it is 
strange that we have ourselves entirely 
neglected the short interval of quiet which 
the continental war gave us. At its com- 
mencement, upwards of two years had 
elapsed since the British government were 
filled with the constant expectation of a 



134 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

descent upon our coasts. Our military 
system was extremely imperfect, and the 
fear of all men was least the invasion should 
be attempted, before any material improve- 
ments could take place. We were indeed, 
u counting hours and minutes," till the 
enemy should land ; and at this critical- 
juncture, a respite is suddenly obtained by 
means of the campaign in Germany. The 
invasion is now necessarily delayed for 
half a year at least. Would not any one 
have conceived that such an interval was 
valuable beyond all price ; that" i gave us 
the very time so much wanted for the 
completion of our defensive preparations ; 
that it might be the turn of the balance in 
our favour, when the attempt should at last 
be made. Yet strange to tell, this oppor- 
tunity was utterly thrown away; our cabinet, 
as soon as the army left Boulogne, seem to 
have thought the whole project of invasion 
at ah end ; and never contemplating the pos- 
sibility of the allies being once more beaten, 
they chose rather to remain spectators of 
the continental war, than to prepare for our 



STATE OB THE NATION. 135 

own battles, should it prove unfortunate. 
Their military system had been tried above 
a year, and might be said to have tailed 
more egregiously than any plan that ever 
was devised. It had not during the whole 
of that period produced 1500 men in th$ 
whole island, and not five hundred of these 
for general service. The volunteer army, 
as it has been called, had relaxed in its most 
valuable quality of ardour and alacrity; ani 
had been losing the only advantage which 
such a force can possess over regular troops, 
without making any sensible progress iq 
discipline. The recruiting for the army 
was at a stand, and nothing whatever had 
been done to improve its constitution. Yet 
did the government allow the whole inter- 
val between the departure of the Boulogne 
army, and the dissolution of the late cabinet, 
to pass over without taking a single step 
for the general reform of our defensive 
measures, or even for the new modelling 
of that plan, which a fair trial had shewn to 
be nugatory in its original shape. They 
did not even assemble the parliament, W^h* 



136 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

out whose interference no such im- 
provements could be made. They avoid- 
ed every thing which could have turn- 
ed their impolicy in making the coali- 
tion, to the smallest account ; and persisted 
in rejecting the one solitary benefit which 
their new war might have produced, in 
compensation of so many calamities. Thus, 
after the best possible opportunity of aug- 
menting the strength of the country, they 
have left it to their successors, feeble and 
confused, at the very crisis when the ne- 
cessary consequences of their other mea- 
sures are hurrying on its fate. With such 
an army, with our volunteers and our de- 
fence bill, with our regular forces weaken- 
ed by the conflicting tendencies of the 
militia and reserve, with our volunteer 
system counteracting all the other branches, 
we are now left to contend alone against 
the undivided force of our enemy, and his 
allies. " Is autan valet exercitu, tenet mul~ 
tos spe et promissis, omnia omnium concupivit. 
Huic tradita urbs est, nuda presidiis, referta 



STATE OF THE NATION. 137 

copiis* Quid est quod ab eo non metuas, qui 
ilia templa et tecta, non patriam sed prcedam 
putet ? Commissum quidem a nobis eerie est, 
sive a nostro duce, ut, & portu sine gubcrna- 
cxdo egressi, tempest at i nos tradercrnus."* 



Such are, in a general view, the lamenta- 
ble effects of that foreign policy which we 
have minutely traced through its different 
errors, in the former part of this inquiry. 
We might have enumerated other evils, 
which have flowed from it both to Europe, 
and to our own individual interests. We 
might, for example, have stated the loss of 
character and influence which has attended 
so plain an exposure of our incapacity for 
continental affairs ; the contempt into 
which our assistance has fallen with every 
ally, reduced as it now has been to the 
mere payment of money ; the pains we 
have taken to make them underrate even 
those supplies which they were willing to 
receive, by pressing our gold upon all the 

* Cic, Epist. Lib. vii. 



138 AN INQUIRY INTO THI 

world, and running from door to door, to 
beg it might be accepted ; and above all, 
the odium which we have incurred with 
the less enlightened part of the continent, 
with the people in every foreign state, in 
whose eyes we have appeared only as in* 
stigators of war, and as corruptors of their 
rulers for their destruction. From the 
erTects of these impressions our name will 
not soon recover, and we may rest assured 
that the Continent is at last heartily sick 
of our interference, and prepared to join 
with the enemy in his plan of excluding 
us from any voice in its affairs. But it 
was the less necessary to enter upon such 
topics, that they are naturally suggested by 
the previous discussions, and that they tend 
in no way to modify the picture formerly 
drawn of our affairs: for it is our misfortune 
that we look around in vain for any cir- 
cumstances which may soften its features, 
while it is impossible to imagine any 
addition which can aggravate them. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 139 



III. State of Foreign Affairs, in- 
dependent OF THE LATE COALITION 
and its Consequences. 

Although the effects of our last exertions 
on the Continent have almost entirely new 
modelled it, yet there are several particulars 
in its present state, which have not been 
directly influenced by the fate of the war, 
partly because they lay beyond the sphere 
of its operation, but chiefly because our 
former impolicy and mismanagement had 
done as much detriment as was possible, 
to our interests in those quarters. An in- 
quiry into the state of our foreign affairs 
would be imperfect without some notice of 
these points. 

1. The unfortunate circumstance of 
having Spain against us, and given up en- 
tirely to the alliance, or rather the service 
of our enemies, during the present war, is 
a consequence of the impolicy of the Bri- 
tish cabinet, previous to the commence- 
ment of the late coalition. After cur run- 



140 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ture with France, and -down to the forma- 
tion of the late ministry, in May 1804, it 
clearly appears, that the dispositions of Spain 
towards this country, and against our 
enemy, were as favourable as could have 
been desired*. Our popularity was never 
so great, either with the Court of Madrid, 
with the confidential ministers of the 
crown, or with the nation at large. France, 
always disliked by the Spaniards, had be- 
come still more odious from her insolent 
and rapacious demands; and from the in- 
temperate conduct of her representatives. 
The wishes of the Spanish cabinet accord- 
ed with those of the people, in lean- 
ing plainly towards an offensive alliance 
with England against France. But the 
state of our continental relations, and our 
inability to give Spain any effectual support 
ill the dangers to which such a conduct 
must expose her, rendered it necessary for 
her to delay all measures leading to a rup- 
ture ; and she submitted to a convention of 

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. Fe- 
l;-<--ry, 1805.— No, II. to XX. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 141 

neutrality, by which she became bound to 
pay a considerable subsidy to the French 
government. To this the English cabinet 
consented as a temporary measure, " in- 
tended to give time till the disposition of 
the great powers of Europe should be more 
decidedly known."* That the subsidy 
was extorted from Spain, by the imminent 
fear of seeing a French army in Madrid ; 
that the dispositions of Spain in our fa- 
vour, and her enmity to France were in- 
creased by this compulsory submission, is 
clearly demonstrated by the dispatches of 
the British Envoy -f-. Of these dispositions 
we ought doubtless to have availed our- 
selves. We were engaged in planning the 
new coalition, nothing could be more 
important than to include Spain in such a 
league. Her position with respect to 
France, must always render her hostility 
extremely hurtful to that power. Her 
frontier on the Pyrennees is strong, and well 

* Additional Spanish Papers, presented 2d. Fe- 
bruary, 1805— No. VII 

+ Ibid. No. VIII. 



}4-2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

defended by fortified places. The French 
frontier is only protected by Perpignan, 
and France has no way of removing 
the danger of an attack from Spain, but 
by attacking her in the first instance, and 
forcing her to conclude a separate peace. 
This would have been rendered imprac- 
ticable by the preparations of the allies on 
the East side of the French territories, and 
a most important accession would thus 
have been gained to the measures of the 
offensive league. By the hostility of Spain* 
too, France would have lost the benefit 
of her subsidies, and the still greater ad- 
vantage of that controul over her coun- 
cils, which enabled her at any time to 
involve every branch of the Spanish 
monarchy in a war with her enemies. 
The allies would have secured the in- 
dependence of Spain, while they pro- 
fited by her assistance; and prevented 
the subjection of the whole of her re- 
sources to France, while they converted a 
just and moderate proportion of them to 
their own use. By going to war with 
Spain, they necessarily threw her into fliQ 



STATE OF THE NATION. 143 

arms of France ; armed her whole force 
against themselves ; sacrificed the benefits 
of a commercial intercourse, the most lu- 
crative and even necessary to their prospe- 
rity ; extended the sea-coast of the enemy 
from Bourdeaux round to Toulon ; in- 
creased his predominating influence in the 
Mediterranean ; and laid Portugal entirely . 
at his mercy. 

Yet this was the very line of con- 
duct which the allies ; or rather which 
England, in the infancy of the alli- 
ance, chose to pursue. She delayed ob- 
jecting to the Spanish subsidy until she 
should sound the dispositions of the other 
Powers. Those she found to be favoura- 
ble, or at least she conceived that they 
warranted her in expecting a new coali- 
tion against France. Instead of delaying 
her objections to the subsidy a few weeks 
longer, and then offering Spain a place in 
the league, when she might declare her- 
self with impunity, England demanded 
that she should produce the subsidiary 
convention, which every one knew she was 
bound to conceal, at the peril of an imme- 



244 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

diate war with France; and she made this 
bootless demand at a time when matters 
were not ripe for assisting her in such a 
war*. The pretext of armaments at Fer- 
rol was mere trifling; they lasted exactly 
nine days, and were intended for quelling an 
insurre n in Biscay. But this pretence, 
with the refusal of Spain to produce the 
convention, were made the grounds of 
that unprecedented violation of justice, 
the capture of the frigates without any 
declaration of war; accompanied with 
circumstances of individual calamity, which 
have not failed to injure the English cause 
irreparably among the Spanish people. — 
Thus did our government sacrifice to the 
paltry object of a few cargoes of silver, 
its character; its prospects of assistance 
from Spain, at the moment when that 
assistance would have been most valuable; 
its hopes of weaning her entirely from 
French connexions; its expectations of 
the security derived from lessening our 

*' The point here at issue, was a mere matter of 
form ; the tenor of the convention was publicly 
known. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 145 

enemy's sea coast, and the advantages con- 
nected with the Spanish commerce; above 
all, its chance of continuing the high fa- 
vour enjoyed by England in Spain, and 
the influence in her councils to which it 
must have led. One of two plans were 
clearly pointed out by the state of our 
relations with Spain ; either we should 
have connived at her compulsory submis- 
sion to France until we could protect her iu 
resisting the French dominion, and added 
her to the new league; or, if unfortu- 
nately we preferred hostilities, we should 
have taken care to make the war as ad- 
vantageous as possible, by liberating the 
Spanish colonies from the galling mono- 
poly of the Mother Country, and opening 
a most profitable inlet for our commercial 
speculations. Neither of those schemes 
was adopted. With our accustomed in- 
genuity, we contrived to find a line of 
policy which should avoid the benefits, 
and combine the disadvantages of all the 
others. We managed to lose the alliance 
of Spain at present, and her friendship for 

L 



146 Atf INQUIRY INTO THE 

ever ; and at the same time gave up all 
chance of turning her hostility to our 
advantage. Her trade so beneficial to all 
the branches of our domestic industry, 
so essential to some of them, we aban- 
doned for a few barrels of dollars. To 
prevent her from paying a subsidy to 
France, we incorporated her whole re- 
sources with those of our enemy ; and 
rather than allow a neutrality, which 
might give a trifling aid to him, we 
rushed into a kind of hostility which 
could procure no assistance for ourselves. 
The total alienation of Spain from our 
interests; the ruin of our ancient popu- 
larity in that country; the absolute sub- 
jection of her power to that of France; 
has been the price paid for our acquisi- 
tions of silver bullion ; and next to the 
evils produced by the new coalition, this 
is the most serious misfortune which her 
fatal impolicy has brought upon the conti- 
nental affairs of England. 

2. If we cast our eyes on the other states, 
who- are confederates, or rather depen- 



STAT& OF THE NATION. 147 

dants of France, we shall find that the 
hopes of their deserting her, or attempt- 
ing to throw off the yoke, with the assist- 
ance of England and her allies, are slen- 
der indeed* Partly from circumstances 
never within our contioul, and partly, no 
doubt, from our former impolicy, those 
countries are as firmly united in fate with 
our enemy, as if they formed integral 
parts of his extensive dominions. 

Holland has always been regarded as 
the natural ally of this country. Her 
proximity to France, and consequent ex- 
posure to the power of that formidable 
neighbour; her commercial relations, the 
nature of her civil and religious establish- 
ments, and the character of her people,, 
have been esteemed, in the better times 
of European affairs, a sufficient pledge of 
her inclination to connect her interests 
with the cause of Great Britain. Accord- 
ingly, except during the impolitic alli- 
ance of Charles II. with France, and the 
no less unwise enmity of the Dutch towards 
us in the American war, Holland has- uni- 
formly been our firm ally in, all our dis- 
L 2 



14S AN INQUIRY INTO THtf 

putes with France, and our cause has* 
never failed to gain by the connexion. 
But since the Dutch Revolution, this 
alliance has been entirely dissolved. 
The arms of France having over-run 
the Netherlands, soon established the 
French power in Holland. The govern- 
ment, the armies and fleets, the trade 
and the revenues of that rich and populous 
country, have been delivered over to our 
enemy, not by an offensive and defensive 
alliance, but by an entire conquest and 
subsequent acknowledgment of the yoke* 
From this important increase of the French 
power, have arisen many serious accessions 
to the dangers to which it exposes us. A 
great extent of sea-coast; a numerous body 
of men accustomed to maritime affairs, 
and eminently skilled in the navigation 
of the North Sea ; a commercial navy, 
next to our own, the greatest in the world 
—these are but a few of the advantages 
which France has derived from Holland, 
and may turn against us in her projected 
attack upon our European dominions. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 149 

Rut many well-informed persons have 
imagined that the Dutch are discontented 
with their yoke; that they earnestly desire 
an opportunity of regaining their indepen- 
dence; and that these dispositions would 
both insure the success of any attempts to 
assist them, in freeing themselves from 
French influence, and deprive France of 
any material benefit from their services in 
her attempts upon England. It cannot 
be doubted that such hopes as these are 
altogether vain — that they are founded 
upon a mistake of the Dutch character, 
and upon gross exaggerations of the French 
polici .towards Holland. A country, in 
the circumstances of Holland, depending 
entirely upon commerce for its wealth, 
and for its support ; crowded beyond all 
others with a population of industrious 
and skilful inhabitants ; covered with 
warehouses, manufactories, canals, docks, 
wharfs, and all the other acquisitions of 
ingenuity and labour; its very land saved 
from the sea by monuments of their per- 
severance, through a long course of ages ; 



150 AN INQUIRY INTO TUB 

its vast accumulation of riches depending 
entirely upon the preservation of order, 
and the safety of commercial credit among 
its citizens— such a country must always 
dread a change as the greatest of evils ; 
must prefer the certainty of being indif* 
ferently well, to the chance of being bet- 
ter, coupled with the risk of being worse; 
and of all revolutions must fear those 
the most which may involve it in the cala* 
mities and the uncertainties of domestic 
warfare. An invasion, or a civil war in. 
England, would indeed be dreadful, 
whatever event it might have ; but Hoi* 
land is in all respects less fitted for sustain- 
ing such a shock ; and the Dutch are 1 not 
so dull to their interests or their dangers 
^as some persons formerly alluded to in 
this country ; for no man in the United 
Provinces will be found hardy enough to. 
contemplate an invasion as matter of exult- 
ation, or even of indifference, however 
sure he may be of its leading to the 
emancipation of his country, and however 
zealous' to see her once more independent* 



STATE OF THE NATION. 151 

Much will be borne of real loss, and much 
more of degradation and insult, by every 
Dutch patriot, before he will rashly con- 
sent to hazard the existence of Holland 
in the most promising schemes for her 
liberation. Whatever may be the pros- 
pect of succeeding in such attempts, he 
will judge, and wisely judge, that the 
maintenance of things in their present 
state, is preferable to the certainty of 
their being improved, when that certainty 
must be purchased by the complicated 
evils of a war in the heart of the Re* 
public. It is the nature of commerce to 
dread revolution and war as the Jast of 
dangers ; and the Dutch depend too much 
upon their trade, to put honour or glory 
in competition with it. These considera- 
tions may, in part, account for the cold 
reception which our attempts to free Hol- 
land from the French yoke have hitherto 
met with ; and may explain the reason of 
our being unpopular in a country formerly 
so much attached to us, merely because 
we have endeavoured to save it from op- 



152 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

pression. In truth, however little the 
Dutch may like their French masters, and 
however much they may regret the changes 
of dominion which have altered their alli- 
ances, there is one thing which they must 
always dislike still more strongly than the 
yoke of France itself, and that is the 
struggle which is necessary to shake it off. 
We, who have forced them to undertake 
this struggle, by carrying the war, unin- 
vited, into their territories, and who are 
always suspected of still retaining the same 
intentions, are not treated as real friends 
to their interests ; and though they would 
not hesitate for one moment in preferring 
our dominion to an alliance on equal terms 
with France, were the original choicein their 
power, yet now that the French have sub* 
dued them, they have as little hesitation 
in preferring their present masters to tlioso 
who would annoy them with attempting 
their emancipation. 

But, in truth,xthe accounts of the Dutch 
oppressions are greatly exaggerated. Many 
capitalists have been ruined and forced tQ 



STATE OF THE NATION. 155 

emigrate. Many persons have had their 
wealth diminished, and the whole riches of 
the state are greatly impaired ; but the pro- 
fits which are still drawn upon the remain- 
ing stock are necessarily higher, and this of 
itself tends to alleviate the Burthens of the 
capitalists who are left behind. The French 
have wisely confined their plunder of the 
•state to public exactions; they have not, as 
in Italy, (where the Directory never intend- 
ed to establish a permanent dominion), al- 
lowed the individuals of their armies to pil- 
lage the country at large. Contributions 
have been levied, but not by the conqueror 
from the people. The government have 
been required to furnish so much money, 
or support so many troops, and have 
been left to devise the means of raising 
those supplies, and to enforce their mea-t 
sures in their own way. It need hardly 
be remarked, how much lighter it is for a 
people to pay a very large tribute in this 
regular manner, than to be robbed in a 
disorderly way, of the smallest sum, by 
the licence of individuals. If any proof 



154 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

were required, we might notice the violence 
of the hatred borne towards the French all 
over Italy, contrasted with the moderate 
dislike in which they are held by the Hol- 
landers ; though no one can believe that 
the Italians lost nearly so much by the in- 
vasion of their country, or that the Dutch 
havt? less regard for their property. 

It deserves further to be remarked, that 
the wars with England, in which the revo- 
lution has engaged the Dutch, however in- 
jurious to their commerce, have greatly en- 
riched their colonies by the prodigious in- 
flux of British capital, which has uniformly 
attended their falling into our hands ; and 
among the hranches of the community 
most likely to feel the weight of their sub- 
jection to France, the most important is 
Amsterdam, which, from ancient antipathy 
to the Stadtholder's party, would at all 
times have embraced any alternative for 
the certainty of ruining his power. If 
to all these considerations, we add the utter 
despair with which the Dutch are filled, 
of ever seeing their country re-established 



STATE OF THE NATION. 155 

in its independence, whatever attempts 
they may make for it, so long as Belgium 
is in the hands of France, and their 
conviction that the time is yet far off 
when any change of affairs may reduce 
the French power ; we shall be satisfied 
that they are indeed lamentably deceived, 
who cherish the hope of assistance from 
the Dutch, in driving the French out of 
Holland, or even of maintaining the popu- 
larity and influence of the English name, 
among a people who reflect on our exer- 
tions in their affairs, as on so many in- 
juries to their prosperity. We must, 
therefore, make up our minds to the un- 
comfortable prospect of Holland remain- 
ing intirely and inactively subject to our 
enemy and averse to us, until changes 
shall have been wrought in the face of 
affairs, which it would be idle to guess at, 
and pernicious to reckon upon. 

The fate of Switzerland was by no 
means so unpromising as that of Holland, 
before the last campaign. How completely 
the changes produced by that dreadful 



156 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

contest have given up the Swiss to the do- 
minion of France, has been already de- 
monstrated. The most short-sighted of all 
policy in England, or her allies, would 
now be to think of agitating that unhappy 
country with any further hopes of regain- 
ing its liberties, by new struggles against 
France. Were the Swiss thoroughly united 
together as one man, and resolved to re- 
sist the power of the masters who now sur- 
round them on every side, nothing could 
be expected from their efforts, but new 
scenes of bloodshed, and an intolerable 
augmentation of their burthens. While 
France possesses Savoy and Piedmont, and 
while Swabia and the Tyrol belong to her 
dependants who exist during her plea- 
sure, as by her pleasure they were created; 
all the exertions which the Swiss can 
make, is inadequate to prevent them from 
being overwhelmed, long before any allies 
could break through the strong French 
provinces that surround them, and come 
to their assistance. The Cisalpine, and 
the petty states in Germany, are, if pos« 



STATE OP THE NATION, 157 

sible, still more dependent on France. 
Their disposition to revolt unhappily sig- 
nifies nothing. For a long course of years 
they must submit in silence, however well 
inclined to rebel ; and the worst service 
that the well-wishers of European inde- 
pendence could render them, would be to 
stir up any premature attempt at effecting 
their deliverance. We may rest assured 
then, that the petty states by whom France 
has surrounded herself, as well as the more 
powerful dominions which she has suc- 
ceeded in subduing, are firmly united to 
her fortunes, fome by their weakness, 
others by their disinclination to exert their 
strength in a way which they deem hurtful 
to their interests ; that from Holland to 
Switzerland, and from Switzerland to Tur- 
key, she has covered a frontier almost every 
where strong by nature, with dependent 
nations, whom there is no chance of our 
seeing revolt, and who will always bear the 
first shock of a war waged against her, if 
they do not actively assist in her of- 
fensive operations. What remains for the. 



t§& AN INQUIRY INTO TffE 

rest of Europe to undertake, in its own be«* 
half, may not be very easily discovered % 
but nothing can be more plain than the 
course of policy which should, at the pre- 
sent juncture, be avoided — the vain at- 
tempt to force those subject nations into 
new and ruinous efforts at regaining their 
independence. 

3. If from a view of the dependencies 
of France, we turn to the contemplation 
of that prodigious empire itself, we shall 
find as little to cheer our prospects of the 
future fates of the European common- 
wealth. The resources which she draws 
from Spain, Italy, Germany, and Holland, 
are trivial when compared with the mass 
of real and rapidly increasing power by 
which she has added those states to her do- 
minions. A population of above thirty- 
two millions; a revenue of twenty-five 
millions sterling, in spite of the ruin of her 
commerce, with a diminution of only three 
millions and a half for the interest of debt, 
notwithstanding the wars she has been en- 
gaged in; a regular army of five hundred 



STATE OF THE NATION. 150 

and fifty thousand men, known in almost^ 
every corner of Europe by the rapidity of 
their conquests, and commanded by the 
first generals in the world ; a force not 
less formidable, of men whose skill in ne- 
gociation has completed the victories of 
her troops ; a spirit, the most turbulent 
and restless, the most impatient of peace, 
and fearless of war, animating all ranks of 
her people, and produced, in a great de- 
gree, by the long continued hostility of 
all her neighbours — these form together 
a foundation of military superiority, suffici- 
ent to alarm more powerful states than any 
that yet remain in her neighbourhood. 
But a change has within these few years 
taken place, in the constitution of the 
French nation, still more formidable in its 
natural consequences to the tranquillity 
and prosperity of Europe, than any of those 
well known particulars which we have just 
now enumerated. We allude to the system 
of military conscription, by which their 
forces are now recruited, which has slowly 
grown up with the revolutionary govern* 



lf?0 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

ment, which has of late been carried 
into complete effect all over the coun- 
try, and now forms a part of the esta- 
blishment, likely to mingle itself in a 
short time with all the views and habits 
of the people, and scarcely to occasion 
more inconvenience or discontent, than 
the milder expedients of the militia law 
do in this island. This conscription af- 
fects all ranks of the community ; every 
man in France, with a very few excep- 
tions in favour of certain public functiona- 
ries, is a soldier from the age of twenty 
to twenty-five, not merely by inrolment 
as in Austria and Prussia, but in actual 
service ; whatever be his rank or his for- 
tune, or his pursuits in life, he must give 
up every other view as soon as he reaches 
his twentieth year, and devote his life for 
five years to the profession of arms alone. 
As there are no exemptions, unless in 
cases of former service, a substitute cannot 
be procured under an enormous sum, fre- 
quently so high as 7001. sterling, neves 
lower than 4001. and if more than a very 



STATE OF THE NATION. l6l 

small number required substitutes, it would 
be altogether impossible to procure them : 
so that in fact there are scarce any excep- 
tions to the rule of strict personal ser- 
vice. The rigour of the police established 
all over France renders it quite impossible 
for any one within the specified years to 
escape. In every quarter. the gendarmerie 
have authority to arrest all the young men 
whom they can find, and detain them 
until they can prove themselves to be 
exempt from the conscription. The peo- 
ple are now learning to submit quietly to 
their fate, and with the happy levity of 
their national character, try to make the 
military life agreeable. The pay is ex- 
tremely small ; but the rich and poor all 
live together, and the former contribute to 
improve the common fare. Every one en- 
deavours in the first place to nlake hirn- 
splf master of the military art, in order 
to qualify him for being promoted ; officers 
are chosen from the ranks without any 
regard to birth or fortune; the emula- 
tion and interest of the common soldiers 

M 



K)2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

are kept up by their chance of promotion, 
and by the voice which they are allowed, 
to a certain degree, in the choice of their 
officers. The Imperial guard, which has 
many privileges, and is composed of per- 
sons possessing a certain fortune, consti- 
tutes a species of aristocracy of extensive 
influence in this system. The military 
schools, the only branch of public instruc- 
tion which is much attended to, secure the 
constant supply of the higher branches of 
the science ; and the excellent organiza- 
tion of the Etat-Major General, to which 
the victories of the French arms are per- 
haps more owing than to any other im- 
provement in their military affairs, keeps 
alive during peace the practice of their 
scientific acquirements, while it prepares 
the most valuable collection of practical 
information, so essential to the success of 
warlike operations. Add to this that the 
great offices of the state are all in the 
hands of military men; that honours as well 
as power and wealth are almost confined to 
this favoured order ; and that all places of 
trust, from the command of armies to v the 



STATE OF THE NATION"* l63 

management of negociations, are their pa- 
trimony. 

Thus, we find, that it is no exaggera- 
geration, no metaphorical language to de- 
nominate France a great military empire ; 
to say that the government now calls forth 
the whole resources of the state, and that 
every Frenchman is literally a soldier. 
Nothing like this has ever appeared since 
the early days of the Roman people. The 
feudal militia had not the same regularity, 
the same science and discipline. The in- 
surrection of Hungary, the rising en masse 
of Switzerland and America, were all con- 
fined to particular emergencies. The nati- 
onal guards and first conscriptions of France 
herself, which approach nearer to the new 
order of things, were still far inferior to it in 
systematic arrangement and extent of ope- 
ration ; yet by their aid, imperfect as they 
were in the comparison, she gained all 
that she had conquered previous to the 
last campaign. But her present system is 
in truth, a terrible spectacle. The most nu- 
merous and ingenious people in the world 
have abandoned the arts of peace, not for 
M 2 



I64f AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

their defence, but after having conquered 
all the nations around them. They have 
betaken themselves to the military life as 
their main pursuit, almost their exclusive 
occupation, not from impatience of a 
long continued quiet, but at the end of 
various revolutions and a series of the most 
destructive wars. With a government 
purely military, a stock of science pecu- 
liarly adapted to the same pursuits, and a 
species of wealth not likely to be imme- 
diately ruined by such a change, they have 
established a regular system of discipline, 
which draws every arm into the service of 
the country, and renders the whole sur- 
face of the most compact, extensive, and 
best situated country in Europe, one vast 
camp, swarming with the finest soldiers — 

" Ubi fas versura atque nefas : tot bella per orbem : 
" Tarn multae scelerum facies : non ullus aratro 
" Dignus honos. Squalent abductis arva colonis, 
" Et curva: rigidum falces conflautur in enaem. 
" Uinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania,, bellum: 
"■ Vicirroe ruptis inter se legibus urbes 
" Arma ferunt ; ssevit toto Mars impius orbe. 

x VlRG. GEORG. 



STATE OF THE NATION. 16\5 

4. So formidable being tbe aspect of 
France, both from her federal relations 
and from her own internal resources, let 
us turn our attention towards the situation 
of the powers yet unsubdued by her arms ; 
to Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who, 
though by no means beyond her controul, 
are, however, still in appearance indepen- 
dent. That the resources of Austria are 
naturally most splendid, cannot be denied. 
If her external commerce were more ex- 
tensile, or even the general policy towards 
her provinces more enlightened, she might 
stiH view the strength of FranceVithout 
dismay. The extent and natural fertility 
of the countries already subject to her, 
renders any acquisition of new territory on 
the side of Turkey a vain and unprofitable 
injustice. While she possesses Bohemia, 
Gallicia, and above all Hungary ; while 
those noble kingdoms remain almost in a 
state of nature, and so neglected, made 
her before her late disasters one of the first 
powers in Europe — what folly could be 
so great as to seek for new countries, and 



166 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

persist in neglecting her ancient posses- 
sions? To explain the various measures by 
which she has already, not merely neg^ 
lected, but stunted the growth of her he- 
reditary provinces, would form a volume, 
by no means uninstructive to the political 
economist, who wishes to contemplate 
the errors of statesmen ; or the practical 
politician, who would be warned by the 
example of his predecessors. We shall 
confine ourselves to the statement of a few 
particulars, which may serve to shew in 
how lamentable a situation the resources 
of the Monarchy are, and how vain all 
new exertions against France must prove, 
until time shall have been given for their 
gradual improvement by the adoption 
of a wiser system. 

In some parts of the Monarchy the pea- 
sants are a great deal too much oppressed 
by their landlords; in others they pay too 
small a rent, and the land is in conse- 
quence neglected, Thus in Austria and 
part of Styria, the feudal services were 
Commuted for a certain fixed sum yearly, 



STATE OF THE NATION. \67 

above thirty years ago: it was reckoned too 
small a compensation then, and now it is 
almost a nominal rent. In Hungary, on 
the other hand, the abolition of villenage 
has been legally effected by the famous 
Urbarium of Maria Teresa ; but the lords 
retain in practice, especially in the re- 
moter parts, a most exorbitant power over 
their vassals. — All over the monarchy, ex- 
cept in Hungary, the system of military 
enrolment presses very severely upon the 
people ; every person, not noble, or ex- 
empted by his office, is liable to serve; if 
a person leaves the country and returns at 
any distance of time, he is stopped in his 
passage through it, and sent to the army 
because he had missed his turn of service 
during his absence. When Joseph II. 
wished to encourage settlers in Poland 
from other parts of Europe, he thought he 
gave them a great exemption by promising 
the fathers of families and their eldest 
sons a freedom from military service. — The 
crown not only carries on, upon its own 
account, a great variety of extensive, (it- 



168 AX INQUIRY INTO THE 

is needless to add) ruinous speculations in 
trade and manufactures ; it has also some 
of the most oppressive monopolies, of use- 
ful or necessary articles. In the towns a 
licence must be bought 4.0 sell almost 
every article_of commerce ; and for enter- 
ing a new line of business' a high price 
must be paid. — Except in Styria and Gal- 
licia, salt is every where a Royal mono- 
poly ; and except in Hungary, tobacco is 
strictly subjected t9 the same oppressive 
restriction. The effect of these mono- 
polies on the prosperity of the state, 
and their trifling utility to the reve- 
nue, may be estimated from the price 
to which they raise the articles in 
question, and the amount of net income 
which they yield the crown. The fossil 
salt, which forms nine tenths of the con- 
sumption in Hungary, and is yielded in 
such abundance, that in the neighbour- 
hood of the mines, it costs but twopence 
a hundred weight to the crown, costs in the 
market nearly forty times as much, or 
about six shillings and sixpence. The 
1 



STATE OF THE NATION. 16*9 

yearly consumption of this article in Hun- 
gary exceeds a million of hundred weight; 
yet this oppressive monopoly yields the 
crown no more than 2po,000/. a year. 
The effects of the monopoly of tobacco are 
nearly similar; but we may judge more 
accurately of them by remarking, that in 
Hungary, where it does not exist, the best 
tobacco is sold ten times cheaper than the 
vile tobaccoes of Austria and Bohemia, are 
in those provinces * ; and that when the 
whole profit of the monopoly was farmed, 

* Tobacco, on the Hungarian frontier, is not seized ; 
but the person attempting to bring it into Austria is fined 
above two hundred times the price of it; and the search 
for tobacco is accordingly as strict as for diamonds at the 
mines of the East Indies. Foreign tobacco may be im- 
ported for use on paying 60 per cent, duty, but not for 
sale. All the manufacture and sale, without exception, is 
carried on upon Royal account. The degree in which 
Hungary is oppressed by these strange regulations, may be 
estimated from this, that she only exports annually 70,000!. 
worth of tobacco, all of which goes to the Emperor's ac- 
count. The Austrians use much more of that herb tlian 
the French, and yet the total importation of tobacco into 
France, used, before the revolution, to exceed ten times that 
sum. 



AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

it yielded only 150,000/. — Hungary, in- 
deed, the finest of all the provinces, and 
sufficient, if well managed, to render 
Austria the richest country in Europe, is 
studiously oppressed, because its free con- 
stitution prevents the crown from laying 
on arbitrary imposts, and monopolizing all 
its produce. In revenge, its tobacco is 
prevented from being exported (except on 
royal account) under the severest penal- 
ties. Its excellent wines are oppressed 
with duties, amounting almost to prohi- 
bitions, in order to encourage the undrink- 
able produce of the Austrian vineyards; 
but those duties are exacted even in coun- 
tries where no Austrian wine ever reached, 
as in Croatia. Even the grains which can- 
not bear the expence of carriage to Fiume, if 
brought round through theotherprovinces, 
are loaded with the heaviest duties, and the 
merchant annoyed with regulations still 
more vexatious. To conclude this melan- 
choly picture of impolitic conduct; the 
same jealousy of the people which deliver- 
ed up the Tyrol to the enemy last war* 



STATE OF THE NATION. 171 

prevails with respect to the peasantry of 
Carinthia and Styria, in spite of past ex- 
perience, in spite even of the success which 
attended a just confidence in the people of 
the frontier towards Turkey, who, since 
the earlier times, have been freed from 
vassalage, and embodied as a feudal militia. 
— If, to these examples of the impolicy 
which has weakened Austria, we add her 
perseverance in an inadequate military 
system, always ill devised, but least of all 
calculated to oppose the light troops and 
young officers of France; and the unfortu- 
nate confusion which prevails in her fi- 
nances, partly from bad management of 
the revenue, partly from an excessive issue 
of paper, and the want of any bank beyond 
the controul of government, and partly 
from the signal marks of bad faith which 
have at different times', so late even as 
1805% been given to the public creditor ; 

* The discount of the paper, which formed the only 
currency, was, during peace, from 28 to 32 per cent, and 
during war much greater. The credit of the Government 
suffered extremely from the unfair treatment of the subscri- 
bers to the Franckiort Loan, in January 1805. 



172 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

we shall be prepared to judge, whether any 
hope can yet be placed in the speedy efforts 
of Austria against France — whether the wit 
of man can figure a season more calculated 
for repose, or worse adapted to the smallest 
movement of a warlike nature. 

Having proved beyond dispute that 
Austria, from the natural weakness of her 
resources, independently of her late mis- 
fortunes, is for the present quite incapaci- 
tated from going to war with France ; it 
is not necessary to stop long in order, to 
consider the resources of her neighbours. 
Without her assistance, it is manifeft that, 
no project for the restraint of French en- 
croachments can be one moment enter- 
tained ; and were Russia as powerful as is 
vulgarly supposed, and Prussia as solid 
in her general strength as she appears 
to be strong from her excellent army; 
still it would be the extreme of infatua- 
tion to think of leaguing them in the 
common cause, alone. Yet it may not be 
useless to remark, that the resources of 
both these powers are commonly over- 



STATE OF THg NATIOX. 175 

rated. Russia possesses, indeed, an immense 
empire, if we only view its extent, and 
the absolute numbers of her inhabitants; 
but that something in the situation of 
affairs prevents her from calling forth a 
large proportion of these, is sufficiently- 
proved by the comparatively small armies 
which she. has ever been able to send 
abroad. With the most noble and dis- 
interested inclinations to support the com- 
mon cause, his ImperiarjVlajesty has not 
sent, by any means, such armies into the 
field as the Emperor of Germany, whom 
we are accustomed to think a much less 
powerful ally. There has been, too, a seri- 
ous defect of talents,and chiefly of prudence, 
the best of talents in a.statesman, amo n he 
Russian counsellors. Prussia, it may also 
be remarked, has a scattered territory, 
feebl.e commercial resources, and in some 
parts a discontented population. Her 
Polish provinces, like those of Austria, are 
sources of constant anxiety. Russia alone, 
of the three partitioning powers, has a 
secure hold of her share; and, without 



174 An inquiry ijsto the 

running any risk herself, may at any tinl^ 
create a revolt in either of the other por- 
tions. If this gives her some influence 
over her two neighbours, it also tends to 
alienate them from her friendship, by 
keeping their jealousy always awake. Nor 
can there be a doubt, that Prussia in par- 
ticular, is generally less inclined towards 
Russia than towards France herself. But* 
in truth, the mutual dissensions of these 
three great powers, upon various grounds, 
are of too long standing to leave us any 
hopes, that a cordial union of them all can 
be formed for the defence of Europe, be- 
fore time is given to adopt a conciliatory 
system, and to sink past differences in 
oblivion. At present their disunion forms 
the best security of the enemy. Were 
France, contrary to all present appear- 
ance, to shew symptoms of decline ; were 
her strength to fail suddenly, and her ap- 
proaching dissolution to afford hopes to 
her enemies that the crisis of European 
subjection was arrived; still she might trust 
for safety in those discords which the hand 



STATE OF THE NATION". 175 

of time had not yet healed ; and looking 
at the three powers whose relations and 
resources we have just now been contem- 
plating, the favourite of fortune might 
justly exclaim with the Roman patriot in 
the decline of his country, " Maneat 
" quaso daretque gentibas, si non amor 
66 nostri, at certe odium sui; quando nr- 
" gentibas imperii fatis, nihil jam prtestare 
u fortuna majas potest quam hostium dis- 
" cordiam*" 

5. Having taken a general survey of the 
present state of our enemy, of his allies, 
and of those powers which are upon the 
whole friendly to us ; it may be proper, 
before concluding this branch of the sub- 
ject, to consider the relations of England 
with the few powers which have preserved a 
strict neutrality in the present unfortunate 
contest, more particularly with the United 
States of America — the chief, indeed the 
only considerable nation of this descrip- 
tion. 

* Tacit De Mor, Genr. 



1/6 AX INQUIRY INTO THE 

It is the uniform consequence of a long 
continued war between the principal states 
of Europe, that the nations which take no 
part in the dispute, are employed to carry 
on much of the commerce of the bellige- 
rent countries, with the permission of all 
parties, and that they also engage in 
branches of trade which those belligerents 
wish, if possible, to prohibit. When 
France and England, for example, are at 
war, the custom of privateering, or in ge- 
neral of permitting the vessels of the state 
to capture merchantmen, renders it dan- 
gerous for the English and French traders to 
sail as often as during peace; and much of 
the business which they used to carry on 
must be transferred to the neutral merchants, 
the Danes or Americans. The mere in* 
terruption of direct intercourse between 
the belligerents, imposes the necessity of 
admitting neutrals to the trade which they 
used to carry on together, and to the 
trade which each used to carry on between 
the other, and third parties. The admis- 
sion of neutrals to the former branch of 

commerce, 



STATE OF THE NATION. 177 

commerce, has seldom been objected to, 
except during the heat of national animo- 
sity, and even then the objection was di- 
rected, not against the neutral, but against 
the other belligerent. The admission of 
neutrals to the latter branch of commerce, 
the carrying trade of the one belligerent be- 
tween the other and third parties, has been 
restricted by certain rules, tending to pre- 
vent the neutral from directly assisting the 
belligerent in his hostile operations.. These 
rules have prohibited the neutral from 
dealing with the belligerent, in articles im- 
mediately subservient to military opera- 
tions, or as they have thence been denomi- 
nated contraband of war. In order to en- 
force this law, a right of searching- 
neutral traders at sea has been claimed by 
belligerent powers, and on some remark- 
able occasions, submitted to by the go- 
vernment of the neutral nation. None of 
these points are at present an object of 
discussion. Neither the right of search 
nor the prohibition of contraband, nor the 
power of blockade, have for some time 

N 



178 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

past been called in question. But a branch 
of ordinary commerce has, during the 
course of the present war, passed into the 
hands of neutrals, so important from its 
extent and so unequally beneficial to the 
belligerents, from its being confined chiefly 
to the weaker party, that a disposition 
has appeared in the councils of the stronger 
party to dispute the neutral right. 

In no maritime war before the present 
has it happened, that the superiority of one 
party was so decisive as to deprive the other 
of every chance of keeping the sea. Eng- 
land may generally have had the better, 
her fleets may have gained signal advan- 
tages, and her cruizers or privateers have 
annoyed the enemy's trade. But still 
France was not so crippled as to lose all 
chance of protecting her commerce. She 
was not so completely beset as to view a 
voyage and a capture with the same appre- 
hensions. Accordingly her merchants ran 
the risk, which was not enormous; and 
continued to freight vessels for foreign 
ports, or to bring home their colonial pro- 



STATE OF THE NATION". f'79 

duce, with the chance, but not the cer- 
tainty of their being taken. Some part of 
this commerce fell into the hands of neu- 
tral traders ; some part was carried on frau- 
dulently under the cover of the neutral flag: 
but the risk was not sufficient to make the 
merchant give up the profit of direct traffic 
on his own account, with vessels and crews, 
and flag of his own country, But the un- 
exampled increase of the English marine, 
and the almost total ruin of the French 
navy during the last and present wars, have 
augmented the risk of capture to the 
French trader so greatly, that he can no 
longer undergo it, and must be content to 
give up much of his traffic to neutrals, and 
endeavour to screen the rest by fraudulent 
devices. The unprecedented length of the 
last war, too, and the renewal of hostilities 
after so short an interval of peace, has in- 
creased still further- the inducement, or 
rather the necessity of employing neutral 
nations, in the commerce formei I y k carried 
on by the belligerent alone. For a few 
years of war the privation of certain articles 
N 2 



180 AN INQULRY INTO THE 

of necessity or luxury may be endured ; 
but this becomes at length intolerable, and 
overcomes every restraint which either go- 
vernment or the opposing interests of traders 
can create. Those traders themselves, too, 
when a war has lasted long, gradually shift 
their capital into new channels, and with- 
draw more and more from the hazardous 
speculations, in which, during a short pe- 
riod of hostility, they might be contented 
or compelled to continue. The lines of 
employment which they thus leave, be- 
come, in consequence, open to neutrals, 
who now carry on the various branches of 
foreign trade, from which they were for- 
merly excluded. Thus it has happened 
from the combined effects of our astonishing 
naval superiority, and the unprecedented 
length of the war, that almost all the fo 
reign commerce of France, and a large 
proportion even of the coasting trade, have 
fallen into the hands of neutral nations, 
and particularly of the Americans, who 
have the greatest facilities of maritime car- 
riage, and the most rising commercial sys- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 181 

»■ 

tern. Among other branches of the French 
commerce now engrossed by American 
traders, with the permission of both go- 
vernments, is that of the colonies. As 
this trade, during peace, was subject to 
the strict rules of the Navigation Law, 
common, to all the maritime powers of 
Europe, a peculiar objection has been taken 
to its being suddenly laid open by the 
enemy to neutrals during war, for the evi- 
dent purpose of screening it from our just 
hostility. And this interference of the 
Americans, in order to assist such a scheme, 
has been supposed inconsistent with the 
relations of neutrality which their nation 
professes to maintain. 

It is in vain, the supporters of the belli- 
gerent rights contend, that England con- 
quers the French marine, nay, reduces it 
almost to annihilation. Her ships of war 
may be captured, but the commerce of 
France is safe. She may declare war when 
she pleases ; and without a ship that can 
make head to our weakest cruizer, she 
has a sure method of at once protecting 
N 3 



182 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

her whole trade, more certainly than if 
she had the entire command of the seas. 
She has but to suspend her Navigation Law, 
to admit the Americans into her colonial 
and coasting trade, and to fit out no vessel 
for sea under French colours. The English 
cruizers may domineer over the seas, and 
yet they are unable to touch a ton of her 
trade. She has millions floating on the 
vessels of neutral nations, which no enemy 
can reach. She reaps the whole benefits 
of commerce and of colonies without the 
risks of capture or detention. She may fit 
out nothing but privateers or cruizers to at- 
tack our trade, and distress our colonies, 
while her own are beyond the efforts of our 
armed vessels. She unites the whole bene- 
fits of war with all the security of peace. 
The rule, it is contended, which should 
guide us in this question, as the fairest 
measure of justice to all parties, is, that 
neutrals can only take part during war, in 
such branches of commerce as the domestic 
regulations of the belligerent allowed them 
to partake in during peace. This doctrine 



STATE OF THE NATION". 183 

was recognised, we are told, in the war of 
1756% and has never since been disputed, 
though England has frequently departed 
from its rigour by voluntary concessions. 
Its policy is as obvious as its justice, say 
the enemies of the neutral claims. Were 
the present principle of unlimited neutral 
trade to be recognized, England might 
give over every pretension to naval power, 
abandon (he hope of curbing French com- 
merce, and despair at once of gaining any 
thing by a continuance even of the justest 
war. Should the support of our maritime 
rights lead to a rupture with the neutrals, 
which, however, is said to be most im- 
probable, we can lose little by such an ad- 
dition to the number of our enemies, in 
comparison of the vast detriment which 
we now sustain, from those neutrals tying 
up our hands against all the enemies we 
have to contend with. Better, say they, 
have America as well as France hos- 
tile, and exposed to our fair attacks, than 
France openly hostile, and America covert- 
ly protecting her from every effort of our 
N 4 



184 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

enmity. This will give us a chance of 
speedily terminating the war, or at least 
secure the opportunity of rendering it both 
safe and lucrative. 

Such is the main body of the argu- 
ment, in favour of the justice as well 
as the policy of our reviving the rule 
of the war 1756". The chief point at issue 
is the application of that rule to the colo- 
nial trade of the enemy; and, without at 
all entering into the question of right, we 
shall pro.ceed to oiTer a few simple consi- 
derations, which may tend to shew that 
the view of the case, in point of policy, 
taken by the supporters of the above doc- 
trine, is by no means a correct one, and 
that the importance of the whole matter 
at issue in the dispute has been enormously 
exaggerated. The following observations 
proceed upon the further admission, that 
the facts stated by the advocates of belli- 
gerent rights are accurately given, and 
also that wherever a neutral flag is as- 
sumed as a cover to the ship and cargo 
of a belligerent power, so evident a fraud 
is excepted from the argument. The points 



STATE OF THE NATION. 185 

to be maintained are, that, whatever right 
England may have to prevent the interfe- 
rence of America in the French colonial 
trade during war, no material advantage 
could be gained from the enforcement of 
such a prohibition ; that the real difference 
between the former and the present method 
of carrying French colonial produce, and 
supplying the French colonies, is extreme- 
ly trifling in its ultimate consequences; 
and that other reasons of a very positive 
nature enjoin a departure from such 
claims in the present situation of affairs. 

To prevent a supply of colonial pro- 
duce from reaching France, if not direct- 
ly, at least by a roundabout importation, 
exceeds the power of the British navy, 
numerous and victorious as it is. Unless 
we can surround every port of the French 
coast with ships, and the land frontiers 
also with troops ; and unless we are still 
further resolved to prohibit neutral na- 
tions from trading with France in their 
own merchandize, or in merchandize of 
our colonies, the French people must 

2 



185 



AN INQUIRY INTO TUB 



continue to be supplied with sugar and 
coffee, whether we are at war with them 
or not. If we prevent those articles from 
being carried directly to France from her 
colonies, a small increase of the price will 
enable neutrals to import them into their 
own countries, and then re-export them to 
France. If we maintain that the mere 
importation and re-exportation, though 
accompanied with re-landing of cargoes 
and payment of duties, is still a collusive 
transaction, and must be prohibited, as a 
continuation of the original voyage; then 
a further increase of price enables the 
same produce to reach France in different 
vessels, while the vessels that imported 
it take other freights. We in fact only 
oblige the neutrals to have two sets of 
vessels, ,one employed between the French 
colonies and America, the other between 
America and France. The total gain of 
England upon these prohibitory opera- 
tions, is the causing Frenchmen to drink 
their coffee some sous a pound dearer, 
which is a most pitiful advantage to us ; 



STATE OF THE NATION. 



187 



and creating inconvenience to America, 
which is no advantage at all. 

But suppose we go a step further, and 
prevent the Americans from exporting the 
French colony produce at all, upon the 
plea that this trade was not open to them 
during peace; let us consider what con- 
sequences will follow. One of three things 
must happen if such a prohibition is 
rigorously enforced ; either the French 
will be compelled to carry their produce 
in their own ships — or the English will be 
allowed to purchase it, and then sell it 
to neutrals in Europe, who will carry it 
to France — or the produce will be con*" 
demned to remain in the colonies. If the 
French venture at first to freight their 
own vessels with the produce, the British 
cruizers will infallibly take them, or at 
least the risk of capture, which made the 
French throw open this traffic to neutrals, 
will continue to be so enormous, that 
neither the planter nor the merchantcan af- 
ford it. This expedient will therefore speedi- 
ly be abandoned. If the English traders arc 



1B8 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

allowed to purchase and carry the pro- 
duce, it may be remarked, that such a 
proceeding, such an intercourse with the 
enemy, would be contrary to all the ge- 
neral rules of war, and would be a com- 
promise of our character for the gain of 
the trade. But, after all, what great na- 
tional end would be gained by such a com- 
merce ? The French would pay somewhat 
higher for the produce than if neutrals 
carried it ; and a few English merchants 
would gain a certain commission upon the 
sale of it. The capital required to carry 
on this new and suddenly created branch 
*bf trade, would leave other branches in 
which it had formerly been employed ; 
and those branches would be filled by the 
capital of neutral nations. At a peace, a 
new change would be necessary, the ca- 
pital must partly shift back again, and must 
in part be thrown out of employment al- 
together. Such changes are rather upon 
the whole hurtful than beneficial in a 
general view. Lastly, if the produce of 
the French colonies is prevented from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 189 

being exported, it must rot there, and 
the colonies must be ruined ; the supplies 
of provisions must fail ; the work of the 
plantations be suspended ; the Negroes 
revolt, and the whole be involved in ruin. 
Besides the cruelty of such a plan, besides 
its total repugnance to the practice of 
civilized warfare, which never attacks pri- 
vate property except at sea ; the evils of 
this system would be shared by ourselves, 
not only from the loss of customers, which 
we should feel when so much wealth and 
industry was destroyed in the country of 
our nearest neighbours, but also from the 
incalculable dangers of having scenes of 
rebellion and confusion in the immediate* 
vicinity of our finest colonies. The plan 
therefore of preventing all exportation of 
French colonial produce, though the only 
consistent one in those who attack neutral 
rights, and the point to which all their sup- 
port of the rule of the war 1756 neces- 
sarily leads them, is clearly objectionable 
on the most established principles, both of 
policy and justice. 



190 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

There is, moreover, a very essential dis- 
tinction to be made, between the ordinary 
branches of trade and that commerce which 
is employed in transporting the produce of 
the colonies to the mother country ; which 
is rather the remittance of their rents to 
the great body of non-resident proprietors, 
than the exchange of colonial for European 
commodities. If Guadaloupe or Cuba were 
countries unconnected with France and 
Spain, except by the intercourse of traffic; 
if no further relation subsisted between 
them, than that the Weft Indian territories 
produced commodities, which the European 
nations required, and must either purchase 
directly, or procure by a roundabout com- 
merce — then it might be of some import- 
ance, according to the views with which 
marLime war is now carried on, for Eng- 
land to harass this branch of Spanish and 
French trade, and to profit by taking it 
into her own hands. The people of Cuba 
and Guadaloupe would then be paid for 
their produce by English merchants, and 
France and Spain would be obliged to 
buy them circuitously from England. But 



STATE OF THE NATION. 19 * 

tli is is by no means the nature of the navi- 
gation between those islands and Europe. 
The proprietors of the colonies reside al- 
most entirely in the mother countries. 
The carriage of West Indian produce, is 
not on account of merchants, who are to 
sell it again after having bought it in the 
colony, but on account of absent land- 
holders, who have no other way of re- 
ceiving their rents but by having the pro- 
duce of their estates brought over to them, 
They live not at their farm, but at the 
market ; and their income is transmitted 
in goods, which they there dispose of. 

Now by intercepting this communica- 
tion, what would England effect ? She can- 
not intend to stop it altogether, to prevent 
the colonial agents from sending any of 
their revenue to the proprietors, or to in- 
tercept it on the way. This would be a 
kind of warfare quite contrary to the spi- 
rit of modern customs ; it would be more 
hurtful to individuals than the entire cap* 
ture of the colonies where their estates lie, 

for in that cv Ihe conquerors never in- 

• ar. 
Icrfere with private property, and only 



I#2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

carry the rents of the planter round for 
them by a channel somewhat more circuit- 
ous. England, then, by interfering in the 
remittance of those rents, without capturing 
the enemy's colonies, can only mean to 
trace with the planters, to purchase the 
produce, and bring it home, where it will 
be sold again, and reach at last the con- 
sumer in the enemy's country, while the 
agents of the proprietors remit their rents, 
not in kind, but in money or bills. The 
same effect will be produced, if, instead 
of buying the produce, we only cause it to 
be consigned to English merchants, who, 
for a certain commission, sell it, and ac- 
count to the planter or his agents. In 
either case, the colonial proprietor loses 
absolutely nothing. His produce is carried 
by English, instead of French or American 
merchants ; the freight cannot be much 
greater ; the commission will probably be 
less ; he is paid by bills upon London or 
Liverpool, instead of Bourdeaux or Nantes, 
or New York ; and a few mercantile houses 
in England gain a profit tfj L i the consign- 
ment instead of the same number of French 



STATE OF THE NATION. 193 

Or American houses. Surely it is neither 
for the gains of these individuals, nor for 
the sake of effecting such a change as this 
upon the wealth of French colonial pro- 
prietors, that we are to insist on the exclu- 
sion of neutrals from the colony trade of 
our enemies. We injure the enemy suf- 
ficiently by forcing those neutrals to carry 
the produce found by their own ports, in- 
stead of allowing it to be transported di- 
rectly from the colony to the mother coun- 
try, as during peace. This may raise the 
price of the goods to the consumer in the 
enemy's country; to the planter* who is 
most interested in the traffic, we can do 
no injury whatever, unless we can take 
the colonies where his estate lies, and then 
choose to violate the rights of individual 
proprietors ; or until we discover a method 
of compelling people to ship cargoes in 
vessels which are absolutely certain of being 
captured. 

If we can only look calmly at the whole 
bearings of this question, we shall discover 
that the advantages which the enemy de- 

o 



194 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

rives from the assistance of neutrals in car- 
rying on his colonial remittances, and all 
the other branches of his distant commerce, 
are by no means unmixed with serious in- 
juries to his prosperity, and that the neu- 
tral flag can by no means cover him from 
the effects of our maritime superiority. 

In theirs/ place, the superiority of our 
navy, which forces him as soon as a war 
breaks out, to employ neutrals in almost 
every branch of his commerce, has the 
obvious effect of creating a great shock to 
his mercantile affairs. Nothing is more to 
be dreaded in a trading country, than such 
sudden and extensive changes as this. 
Scarcely a merchant in France but must 
feel the consequences of our instantly 
transferring all the navigation of the coun- 
try to the hands of neutrals, and compel- 
ling its foreign imports and exports to be 
entirely carried on circuitously, instead of 
directly. What should we not expect in 
this country, if, by the sudden occurrence 
ot any event, our whole foreign, and part 
of our coasting trade were thus new mo- 
delled, and, if by the occurrence of an- 



STATE OF THE NATION. 195 

other event a few years afterwards, it were 
as suddenly to be drawn back to its former 
state ? We should undoubtedly tremble 
for the whole mass of our commercial esta- 
blishment; and if France were as mercan- 
tile a country as England, she too would 
be nearly ruined by so violent a succession 
of changes. 

In the second place, the total suspension 
of the enemy's navigation is an injury of 
the greatest moment to his general power. 
It is precisely the sort of injury most de- 
sirable to our own interests, and the natu- 
ral consequence of our naval superiority. 
While neutral ships and seamen alone are 
employed in carrying on the commerce of 
France, her only nursery of maritime 
power is destroyed ; she loses her whole 
chance of gaining a navy ; she can neither 
procure a stock of merchant vessels nor 
breed a race of seamen to man her ships 
of war. We are told indeed, that theexclu - 
sion of her seamen from trade, gives her a 
great command of recruits for her vessels 
of war ; but is this any thing more than a 
mere temporary supply ? When the Eng- 

o2 



196 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

lish navy has taken or destroyed the crews 
thus procured, or when, in a few years, 
they have died out, whence are their places 
to be supplied ? The trade of France must 
revive, it must be re-established for some 
years, before her navy can be placed 
on the footing which it had when the 
neutrals began to lend her their assistance, 
by engrossing her foreign commerce. The 
ruin of all her hopes of ever acquiring ma- 
ritime strength is as effectually secured by 
our naval superiority driving her trade into 
neutral hands, as it could be by our pre- 
venting her from trading at all. And let 
it be remembered that this is all the injury 
which it is our interest to make hor feel 
from the war. The destruction of an 
enemy's trade is not to be desired, in order 
to annihilate his national wealth. By the 
individual prosperity of his subjects we 
ourselves gain ; by their progress in riches 
we improve our own; and though his pub- 
lic revenue may be augmented by the 
increase of his public wealth, we must ne- 
cessarily augment our own revenue by the 
increase which our wealth receives from 



STATE OF THE NATION. 197 

his. It is the " terra potens arrriis" that 
we have to dread, not the " ubere gleba** 
It is his progress in arms, not in arts, 
that is formidable ; and there cannot be a 
doubt that an expedient which renders 
him richer and weaker — which augments 
the opulence of his people, and makes 
them harmless to their neighbours — which 
preserves their trade, but stunts the growth 
of their navy — is of all others the contrive 
ance best suited to our interests. The 
surrender of the French commerce to the 
neutral nations, is this expedient. It pre- 
serves whatever of that commerce is bene- 
ficial to England, and destroys whatever 
might injure us; it gives us all the ad- 
vantages of a rich neighbour, and all, the 
security of a weak one. This is the re- 
ward of our unexampled naval superiority; 
it is the glorious fruit of our numerous 
victories ; it is a benefit which provides of 
itself the means of retaining it ; it is a 
prize which we shall assuredly lose, as 
soon as we surrender by our impolicy 
the commercial greatness that makes us 



* 



198 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

powerful at sea. We may prevent it from 
passing into the hands of France, indeed ; 
but some other nation must take it from 
us, if we sacrifice our real prosperity to a 
foolish jealousy of the good as well as the 
bad ; a shortsighted desire of annihilat- 
ing the advantageous with the dangerous 
branches of our rival's commerce. 

But, lastly, the operation of our marw 
time power upon the naval affairs of the 
enemy, besides destroying that part of his 
system which alone it is our interest to 
injure, confers important benefits upon 
those whom it is our interest to assist. Not 
only does the ruin of the French navy, 
by the neutral interference, produce the 
greatest injury to the government of 
France, with which alone we ought to be 
at war, without ruining the unoffending 
and peaceable inhabitants, whom we should 
have no spite against ; but it transfers a 
large portion of commercial wealth, and a 
capacity of acquiring maritime power, to 
nations naturally allied to us, by blood, by 
the relations of political interest, and by 
3 



STATE OF THE NATION. 199 

the intercourse of trade. The Americans, 
in particular, with vvhom our most ex- 
tensive and lucrative traffic is carried on, 
and whose friendship in a political view 
we ought to court, as the only respectable 
s,tate beyond the influence of our enemy, 
are gainers by the commerce in question, 
to an astonishing degree, both as a 
mercantile and military people. How 
much their commercial gains are our 
gains, need scarcely be pointed out ; 
neither need we shew how greatly it is 
for the advantage of England, and of the 
world in general, that what the French 
power loses should pass into the hands of 
a state where no undue bias, either to- 
wards schemes of ambition, or measures 
of submission to the common enemy, has 
ever been shewn — a state where so many 
circumstances concur to establish the in- 
fluence of English principles and con- 
nexions ; where the other powers of the 
continent, without having any ground for 
alarm, may always expect to find assist- 
ance, as soon as its means are commensu- 
rate with its inclinations. 



WO AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

It is in vain, then, to represent the 
neutral trade as a complete security to our 
enemies, against the effects of our mari-« 
time superiority. The injuries which it is 
our interest to inflict upon France, are in 
no wise diminished by the interference of 
America in her commerce. The French- 
navy is destroyed by ours, and the chance 
of restoring it may be considered as at an 
end, during the war. The revenue of France, 
in so far as it depends upon colonial pro- 
duce, we might wish to cut off, but we 
cannot ; for so long as the French people 
have a taste for that produce, and money 
to pay for it, they will buy it : it will enter 
France, and pay duties to the government. 
The commercial prosperity of France we 
have no interest to destroy; but if we had, 
we could not, and the transference of the 
trade to neutral carriers, must always pro- 
tect it in one way or another, when a long 
war, and a total ruin of their naval force/ 
compels the French to embrace this last 
alternative, as the only chance that is left 
of importing and exporting commodities,, 



STATE OF THE NATJON. 201 

A further ground of objection to the 
Americans has been urged with consider- 
able popular effect. Their merchantmen, 
it seems, are now manned, in a great de- 
gree, by deserters from the British navy. 
While the emigration of seamen into their 
service prevents England from putting her 
ships of war in, commission, the Americans 
are ready to establish a formidable marine 
upon the ruins of ours, for the maintenance 
of their disputed claims. — It happens*how- 
ever, to be the necessary consequence of 
our situation, that such an emigration 
should take place. The similarity of lan- 
guage and manners, which determines the 
ordinary course of emigration towards Ame- 
rica from this country, has a similar effect 
upon the emigration of our seamen. The 
higher wages too, of the American service* ^ 
and still more, the total freedom from 
pressgangs, which it enjoys, cannot fail to 
attract a great number of men from our 
merchant vessels during a war. But how 
can this possibly be prevented ? No re- 
gulation of the government can alter the 



202 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

manners of America, nor make our mer- 
chants raise their wages, in order to retain 
subjects for the impress service. Nor do 
we seem willing to abolish that mode of 
supplying our navy, which would pro- 
bably, if coupled with a rise of wages, have 
the desired effect. 

It is said, however, that we may 
insist upon a right of searching all Ame- 
rican vessels at sea, and impressing the 
British seamen found in them. Do we 
mean, then, ta deny to our sailors alone, 
of all classes of the people, a right to leave 
the country, and seek employment in the 
territories of friendly powers ? It is hurt- 
ful to the commerce of the country, that 
artisans should go to America and Russia, 
and we have various laws on our statute 
book, the fruits of a mistaken policy, 
framed with a view of preventing such an 
emigration. But no one can propose, 
at the present day, to extend such pro- 
hibitions, and still less was it ever in 
contemplation to reclaim the artisans 
who had actually gone away and settled 
in foreign countries. A sailor working 



STATE OF THE NATION. 203 

in an American ship, is only in the 
predicament of a farmer cultivating an 
American plantation ; and the search 
of the ship for the purpose of seizing the 
sailor, would be an act of as violent ag- 
gression, as the search of the country for 
the seizure of the farmer. The only diffe- 
rence between the cases, is, that we hap- 
pen to have the power in the former, and 
not in the latter. 

But by going to war with America, 
we may prevent the further emigra- 
tion of our seamen, and acquire a right 
to reclaim those who are already gone. 
By turning all our vessels into armed 
cruizers too, and engaging in an universal 
piracy, we might still further enrich our- 
selves. We have the first navy and bravest 
people in the world. We may take the 
sea, as France has seized upon the land ; 
and thus find our profit in preferring war 
with the whole world, to peace with a 
single nation, which has rights and advan- 
tages repugnant to our supposed interests. 
- — After all, however, laying justice out of 
the question, is it our real interest to 



204 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

quarrel with the only power which remains 
unhurt by French influence, to lose our 
intercourse with the nation best calculated 
for our commercial relations. At this mo- 
ment, France and America seem of them- 
selves disposed to a rupture; and possibly, 
before' this time, war is declared by the 
United States against Spain. Ought we 
not to think well both of the consequences 
of the contest, and of the value of the 
matter in dispute, before we abandon so 
fair an opportunity of adding America to 
the number of our allies, and of establish- 
ing our influence there, upon the only du- 
rable foundation of alliances, mutual sa- 
crifices, and mutual benefits ? The trivial 
importance of all that could be gained by 
excluding the neutral traders from the ene- 
my's commerce, has already been shewn. 
No words are required to prove, that the 
blanks occasioned by some sailors leaving 
our service will speedily be filled up ; that 
the number of British seamen at the end of 
a given period will be greater, in conse- 
quence of our breeding for the American 
nivy, just as the number of our people is 



STATE OF THE NAtlOtf. 205 

on the whole augmented by the demand 
for men, which our colonies .create. 
We may feel some inconvenience in the 
mean time, from the progress of the ene- 
my's commerce, and the desertion of our 
seamen to neutral powers. But our gene* 
ral policy can never surely be modelled 
according to such temporary considerations. 
The evils or difficulties in question, are the 
necessary consequences of the long war in 
which we have been engaged. They are 
part of that succession which the new ad- 
ministration have fallen heirs to — a suc- 
cession made up of all the dangers and dif- 
ficulties, which a long course of misma- 
nagement and misfortune has accumulated 
upon the country. 



We have now taken a general survey of 

the relations of England with foreign 

powers, and have viewed in detail the 

hopelessness of her situation, if she still 

c 2 



£06 AS INQUIRY INTO THE 

persists in building upon the chance of an 
immediate resistance to the influence of 
France^ Very few words are required, to 
deduce from the investigation which has 
just been closed, the lessons of political 
conduct pointed out by the experience of 
the past, and by the actual state of affairs. 
That the high, unbending, unaccommo- 
dating tone, which we have been accus- 
tomed to hold all over the world, and 
which the personal behaviour of our foreign 
ministers has generally rendered still more 
unpalatable, is in the extreme foolish at 
all times, and particularly unfit for the 
present aspect of things, needs not be 
proved by a single argument, or illustrated 
by one example. Nor is it less obvious, 
that the feelings and the language of con- 
ciliation, of moderate views, of calm and 
temperate dignity to our enemies, of 
friendly sincerity and frankness to our 
allies, are the feelings and the language 
most subservient at all times to our highest 
interests; most consistent with our true 
honour; and most agreeable to the situation 



STATE OF THE NATION. 207 

in which the affairs of Europe, as well as 
of England, are placed in the present 
crisis. 

The whole concerns of this great and 
invincible people are now committed to 
the care of an administration which unites 
the largest portion of talents, experience, 
rank, and integrity ; the most ample share 
of all the qualities, whether natural or 
acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which 
ever enabled a government to secure influ- 
ence with its subjects, and command respect 
among foreign nations. The ministers have 
taken upon themselves the management of 
public affairs, at a juncture of unprece- 
dented difficulty and peril. For all the 
errors of their predecessors, in peace and 
in war, at home and abroad, they have 
become in some sort responsible. The na- 
tural consequences of those errors must be 
warded off by their efforts. No compro- 
mise of principles, no paltry, half mea- 
sures, no incongruous mixture of big words 
and little doings, will bear them out in 
redeeming their pledge to save the coun- 



208 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

try. The world will judge fairly, how- 
ever, of their conduct, while it scrutinizes 
their measures strictly. Miracles will not 
be expected from them ; and in all the 
departments of our national concerns, the 
magnitude of the losses which have al- 
ready been sustained — the extent of the 
dangers which at present surround us, 
from no fault of theirs, will be justly taken 
into the estimate of their attempts to bet- 
ter our condition. 

There are, it is true, some reforms ill 
our practical policy which the inquiry now 
concluded, has plainly dictated, and which 
will peremptorily be expected from the 
new administration. We may expect that 
the important branch of our intercourse 
with foreign nations will be entrusted to 
men of talents and acquirements, adapted 
to so weighty and difficult a department 
of affairs ; that we shall now see extended 
to those situations of high trust upon 
which depend the alliances, nay, the 
questions of peace and war with our neigh- 
bours, the same enlightened principle of 



STATE OF THE NAT I OX. 209 

preference for real merit and tried inte- 
grity, that has presided over the formation 
of the new ministry in all its other 
branches. — A careful review of our cold- 
nial affairs forms another fair subject of 
expectation at the present crisis. Nothing 
can be more gratifying than the beginnings 
which have already been made, towards 
the attainment of security for our esta- 
blishments in the West Indies; a security 
which can only be attained, by the utter 
destruction of the grand evil that hourly 
endangers our existence in those rich set- 
tlements, and the gradual relaxation of 
the prohibitory system, that has produced 
of late so many serious inconveniences.— 
The "state of affairs in the East is no less 
delicate and urgent. By an unhappy de- 
parture from the only system of manage* 
ment which can give us a chance of secu* 
rity, amidst the rivals of our power, and the 
ljatural enemies of our enormous empire 
in those distant countries, we have arrived 
at a point where it is difficult to determine 
whether the pursuit of the path before us, 
p 



1210 AX INQUIRY INTO THE 

or the retracing of our steps, be attended 
with the greatest perils. Our measures, 
unfortunately successful at first, have now 
produced their natural effects; and even 
the external circumstance of military 
triumph has begun to forsake us ; while 
the whole consequences of our impolicy, 
in the ruin of our Indian finances, the ex- 
tension of our untenable conquests, the 
union of our implacable enemies, hitherto 
happily for us divided among themselves, 
have been exhibited by symptoms too 
plain to be mistaken. The details of these 
questions belong to another branch of this 
Inquiry. The subject is only alluded to 
here, as an additional presumption in fa- 
vour of the moderate and pacific system, 
which every other view of our present 
situation concurs to recommend. — Neither 
is this the opportunity for discussing the 
various questions of domestic policy, which 
now press upon the attention of govern- 
ment. Yet, when by the most general 
survey of our situation in this department, 
we discover such radical defects in our 
7 



STATE OF THE NATION. S>!1 

military system as were formerly hinted 
at, we may deduce a new argument in 
favour of the reforms which the country 
has a right to expect; the improvement of 
our military economy confessedly inade- 
quate to the emergency ; and the adop- 
tion of such moderate councils, as may 
give the requisite time for carrying that 
improvement into effect. — The state of our 
finances, the hurthens to which the peo- 
ple have long been exposed, the accumu- 
lation of our debts, lead to the same con- 
clusion. — Moderate councils are still more 
strongly recommended by the situation of 
Ireland ; the difficulty of adopting at pre- 
sent the gre^t measure so desirable for the 
prosperity of that valuable dominion ; and 
the propriety of taking all the steps short 
of complete emancipation, which may as- 
similate the catholics with the rest of the 
people. An interval of peace would, in- 
deed, be invaluable for that important 
branch of our empire ; nor can a doubt be 
entertained that it would be improved in 
the way best adapted to restore real con* 
p 2 



212 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

tentmentand substantial obedience by the 
confidence and kind treatment which can 
alone establish solid authority — " 7W- 
" umpho multo clarius est, senalum judkare, 
" potius mansuetudine el innocentid- impe- 
" ratoris, provinciam, quam vi militum aut 
" benignitate deorum retentam atque con- 
" servatam esse."* 

. It is, indeed, abundantly clear, that the 
state of our affairs, domestic as well as fo- 
reign, enjoins a strict regard to the conci- 
liatory system in general, and prepares us 
more especially to expect in such a peace as 
may be consistent with our real honour, 
the highest advantages both to our own in- 
terests and those of Europe at large. With 
regard to the continent it has already been 
demonstrated, that nothing but mischief 
can possibly accrue from a renewal of the 
late unhappy war. What then is likely to 
result from things remaining in their pre- 
sent unsettled state ? Will the enemy, so 
long as we refuse to give him peace, so 
long as we prevent our allies from treat- 

* Catonis Epist. apud Cic. Ep. lib. xv, 



STATE OF THK NATION, 213 

ing, so long as wc do not use our influence 
to bring about a negotiation— will he ab- 
stain from reaping the thousand advan- 
tages of his present situation ? Will he 
submit to all the evils of warfare and forego 
all its gains? Will he unite in his plan all 
the losses of war and all the constraints 
of peace ? This would be too close an imi- 
tation of our own conduct with regard to 
Spain. Unhappily we cannot expect to 
be imitated in our European tactics. Our 
East Indian policy will suit him better. 
He will go on conquering such of our allies 
as continue hostile ; uniting with those 
whom he may intimidate, or allure to share 
in the plunder of the rest ; stretching his 
creations of kings over the North of Ger- 
many ; aggrandizing those whom he has 
made in the South ; extending his domi- 
nion in Italy over the islands, and from 
Italy striding onwards to the East. 

*' Jam tenet Italiam;tamen ultra pergere tendit 

Actum, inqu&j nihil est."* 

To all this prospect of loss, from a sense- 
less prolongation of a war which has un- 

* Juven. 



<c 



214 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

fortunately reached its natural conclusion, 
the enemies of peace can only oppose 
certain vague, indefinite fears, of the dan- 
gers with which they conceive a peace to 
be pregnant. First they imagine that 
good or even fair terms cannot be ex- 
pected ; then they think the enemy will 
not be sincere; next, they dread his 
taking the opportunity of recruiting his 
resources, and especially of restoring his 
navy; lastly, they expect that he will 
take us by surprize, and attack us when 
he is sure to succeed. In all these 
apprehensions, however, there is a great 
deal of misconception, and no small incon- 
sistency. As to the terms, we must first 
see what he offers. It is indeed very evident, 
that vve cannot expect such favourable 
conditions for the Continent, as if we had 
not plunged it into the late war, and occa- 
sioned the ruin of Austria, the conquest of 
Naples, and the aggrandisement of France 
and her dependencies. We cannot hope 
such terms as the present Administration 
would have gained, had it been formed 
two years ago. But it is equally clear, 



STATE OF THE NATION. %\5 

that if the enemy finds his advantage 
iii peace (and if he does not, we need 
neither expect it nor desire it) and if he 
estimates, as he must, the high spirit and 
unconquerable valour of this country, he 
will make no proposals which can disho- 
nour us. He will even tempt us to over- 
come our repugnance towards him, and 
our contempt of his new authority, by 
some favourable concessions. — Then, with 
regard to his sincerity, we may safely con- 
clude that the same motive which leads 
hi m 'to think of making a peace, will in- 
duce him to keep it — the motive of inte- 
rest — for what can he gain by a transient 
peace, except the paltry cession of a few 
islands, which we shall always be able to 
retake, with the troops and shipping hemay 
send thither, so long as our marine is supe- 
rior to his« — Next, as to his recruiting his 
resources, and particularly his navy, this he 
most undoubtedly will attempt to do. We 
must lay our account with it. We mean 
to recruit our own army, and he must lay 
his account with that. But does it follow, 



216 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

that he will be able to acquire a navy equal 
to ours during the peace ? Where are his 
seamen ? Where are his officers and pilots ? 
W^here are his Nelsons? Should the peace 
last for ten years, which is unfortunately a 
high estimate, how much would England 
gain in her commerce, her finances, her 
colonial and domestic economy, her mili- 
tary system, her foreign policy ! And 
France, too, would gain somewhat in se- 
veral of these particulars. Her trade would 
increase, and she would acquire colonial 
establishments. Would not this make her 
much less warlike? Would it not be utterly 
incompatible with the military conscrip- 
tion, the most formidable feature in her 
present aspect? Would it not render her 
less military in peace, and more averse to 
war, the greatest of evils to a mercantile 
and colonial nation ? But could her navy 
in ten, or even twenty years of peace 
possibly grow up so as to match our own ? 
Should we not at the end of such a happy 
period, enter upon the war with our com- 
merce augmented, our finances cleared 



STATE OT THE NATION. %17 

from debt, our wealth more able to supply* 
our necessities, our navy more numerous? 
And would not this be the very same thing 
with beginning a new series of brilliant 
victories over the navy of our enemies ? 
Besides, with the restoration of our conti- 
nental relations and the improvement of 
our army, might we not fairly expect 
even success on shore, as well as at sea ? 
Why is not France averse to peace from, 
her fears of our commerce increasing, 
and our army being established on a new 
system ? Why then should we, who are as 
courageous as herself, dread the progress 
of her trade and the re-establishment of 
her marine ? But to all such fears one 
answer may be given— they prove too 
much — they prove that peace can never 
be made, if they dissuade us from making 
it now ; they have no application to this 
particular time, they are apprehensions of 
all times, and they go to involve the world 
in one eternal war*. 

* Though no authority is requisite to prove that the po- 
sition if absurd which leads to such a conclusion, it may b; 



£18 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 

Let us hope that the wise men, who are 
now happily placed at the head of the 
state, will judge better, as they see more 
clearly than such desponding and narrow 
views permit the multitude to do; that 
they will justly estimate the sum of af- 
fairs, nor timidly shut their eyes to the 
misfortunes in which they have found the 
country ; that with all their efforts to 
carry on a vigorous war, they will keep in 
mind how peculiarly the great end of all 
warfare is desirable at the present crisis, 
for our allies as well as for ourselves ; that, 
without abandoning one point which the 
honour of England requires them to main- 
tain, they will abjure all those false notions 
of honour, by which nothing but eternal 
hostility with all the world can ever be 
obtained ; and that, whether we are to be 
blessed with peace, or compelled to pre- 

proper to remark that Mr. Burke, in the midst of his cele- 
brated arguments for war with f&e French Republic, quotes 
Vattel in order to shew that, it a belligerent power fails 
repeatedly in obtaining the object of the war, it must at 
tength " give peace to its people^ nor~w&?e eternal hosti- 
lities." Burke, vii. 209. Vattel, h\ if. ctap. xii, 
3 



STATE OF THE NATION. 219 

p^**e for new battles, they will pursue 
those plans of m c .ate and salutary re- 
form in the various branches of our na- 
tional policy, without which no glory, no 
safety, not even the inheritance of a name 
will remain for Eqgland. 



APPENDIX. 



Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and the Emperor of all the 
Russias, signed at St. Petersburgh, the nth of April 1803. 

(Usual Preamble.) 

Art. 1. A S the state of suffering in which Europe is placed, de« 
Ix. mands speedy remedy, their Majesties the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of 
all the Russias, have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of 
putting a stop thereto, without waiting for farther encroachments on 
the part of the French government. They have agreed in consequence, 
to employ the most speedy and most efficacious means to form a general 
league of the States of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the 
present concert : and to engage them, in order to accomplish the end 
proposed, to collect together a force, which, independently of the 
succours furnished by his Britannic Majesty, may amount to five hun- 
dred thousand effective men ; and to employ the same with energy, in 
order to induce or to compel the French government to agree to the 
re-establishment of peace and of the equilibrium of Europe. 

Art. 2. The object of this league will be to carry into effect what 
is proposed by the present concert, namely ; 

(a) The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of 
Germany. 

(b) The establishment of the independence of the Republics of 
Holland and Switzerland. 

(c) The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont with 
as large an auajnentation of territory as circumstances will permit. 

(d) . The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the com- 
plete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French 
forces. 

(e) The establishment of an order of things in Europe, which may 
effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different 
States, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. 

Art. 3. His Britannic Majesty, in order to concur efficaciously on 
his side to the happy effects of the present concert, engages to contri- 
bute to the common efforts, by employing his forces both by sea and 
land, as well as his vessels adapted for transporting troops, in such 
manner as shall be determined upon in the general plan of operations ; 
his Majesty will moreover assist the different powers who shall accede 
thereto by subsidies, the amount of which shall correspond to the respec- 
tive forces which shall be employed ; and in order that the said pecu- 



n APPENDIX. 

niary succours may be proportioned In the manner most conducive r# 
the general good, and to assist the powers in proportion to the exer- 
tions they may make to contribute to the common success, it is agreed 
that these subsidies (barring particular arrangements), shall be furnished 
in the proportion of one million two hundred an.d fifty thousand pounds 
sterling, for each hundred thousand men of regular troops, and so in 
proportion for a greater or smaller number, payablt according to the 
conditions herein after specified. 

Art. 4. The said subsidies shall be payable by instalments, from 
month to month, in proportion to the forces which each power shall 
employ in pursuance of its engagements, to combat the common enemy, 
and according to the official report of the armies employed at the 
opening of the campaign, and of the several reinforcements which may 
join them. An arrangement shall be made in conformity with the 
plan of operations, which shall be forthwith regulated as to the period 
when these subsidies shall begin to be paid, and the mode and place of 
payment shall be settled, so as to suit the convenience of each of the 
belligerent parties. His Britannic Majesty will likewise be prepared to 
advance within the current year, a sura for putting the troops in motion. 
This sum shall be settled by particular arrangements to be entered into 
by each power, who shall take part in this concert ; but his said Ma- 
jesty understands that the. whole of the sums to be furnished to any 
power within the current year, as well on account of the said advance 
as for the monthly subsidies, is in no case to exceed the proportion of 
cne million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, for every 
hundred thousand men. 

Art. 5. The high contracting parties agree that the different mem- 
bers of the league shall respectively be permitted to retain accredited 
persons with the commanders in chief of the different armies, to carry 
on the correspondence, and to attend to the military operations. 

Art. 6. Their Majesties agree, that in the event of a league being 
formed, such as is pointed out in the first article, they will not make 
peace with France but by the common consent of all the powers who 
shall become parties in the said league ; and also that the continental 
powers shall not recal their forces before the peace ; moreover, his 
Britannic Maje ty engages to continue the payment of the subsidies 
during the continuance of the war. 

Art. 7. The present concert which is mutually acknowledged by 
the high contracting parties to be equally valid and binding as the most 
solemn treaty, shall be ratified by his Majesty the King of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by his Majesty the Empe- 
ror of all the Russias, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at 
St. Petersburgh within the space of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In testimony whereof, &c. &c. 

(L.S.) Granville Leveson Gowsr. 
(L.S.) Adam Prince Czartortski. 
(L.S.) Nicolas de Nqvossiizofs. 



APPENDIX* UI 



No. I. (A.) 

First separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty and 
the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April — 30th 
March, 1805. 

I IIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, having made known to 
his Britannic Majesty his arrangements with their Majesties the Em- 
peror of Germany and the King of Sweden, his Britannic Majesty 
engages to fulfil his stipulations of the present Treaty of Concert to- 
wards each of these Powers, if, in the space of four months, reckoning 
from the day of the signature of the present Instrument, both those 
Powers, or one of them, shall have caused their forces to act against 
France by virtue of the engagements they have taken with his Majesty 
the Emperor of all the Russias. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (B.) 

Fourth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April— « 
aoth March, 1805. 

THE collecting of 500,000 men mentioned in Article I. of the Treaty 
of Concert signed this day, not being so easy as it is desirable, their 
Majesties have agreed that it should be carried into execution as soon as 
it should be possible to oppose to France an active force of 400,000 men 
composed in the following manner; Austria will supply 250,000 men, 
Russia not less than 117,000 men, independently of the levies made by 
her in Albania, in Greece, &a; and the remainder of the 400,000 will 
be made up by the troops of Naples, Hanover, Sardinia, and others. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
*nd shall be ratified at the same time. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower, 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski, 
(L, S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



A * 



»* APPENDIX, 

No. I. (C.) 

Fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April — 
30th March, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages also to march a* 
soon as possible an army of not less than sixty thousand men to the 
frontiers of Austria, and also another of not less than eighty thousai:t5 
men to the Prussian frontiers, to be ready to co-operate -with the said 
courts in the proportion established by the Treaty of Concert signed this 
day, and to support them respectively in case they should be attacked by 
France, who might suppose them to be engaged in some negotiation 
tending towards an object contrary to her views; but it is understood, 
that independently of the one hundred and fifteen thousand men, which 
his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias will cause to act against the 
French, he will keep bodies of reserve and observation upon hi* 
frontiers. 

It is moreover agreed, that as the forces promised by his Majesty the 
Emperor of all the Russias, shall all, or in part, quit the frontiers of his 
empire, his Britannic Majesty will pay them the subsidies at the rate 
established by the present Treaty of Concert, until the return of the 
said forces to their homes ; and moreover, the equivalent of three 
months of subsidy as a Premiere mise en Campagne. 

TheRusiian troops already stationed at the Seven Islands, or which 
may be intended to be transported thither, will not enjoy the advan- 
tage of the subsidies and of the Premiere mise en Campagne, stipulated in 
the present Article, before the day of their leaving the Seven Islands to 
commence their operations against the French. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
Were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day* 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 

(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartorvski. 

(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I (D.) 



Sixth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert between his Majesty 
and the Emperor of Russia, signed at St. Petersburgh, nth April — 
30th March, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias being disposed 
to form an energetic Concert, with the sole view of insuring to Europe 
a lasting and solid peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, 
and the law of nations by which they are constantly guided, are aware 
of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time upon several 
principles, which they will evince in pursuance of a previous Concert, 
iM toon as the events of the war may render it necessary. 



APPENDIX, ▼ 

These principles are, in no degree to controul the public opinion in 
France, or in any other countries, where the combined armies may 
•arry on their ope ations, with respecc to the form of government 
which it may be proper to adopt ; nor to appropriate to themselves, 
till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or 
the other of the belligerent parties ; and to take possession of the towns 
and the territories which may be wrested from the common enemy in 
the name of the country or states to which by acknowledged right they 
belong, and in all other cases, in the name of all the members of the 
league ; and finally, to assemble, at the termination of the war, a 
general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations, 
on a more determined basis than unfortunately ha> hitherto been 
practicable; and to insure their observance by the establishment of a 
federative system calculated upon the situation of the different States 
ef Europe. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were in erted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
iind shall be ratified at the same time. 

In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski. 
(L. S.) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (E.) 

Eighth Separate Article. 

IT being possible that the bias which the French government tries to 
give to the counsels of the different States of Europe," may determine 
one or other of those States to throw obstacles in the way of the 
attainment of the salutary effects which are the object of the present 
Concert, and even to have recourse to hostile measures against one of 
the high contracting parties, in spite of their endeavours to establish an 
equitable and permanent order of things in Europe, his Britannic 
Majesty and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias agree to make 
common cause against every power, which, by the employment of its 
forces, or by too intimate an union with France, may pretend to raise 
essential obstacles to the development of those measures which the 
high contracting parties may have to take, in order to attain the object 
proposed by the present Concert. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L.S.} Adam Prince Czartoryski, 
(L. S.) Nicolas di Novossilzoff, 



VI APPENDIX. 

No. I (F.) 

Eleventh Separate Article. 

THE High Contracting Parties, acknowledging the necessity of 
supporting the propositions of peace, Which it is their intention to make 
to Bonaparte by energetic demonstrations, have resolved to invite his 
Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to put his armies in a state of 
readiness for action without delay, by completing their numbers, and 
by concentrating them in the neighbourhood of the borders of France. 
His Britannic Majesty, considering the extraordinary expences which 
this measure vviil render ncc ssary, promises and engages to furnish to 
his Imperial and Royal Majesty, immediately after his accession to the 
present Concert, the sum of one million of pounds sterling for Premiere 
mlse en Champagne, which the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland will not reclaim, in case the negotiations for peace 
should be crowned with success, provided that, in a contrary event, 
Austria would take the field immediately. 

This separate Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this day, 
and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gowf.r. 

(L, S.) Adam Prince Czartorvski. 

(L. S ) Nicolas de Novossilzoff. 



No. I. (G.) 

Separate and Secret Article. 

ALTHOUGH the High Contracting Parties have agreed by the 
first separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established this day be- 
tween them, that Austria and Sweden shall not partake of the advan- 
tages of the said Concert but in the event of their bringing their forces 
into action against France, four months after its signature, by virtue of 
their engagements with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias ; 
yet his Britannic Majesty, considering the advantage to the future 
security of Europe, which results from an union similar to that formed 
by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias with their Majesties the 
Emperor of Germany and the King of Sweden, for the purpose of 
oppoing the further encroachments of Bonaparte, promises to fulfil the 
stipulations of the present Concert, in the same degree towards either of 
those powers, if, in the course of the year 1805, both or one of them 
should bring their forces into action against France, in virtue of their 
engagements with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. 

This separate and secret Article shall have the same force and validity 
as if it were inserted word for word in the Treaty of Concert signed this 
day, and shall be ratified at the same time. 
In witness whereof, &c. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 

(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartorvski. 

(L. S.) Nicolas de NovossitaoFr. 



APPENDIX. Vii 

No. I. (H ) 
Additional Article. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having, in pursuance of 
his sincere desire to insure success to the enterprize concerted against 
France, determined, in ca e the circumstances should require it, to 
augment the forces which he has promised to bring into action, to an 
hundred and eighty thousand men, hi= Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland promises and engages to 
pay, in that case, to his Imperial Majesty of ail the Ru->sias, fo. the 
troops which he may thus add to the 115,000 already Agreed upon, a 
subsidy and a Premiere mhe en Cha?npagne, at the same rate as is agreed 
by, the fifth separate Article of the Treaty of Concert established 
between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and hi-, Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the 30th 
March — nth April 1805. 

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity as if it 
were inserted word for word in the aforementioned Concert, and shaft 
be ratified by the two High Contracting Powers ; and the ratifications 
shall be exchanged in the space of ten weeks, or sooner, if possible. 

In witness whereof, Sec. &c. 

(L. S.) Granville Leveson Gower. 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czar toryski. 

(JL. S.) NlCOLA9 DE NOVOSSILZOFF. 



No. I. (I.) 



Additional Article cf the Treaty of Concert, signed at St. Petcrsburgh, 
the nth April, 1805. 

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, purposing to concert 
measures with the Court of Vienna, by which considerable Russian 
armies may be approximated to the frontiers of France, by crossing the 
Austrian and Prushian territories, while it is declared that the object of 
these movements is to obtain securities for the continent, promises and 
engages to his Britannic Majesty, in his own name and in that of his 
allies, that, should even circumstances require, that at the moment 
when the Russian troops began their march, they should declare that 
this movement was in no way connected with an existing Concert with 
his Britannic Majesty, but that die powers of the continent reclaim the 
fulfilment by France of her immediate engagements with them, yet as 
soon as the war shall have broken out, they will no longer pursue a 
particular object, but that which has been determined by the Concert 
of the 30th March — nth April, with all the clauses incorporated 
with it : 

In return for this as urance, his Britannic Majesty promises and 
engages, in the fi'st place, to fulfil towards the Emperor of all the 
Russias, the stipulations of the abovementioned Concert, in all their 
parts, as soon as the war shall have broken out between Russia and 



Vlll APPENDIX. 

France, and especially to furnish for the Russian troops the subsidies 
agreed upon, payable from the day on which they shail have quitted the 
frontiers of the empire, and moreover the three months stipulated 
subsidy under the name of Premiere misc en Campagne : with this 
condition, nevertheless, that however long may be the term between 
the epoch of the departure of the Russian troops from their frontiers, 
and that of the commencement of hostilities, his Britannic Majesty 
shall not be bound to pay to Russia for that interval more than six 
months subsidy at the most, the Premiere mise en Campagne being 
therein comprised. 

In the second place, to fulfil, with regard to Austria, all the stipula- 
tions of the abovementioned Concert, and especially all that relates to 
the subsidies, as soon as the ambassador of his Imperial and Royal 
Majesty shall have signed the act of accession of his court ; and lastly, 
in the third place, to pay in the like manner to the other allies of 
Russia, who shall assist in this enterprize (except in the case of special 
arrangements), the subsidies which have been allotted for them by the 
abovementioned Concert, and on the conditions therein specified. 

This additional Article shall have the same force and validity, as if it 
were inserted word for word in the abovementioned Concert, and shall 
be ratified by the Two High Contracting Parties, and the ratifications 
exchanged at St. Petersburgh, in the space of six weeks, or sooner, if 
possible. 



In faith of which, &c. &c. 



(L.S.J 'Granville Leveson Gowe?.« 
(L. S.) Adam Prince Czartoryski. 



(No. II.) 

Extract from a dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower.to Lord Mulgrave, dated 
St. Petersburgh, 29th June, 1805. (No. zy.) 

My Lord, 
THE annexation of the Ligurian republic to the French empire, 
executed at the very moment when a Russian plenipotentiary was 
expected in France, charged with propositions of which the professed 
object had been the general arrangements of the affairs of Europe, is 
considered as so great an insult to both sovereigns, whose sentiments 
that plenipotentiary was empowered to declare, that his imperial ma- 
jesty has judged under these circumstances, he could not consistently, 
with what is due to his own dignity, or to that of his august ally, permit 
M. Novossilzoff to proceed to fulfil the object of his mission. 
I have the honour to be, &c. &c. 

GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER. 
The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c. 



APPENDIX. 



Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated 
Peter:bur-h, azd July, 1805. (No. 30.) 

My Lord, 

I WAS on the point of dispatching yesterday the messenger to 
England, when I received an invitation from Prince Czartoryski to a 
conference, in which he read to me some very important dispatches he 
had just received from Count Razoumofsky and General Winzingerode. 
By these it appears that the emperor of Germany is at last awakened to 
a sense of his true dignity, and the real interests of his empire ; and that 
foreseeing the inevitability of war, he is determined not to leave to 
Bonaparte the choice of the moment to commence hostilities. . 
The right hon. Lord Mulgrave, &c. &c. 



Extract of a dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower, to Lord Mulgrave, dated 
St. Petersburgh, 3d September, 1805. (No. 38.) 

My Lord, 

THE last dispatches from the Russian ambassador at Vienna speak 
in strong terms of the warlike temper of that cabinet ; certain commu- 
nications had been made from Paris, which indicated a yielding disposi- 
tion on the part of Bonaparte, but to these indications Count Cobentzel 
seems to attach no credit, and Count Razoumofsky represents that the 
present character of the Austrian minLtry is a direct contrast to its 
former timidity and indicision, and that a firm conviction seems now to 
prevail at Vienna, that it is through war alone that any security can be 
obtained against the ambition and power of France. There is just 
ground for expecting, that his imperial and royal majesty, being per- 
suaded that war is inevitable, may be induced not to wait the issue of 
the proposed negotiations with the French government, but that he will 
commence hostilities at the time when the superioiity of the allied 
forces promises the best prospect of success. Towa ds the beginning of 
October, the Austrian army upon the Venetian frontier will be com- 
pletely to its full establishment, and will without doubt be greatly 
superior in numbers to the French forces in Italy, and the Russian 
armies will be sufficiently advanced into the hereditary states to ensure 
their arrival upon the frontiers of Bavaria, before the French troops 
from the coast and the interior of France can reach the German empire; 
I have, therefore, in several conversations lately with Prince Czartorysky 
and Comte Stadion, urged the expediency of losing no time in beginning 
the war. The prince informs me, that he has already instructed Comte 
Razoumofsky to press this consideration upon the attention of the cou.t 
of Vienna, but that he will not fail to repeat the instructions to the 
Russian ambassador. 

1 have great satisfaction in observing the encreased energy and vigour 
of this court. The Emperor, foreseeing the possibility of Bonaparte 
effecting a large augmentation to the French army in consequence ei 



X APTXtfDIXe 

the menaced attack by the allied power?, has resolved to be prepared t# 
meet such an effort, by a corresponding exertion on his part, and he has 
ordered a levy of four men out of every five hundred, which will produce 
above 150,000 men. 

A corps of above ten thousand men, under the command of his 
Imperial highness the Grand Duke Constantinc, and composed chiefly of 
the garrison of St. Petersburgh, began their march towards the Prussian 
frontier on Thursday the 22d. The troops destined for Pomerania are 
ready for embarkation, and will probably sail in about six or eight 
days; they amount to twenty thousand men. No dispatches, however, 
have been received from M. Alopeus, who was charged to negotiate 
with the King of Sweden the necessary arrangements for the landing of 
the Russians at Stralsund, and the augmentation of the Swedish garrison 
at that port. 

' I have the honour to be, &c. &c. 

GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER. 



No. III. (A.) 

(Translation.) 

Plan of Operations proposed by the Court of Vienna. 

FRANCE, upon the new organization of her army, has on foot, 
ii2 regiments of the line, - - 4045828 men. 

30 regiments of light infantry, - 107,540 

85 cavalry, - 64,226 

16 artillery, - - - - 21,43° 

598,024 

This number, with the addition of the different corps in Corsica and 
the islands, of 21 regiments of Dutch soldiers, 11 Swiss regiments, 
18 auxiliary troops from Italy, and the Imperial guard, which consists 
of 15,000 men, makes a total of 651,964, the whole military force now 
on foot in France. These troops are for the greater part already on the 
war e. tabli hment. Any grand descent from England, upon the coa t 
of France> with the probability of decided success, is scarcely to be 
expected. France may therefore venture to draw almost all her troops 
from her interior, and from her coasts. besides, a well arranged 
national guard, in perfect discipline, would enable her to spare her 
troops of the line, even from where they had been employed in prs- 
serving domestic order and security. It follows, that France might 
ca.ploy 500,000 men in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. 

In opposition to that force, the 250,000 Austrians, and' 115,000 
Russians, stipulated in the last treaty, compose a total force, which is, 
in compari-on, so much the less to he depended upon, because very 
little effective assistance is to be expected from the Swedes and the 
English. The following are the necessary conclusions from' th« 
statement, 



APPENDIX. XI 

1st. Considering this estimate, and the advantages which France 
enjoys in its geographical situation, whether for defence or for aggres- 
sion, the maintenance of peace, till a more favourable conjuncture shall 
arise, seems to be infinitely desirable. 

2d If, however, war should become Inevitable, not only to ensure 
its success, but to avoid likewise evils more alarming than those of 
the present moment, it would become indispensibly necessary, that 
the allied courts should use their most vigorous efforts to oppose those 
of the enemy, and bring into efficiency means at least equal to their:, 
if not superior. 

The military arrangements, the financial, and the general policy of 
the aides, must concur in putting forth those energies, by which alone 
we can hope to give success to our efforts. 

1st. Military arrangements. This co-operation in these three branches 
•could be of very little effect, if the Austrian armies should not come 
into the field more than 300,000 strong. The fir^t of the papers sub- 
joined, shews, what would be the. deficiencies to be supplied in the Im- 
perial and Royal army, in recruiting, in appointments, and in remount- 
ing the cavalry, bei»des other augmentations, necessary to raise it from 
its present weak state, upon a peace establishment, to the number above- 
mentioned; and, at the same time, to leave the number of troops re- 
quisite for service in the interior of the Monarchy, and for the observ- 
ance of the movements of Prussia. 

The difficulties which strike upon a first view will appear still more 
considerable upon a due attention to the manner in which the Austrian 
troops are now distributed. The line formed to prevent the introduc- 
tion of infectious disease, has indeed contributed to obviate, in part, 
that disadvantage, as it leaves the Venetian dominions of the empire no 
longer in danger of a surprise from the French. But, if it were neces- 
sary to take measures to oppose a great force to that which the enemy 
might bring againbt us from the interior of his dominions, then would 
dispositions the most prompt and vigorous be requisite, to the season- 
able concentration of the Austrian troops which are, in great part, at a 
distance from the frontiers in danger, to put them upon the footing for 
war, and to bring them to act upon the points which are the most ex- 
posed. This first measure would require to be carried into effect with 
the greater activity, because it could not be expected that the troops of 
his Majesty the Emperor of Russia should; from such a distance, arrive 
on the scene of action, till after the Austrian troops should have sus- 
tained the first attacks of the enemy. His Majesty will not be deterred 
by these great difficulties, if war should become unavoidable; he will, 
ia that case, use his most strenuous endeavours to surmount every difii- 
culty, and fulfil his engagements. But to give effect to this steady 
resolution, it is necessary; 

idly. That there should be adequate financial resources, and that 
the difficulties which present themselves under that head should be re- 
moved ; the imperial court of St. Petersburgh has already been in- 
formed of the vast and necessary expenditure required to put the infan- 
try, the cavalry, the carriages and artillery, the objects of the commiffa- 
Ties' Department, the magazines and stores, in short, every thing be- 
longing to the army, upon the full war establishment. The succour of 
fifteen millions of Florins, which has been asked from England for this 
primary service, is not more than one-half of what is actually wanted. 
The expense of each campaign of the last w«f was bam one hundi«d 



XH APPENBIX, 

and ten tc one hundred and twenty millions. The sabsequent rise «f 
the prices of commodities would render the expense of the same objec s, 
now, considerably greater. But, suppose it even not to exceed the 
former, yet the subsidy of thirty millions of Florins, which is asked 
from England, added to the ordinary peace expenditure of the army, 
would leave still an enormous deficit, which the burthencd finances of 
Austria could hardly make good. It follows that,, unless England grant 
the subsidy which has been demanded, it mu%t he impossible for the 
Court of Vienna, notwithstanding its determined inclination, even t« 
make those preparations for war, which are not to be attempted 
xvithout an assurance of being able to follow them up, and maintain 
them. 

These considerations being stated, it is next to be examined, what 
would be the detail of the operations of ike armies in Italy, the Tyro!, 
Switzerland, and the frontier:, of Germany, if they should make all 
their movements in perfect mutual concert. It is this concert of opera- 
tions which must meet the first plans and marches of the enemy. Its 
prompt or tardy success, its' favourable or unfavourable result, will de- 
termine, in fact, the whole fortune of the war, and of course, the fate 
of Europe. 

Considering the geographical position of France ; its German fron- 
tier ; Switzerland, which is in subjugation to it ; and the Italian repub- 
lic ; and observing, on the other hand, the position of the hereditary 
dominions of Austria ; it is impossible not to discern, that it would be 
imprudent to make any attempt from Germany, against France, in Al- 
sace, or on the Rhine. Such an attempt could be made, only, by passing 
the Rhine at Manheim, or by laying sie.e to Mentz. 

In the first of these enterprises, thee would be the vat disadvantage 
of advancing, from the very first step, amidst fortified places of the 
greatest ftrengih ; of being forced to carry on a war of sieges, with an 
enormous consumption of men and money, and without a prospect of 
any happier issue of the campaign, even at the best, than by the re- 
duction of one of those strong places. To underiake the siege of Mentz, 
at least 50,000 men would be necessary to blockade the place, and to 
cover the operations of the siege. The extent and strength of Mentz 
are such, that we should be detained befoe that place alone for half 
the campaign; and no operation subsequent to its surrender, could lead 
to any but very uncertain and insecure results; because the places upon 
the Meuse on the one side, and in Alsace on the other, would every 
where arres' the progress of our armies. Add to these another conside- 
ration of not le c s weight, that, since neither of those operations could 
be carried into effect hut by great armies, there would be few troops 
left to cover the Upper Rhine. The enemy might avail himself of 
that local weakness; might direct his attack there, whi'e we f.hould be 
occupied in the siege of Landau or Mentz; and might thus advance in 
a line of operation shorter than ours ; might possess himseT of our 
communications ; and might get between us and all our supplies. To 
avoid bein t cut off from these, we should, in that case, be obliged to 
abandon every thing without striking a blow. 

An attempt through Switzerland, against Franche Comte, would be, 
indisputably, the most formidable to the enemy. His frontiers are there 
open. But. as such a plan of operation could not be carried into effect 
but through Swabia, by ihe Voralberg, or below the Lake of Constance, 
on account of the impossibility of having supplies conveyed through the 



APPENDIX. XUl 

Tyrol; it would be necessary, before attempting if, to have made con- 
sidcrab'e progress in Swabia, and to have an army cf observation op- 
posite Strasburg, to watch the enemy. It would even be necessary to 
have obtained some advantage-, in Italy, before hazarding an attack in 
Switzerland. A retreat of the army in Italy towards Klagenfurt, would 
prevent the army in the Tyrol from joining in the operations in Swit- 
zerland. The enemy would possess themselves of the Puster-Thal, (the 
Puster-Thal is the Tyrol between Brixen and Lientz, and communi- 
cates with the vale of the Adige), on the great road for our communi- 
cations and conveyances to and from the Tyrol. We should be com- 
pelled to detach troops from the army in Germany for the interior de- 
fence of Austria, and not only to relinquish all offensive operations, 
hut even to confine ourselves within the line of the Lech, or, possibly, 
the Inn in Germany, and there to take a defensive position, in order 
not to be at too great a distance from Austria, and to be ready to supply 
with dtif promptitude the a.-sistance which might there be wanted. It 
follows, from all these considerations, that the war should begin with 
vigorous offensive operations in Italy. It is there we should act with the 
superior force of our army. A victory gained there, would afford us 
the same advantages for the prosecution of offensive operations against 
France, which France would acquire from our loss of a battle, in order 
to penetrate into the Austrian hereditary dominions. If the difficulties 
of our situation render it even impossible for us to arm and advance to 
a<St upon the frontier as soon as the enemy, how much less is it to be 
expecled, that the troops of the Emperor of Russia could arrive in 
time to acl at the very commencement of the war ? 

It would be the interest of France to use every means to anticipate 
their arrival, by an early and deci.-.ive superiority. Any concentration 
of our troops, or the march of the Russians, would not fail to afford 
Eonaparte a specious pretext to declare war. The force of this obser- 
'vation is, to prove, that, in case of war with France, the plan of 
operations, first distribution and disposal of the troops, the com- 
mencement and the first progress of the military movements, must 
be arranged, on the supposition that, war will be begun by the Aus- 
trians alone. 

It would be requisite, that the army in Italy should begin its move- 
ments with forcing the passage of the Adige, dislodging the enemy from 
the Mincio, investing Mantua and Peschiera, detaching a body of troops 
to the Po to observe the South of Italy, and open its way to the Adda, 
in order to cover the blockade or siege of these places. Only the re- 
duction of these two fortresses, or some such great and foitunate events, 
as are not to be reckoned upon, could induce the commandant of this 
army to push his operations farther; 

The army in Germany would commence its operations by parsing the 
Inn, would enter Bavaria, and would there await on the Lech, the 
movements of the other armies, and in particular, the arrival of the 
troops from Russia. The army in the Tyrol would be determined in 
its movements by those of the armies in Italy and Germany. 

In the case of operations against Switzerland, a part of the troops in 
the T^rol would be employed in an attack on the Grisons and the other 
small cantons ; and the rest would, in the case of the success of the 
army in Italy, advance from its defensive positions-, and join that 
army. This is all that, with our greatest efforts, and upon the sup- 
position of decided success, we can expect to accomplish, till the whole 



XIV APPENDIX. 

of the plans and powers of the coalition shall be in full activity. If 
Italy be the grand point of operation at the commencement of hostilities, 
Switzerland must become such, as soon as we shall have obtained 
successes in that quarter, and shall have advanced through Swabia. 
Switzerland offers to a conqueror the advantage of the shortest commu- 
nication between Italy and Germany; it gives the facility of sending 
supplies and reinforcements with promptitude to the one or the other 
of these countries ; and it is only through Switzerland that an entrance 
can be effected into France on the side of Franche Comte. It would 
then be necessary to cover ourselves on the side of Alsace, by taking 
Eefort and Hunningen, and leaving, at the same time, a considerable 
body of trdops in Swabia, to cover the right wing of the army in 
Switzerland from any of the attempts by the French from Strasburg, 
and to protect our communications, and ensure the conveyance of 
supplies. 

The reasons have been explained, on account of which, in the general 
plan of operations, it is not indicated in what manner the troops of the 
two Imperial courts might co-operate, either in union under the same 
standards, or by a Concert in their movements. We must look for- 
ward to the case of Austria being attacked by France before the arrival 
of the Russians in Germany. The combination of the operations of the 
two Courts would then depend upon the resolution of Prussia. And, 
thanks to the wise measures of the Emperor Alexander ! we are soon. 
to learn decisively how far we may or may not reckon upon Prussian 
co-operation, upon the neutrality of that power, or its rejection of our 
propositions. We shall then be enabled to present to the Imperial 
Court of Russia, upon the request which it has communicated, propo- 
sals for its co-operation towards the common and general object. 

We may here previously submit the consideration, that the line of 
operation in Italy is the most remote, and that it is there the campaign 
must be opened with the greatest vigour ; that the Court of Vienn.» 
will therefore send a great army into Italy, in order to act with rapidity 
upon that line ; and that therefore the march of the Russian troops, and 
their substitution for those of Austria, amidst the movements of the 
war in Italy, would be impossible. 

As soon as we shall certainly know the result of the great and im- 
portant step which his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has 
taken at the Court of Berlin, we shall add, without delay, whatever 
remains to be communicated farther upon the subject of the friendly 
propositions here explained, and upon the plan of operations for the 
two Courts, in Germany, and shall forthwith submit it to the Court of 
Russia. 



TREATY OF PRESBURGH. 
(usual preamble.) 

Art. I. There shall be from the date of this day peace and friend- 
ship between his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and 
his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, their heirs and 
successors, their States and subjects respectively, forever. 

II. France shall continue to possess to property and sovereignty the 
Dutchies, Principalities, LordfHips, and territories beyond the Alps. 



APPENDIX. XV 

which were before the present Treaty united and incorporated ttith 
the French Empire, or governed by the Laws and Government of 
France. 

III. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, for him- 
self, his heirs, and successors, recognise* the dispositions made by his 
Majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy, relative to the Princi- 
palities of Lucca and Piombino. 

IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria renounces, 
as well for himself, as for his hei s and successors, that part of the 
States of the Republic of Venice, ceded to him by the Treaties of 
Campo Formio and Lunevillc, mall be united in perpetuity to the 
kingdom of Italy. 

V. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknow- 
ledges his Majesty the Emperor of the French King of Italy ; but it 
is agreed that, in conformity with the declaration made by his Majesty 
the Emperor of the French, at the moment when he took the Crown 
of Italy, that as soon as the parties named in that declaration fhall 
have fulfilled the conditions therein expressed, the Crowns of France 
and Italy shall be separated for ever, and cannot in any case be united 
on the same head. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany binds him- 
self to acknowledge, on the separation, the successor his Majesty the 
Emperor of the French fliall appoint to himself as King of Italy. 

VI. The present treaty of peace is declared to comprehend their 
most Serene Highnes-es the Electors of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and 
Baden, and the Batavian Republic, allies of his Majesty the Emperor 
of the French, in the pre-ent war. 

VII. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg having taken the: 
title of King, without ceasing nevertheless to belong to the Germanic 
confederation, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria ac- 
knowledges them in that character. 

VIII. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as well 
as himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, 
their heirs and successors respectively, renounces the Principalities, 
Lordftiips, Domains, and Territories herein-after specified : — 

Cedes and abandons to his Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Mar- 
graviate of Burgau and its dependencies, the Principality of Eichstadt, 
the part of the territory of Passau belonging to the Elector of Salz- 
burg, and situated between Bohemia, Austria, the Danube and the 
Inn ; the county of Tyrol, comprehending therein the Principalities of 
Brixen and Botzen, the seven Lordships of the Voralberg, with their 
detached dependencies; the county of Hohenems, the county of 
Konigsegg, Rotrensels, the Lordships of Tetnany and Argen, and the 
town and territory of Lindan. 

To his Majesty the King of Wirtemberg, the five cities of the 
Danube, to wit — Ehingen, Munderkengen, Rudlingen, Mengen, and 
Susgaw, with their dependencies, the city of Constance excepted, 
that part of the Brisgaw which extends in the possessions of Wirtem- 
berg, and situated to the East of a line, drawn from Schlegelberg to 
Molback, and the towns and territories of Willengen and Brentingen. — 
To his most Serene Flighness the Elector of Baden, the Brisgaw (with 
the exception of the branch and separate portions above described), 
the Ortenaw and other dependencies, the city of Constance, and the 
commanding of Meinau. 

The Principalities, Lordfhips, Domains, and territories above-men - 



*Vi APPENDIX. 

tinned, mall be possessed respectively by their Majesties, the Kings of 
Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and by his most Serene Highness the Elector 
of Baden, as well in paramount as in full property and sovereignty, in 
the same manner, with which they were possessed by his Ma'iesty the 
Emperor of Germany and Austria, or the Princes of his House, and 
not otherwise. 

IX.' His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria acknow- 
ledges the debts contracted by the House of Austria, for the benefit 
of private persons and public establishments of the country, making at 
present an integrant part of the French Empire, and it is agreed that 
his said Majesty shall remain free from ail obligation with respect to 
any debts whatsoever which the House of Austria may have con- 
trailed, on the ground of the possession and of securities on the soil 
of the countries which it renounces by the present treaty. 

X. The county of Salzburgh and of Berchtolsgaden, belonging to 
his Royal and Electoral Highne-s, Prince Ferdinand, shall be incorpo- 
rated with the Empire of Austria, and his Majesty the Emperor of 
Germany .and Austria shall possess them in full property and sove- 
reignty, but by the tit'e of a Duchy only. 

XI. His Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, engages 
himself to obtain, in favour of the Archduke Ferdinand, Elector of 
Salzburgh, the cession of his Majefty the King of Bavaria, of the 
Principality of Wurtzburgh, such as it has been given to his said 
Majesty by the recess of the Deputation of the Germanic Empire, of 
the 25th Feb. 1803. 

The Electoral title of his R. H. shall be transferred to this Principa- 
lity, which to his R. H. shall possess in full property and sovereignty,, 
in the same manner and on the same conditions that he possessed the 
Electorate of Saltzburgh. 

And with respect to debts, it is agreed, that the new possessor shall 
stand charged only with those debts resulting from loans formerly 
agreed to by the States of the country, or the expences incurred for the 
effective administration of the said country. 

XII. The dignity of the grand Master of the Teutonic Order, its 
.lights, domains and revenues, which before the present war were de- 
pendencies of Mergentheim, the chief place of the Order; the other 
rights, domains and revenues, which shall be found to belong to the 
grand masterfhip at the present time of the exchange of the ratification 
of the present treaty; as well as the domains and revenues in possession 
of which the said Order shall be, at the same epoch, shall become he- 
reditary in the person and descendants in the direct male line, accord- 
ing to the order of primogeniture, in which ever of the Princes of 
the Imperial House as shali be appointed by his Majesty the Emperor 
of Germany and Austria. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon pro- 
mises his good offices to obtain, as soon as possible, for his Royal 
Highness the Archduke Ferdinand a full and entire indemnity in Ger* 
many. 

XIII. His Majesty the Elector of Bavaria shall occupy the city of 
Augsberg and its territory, and unite them to his States, in full pro- 
perty and sovereignty. In the same manner the King of Wirtemberg 
may occupy, to kis States, and possess in full property and sovereignty 
the county of Borndorff; and ins Majesty the Emperor of Germany 
and Austria engages himself to give no opposition. 

XIV. Their Majesties the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and 



APPENDIX. XVU 

lis most Serene Highness the Elector of Baden, shall enjoy over the 
territories ceded, as well a^ over their ancient estates, the plenitude of 
sovereignty, and all the rights resulting from it, which have hceii 
guaranteed tothem by his Maje-ty the Emperor of the French and King 
of T taly, in the same manner as his Majesty the Emperor of Germany 
and Austria, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, over their German 
States. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, both as 
chief of the empire, and as co-estates, engages himself not to oppose 
any obstacle to the execution of the acts wh.ch they may have made, 
or will make in consequence 

XV. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, as we-1 
forhimsef, his heir and successors, as for the Princes of his House, 
their heirs and successors, renounces all the rights as well of sove- 
reignty, as of paramount right to all pretensions whatsoever, actual or 
eventual, on all the States, without exception, of their Majesties, the 
Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and of hi-; most Serene Highness 
the Elector of Baden, and generally on all the states, domains, and 
territories comprised in the circles of Bavaria, Franconia, and Suabia, 
as well as to every title, taken fVom the said domains and territories ; 
and reciprocally, all pretensions, aclual or eventual, of the said States, 
to the charge of the House of Austria, or as Princes are, and fhali be, 
for ever extinguished ; nevertheless the renunciations contained in the 
present artide. do not concern the properties which are -by the nth 
article, or which shall be by virtue of the iath article above, con- 
ceded to their Royal Highnesses the Archdukes, named in the said 
arti:les. 

XVI. The titles of the domains and archives, the plans and maps of 
the different countries, towns- "and fortres es ceded by the present 
treaty, shall be given up in the space of three month: from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications, to the persons that shall have ac- 
quired the property of them. 

XVII. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon guarantees the integrity 
of the empire of Austria in the state in Which it shall be in conse- 
quence of the present treaty of peace, as well as the integrity of the 
pos=e sions of the Princes of the House of Au.tria, pointed out in the 
Ilth and 12 th articles. 

XVIII. The high contracting parties acknowlege the independence of 
the Helvetic republic, as established by the act of mediation, as well 
as the independence of the Batavian republic. 

XIX. The prisoners of war made by France and her allies front 
Austria, and by Austria from France and her allies, a \d who hive not 
been yet restored, hall be restored within 40 days from the date of 
the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. 

XX- All commercial communications and relations are re-established 
in the two countries on the same footing as before the war. 

XXI His Majesty the Emperor of Germany and Austria, and his 
Majesty the Emperor of the French and Kin; of Italy, shall maintain 
between them the same ceremonial as to rank and etiquette as was ob- 
served before the present war. 

XXII Within five days from the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty, the town of Presburg, and its environs, to the extent 
of six leagues, shall be evacuated. Teh, days after the said exchange, 
the French, and the troops of the allies of France, shall evacuat 
jravia, Bohemia, the Viertel Unter Vienner, Wald, the Viertel Uvtfit 

b 



XV1U APPENDIX. 

Manhertsberg, Hungary, and the whole of Styria. In the ten follow- 
ing days they shall evacuate the Viertel Vienner Wald, and the Viertel 
Ober Manhertsberg ; and finally, in the space of two months from the 
exchange of the ratifications, the French troops, and the troops of the 
allies of France, shall evacuate the whole of the Hereditary States of his 
Majesty the Emperor of Germany and of Austria, with the exception 
of the rlace of Braunau, which shall remain for one month at the dis- 
posal of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, 
as a place of dep ot for the sick and forthe artillery. 

No requisition, of whatever nature, shall be made of the inhabitants 
during that month. But it is agreed that at the expiration of the said 
month, no corps whatever of Austrian troops can be stationed or intro- 
duced within a circuit of six leagues around the said place of Brannau. 
It is in like manner agreed, that each of the places which, are to be 
successively evacuated by the French troops within the times above- 
mentioned, shall not be taken possession of by the Austrian troops till 
eight and forty hours after the evacuation. It is also agreed, that the 
magazines left by the French army, in the places which they shall suc- 
cessively evacuate, shall remain at its disposal; and that the high con- 
tracting parties shall make an arrangement relative to all contributions 
of war whatsoever imposed on the different hereditary states occupied 
by the French, an arrangement in virtue of which, the rai-ing of the 
said contributions shall entirely cease from the day of the exchange of 
the ratifications. The French army shall draw its provisions and its 
sustenance from its own magazines, established on the routes by which 
it is to proceed. 

XXIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty, commissaries shall be named on both sides to give up and 
receive in the names of their respective sovereigns, all parts of the Vene- 
tian territory, not occupied by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor 
of the French and King of Italy. The city of Venice, the Lagunes, and 
the possessions of Terra Firma, shall be given up in the space of fifteen 
days; Venetian Istria and Dalmatia, the mouths of the Cattaro, the 
Venetian Isles in the Adriatic, and all the places and forts which they 
contain, in the space of six weeks from the exchange of the ratifications. 
The respective commissaries will take care that the separation of the 
artillery belonging to the Repubic of Venice from the Austrian artil- 
lery be exactly made, the former being to remain entirely to the king- 
dom of Italy. They will determine by a mutual agreement the kind 
and nature of the objects, which being the property of the Emperor of 
Germany and of Austria, are consequently to remain at his disposal. 
T'hey will agree either on the sale to the kingdom of Italy, of the ob- 
ject- above-mentioned, or their exchange for an equivalent quantity of 
artillery, or other objects of the same, or a different nature, which 
shall have been left by the French armies in the hereditary states. 

Every facility and every as istance shall be given to the Austrian 
troops, and to the civil and military administrations, to return into the 
Austrian states by the most convenient and sure ways, as well as to the 
conveyance of the impeiial artillery, the naval and military magazines, 
and other objects which are not comprehended in the stipulations of 
sale or exchange which may be made. 

XXIV. The ratifications of the present treaty shall be exchanged 
within the space of eight days, or sooner, if possible. 

Done and signed at Presburg, the »6th December, i8oj, 

THE END, 



C. Stozver J Printer , Pater nos er-roiv* 



SECOND EDITION', 



AN 



ANSWER, 



[PRICE FOUR SHULLINGS.j 



PrinteJ by C. Stower, 
34, Pat$r'?i9*ter JRw, T 



AN ANSWER 



TO THE 



INQUIRY 



THE STATE OF THE NATION 



Strictures on the Conduct of the present 
Ministry. 



Ubi sunt, C. Pansa, ills cohortationes pukherrimss tuse, quibus a te 

excitatus senatus, inflammatus populus Romanus, non solum audivit 
sed etiam didicit, nihil esse homini Romano foedius servitute ? 

Cic. Phii.jp. i%, 



SECOND EDITION. 



LONDON: 

'RINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, FLEET STREET. 

J 806. 



PI 



INTRODUCTION. 



THE Inquiry into the State of the Nation 
appears, on a cursory perusal, the produc- 
tion of a superior mind. The reader is 
induced to believe, that the author has 
successfully illustrated general principles 
by the evidence of facts, and that his per- 
formance exhibits a combination of the 
enlightened views of the philosopher with 
the experience of the statesman. Had it 
possessed in reality this merit, had the 
soundness of argument equalled the ele- 
gance of its stile, that work would have 
deserved the patronage not of a minister 



a 3 



VI INTRODUCTION. 

merely, but of the country — the attention 
not only of the present generation, but of 
posterity. 

A second and more scrupulous perusal, 
however, will dispel the illusion. An at- 
tentive investigation of the arguments on 
which the author of this Inquiry has rested 
his opinions, will discover their fallacy in 
many cases, and their over- strained appli- 
cation in all. This work, which has been 
so generally circulated, and by some so 
much admired, will be found to prove a 
splendid superstructure on a false basis — - 
like the newly-discovered relics of anti- 
quity, interesting to contemplate, but 
which, when touched, crumble into dust. 

In an inquiry into the state of this rich 
and powerful nation, it is singular that, 
except the character of our present mi- 



INTRODUCTION. VII 

nistry, there should not be discovered a 
single favourable circumstance in our situ- 
ation — no cheering ray to diversify a 
picture of the most gloomy colouring. A 
melancholy note is struck at the beginning, 
and the doleful cadence continues to the 
end. The state of our public funds has 
entirely escaped the notice of this impar- 
tial writer. Our naval victories, although 
only a few months old, appear to have 
fled from his recollection. Perhaps he is 
prepared to argue, that flourishing finances, 
and unparalleled naval triumphs, have no 
connexion with our foreign relations, or 
with the state of the country, 

Let us examine, in the first instance, 
the plan of the work before us, and how 
far its substance fulfils its title. The au- 
thor confines himself almost entirely to 

A 4 



yiil INTRODUCTION. 

our foreign relations, and divides them 
into the following heads. 

I. The late continental alliance. 

II. The consequences of our late foreign 
policy. 

III. The state of foreign affairs, inde- 
pendent of the late coalition and its con- 
seq- ences. Under this head the author dis- 
cusses the origin of our war with Spain, 
and the neutral questions. 

It is apparent from this outline, that the 
work under review is only nominally an 
Inquiry into the State of the Nation. In 
reality, it is an exposition of every unfa- 
vourable circumstance in the state of our 
relations with foreign powers. In other 
words, it is a most gloomy catalogue of 



:> 1 RODUCTION. IX 

the difficulties under which the Right Ho= 
nourable Secretary for the Foreign Depart- 
ment is desirous that the public should 
believe he has entered upon office. It con- 
cludes with lavishing the most profuse en- 
comiums on the talents, experience, rank, 
and integrity of the Right Honourable Se- 
cretary and his friends. 

Before proceeding upon an examination 
of the work, it is natural to inquire in what 
light Lord Grenville views its publication. 
We believe it is without example in the 
history of those constitutional parties 
which have divided the attachments of 
our countryrhen, that a minister should 
lend bis sanction to a pamphlet replete 
with the most bitter censure of his col- 
leagues — a colleague who is not only a 
distinguished member of the cabinet, but 
the head of administration. The allusions 



X INTRODUCTION. 

to the former conduct of the Nobie Lord, 
are direct— the condemnation they convey 
is unqualified . The author dwells on the 
" high, unbending, unaccommodating tone 
which we have been accustomed to hold 
all over the world." Now, Lords Hawkes- 
bury, Harrowby, and Mulgrave, the suc- 
cessors of Lord Grenville in office, have 
never even been accused of giving offence 
to foreign courts by haughty or unbend- 
ing conduct. The^ reprobation so point- 
edly expressed in the Inquiry, is applicable, 
therefore, in a particular manner, to Lord 
Grenville. Indeed the author leaves us in 
no doubt in this respect. I shall quote 
his own words—" To have looked forward 
beyond the next year ; to have taken mea- 
sures in silence for the slow preparations 
of distant events ; to have gradually dis- 
posed the minds of a people in our favour 
by kind treatment, for which no immedi- 



INTRODUCTION. Xl 

ate return was expected, or won them by 
any other means than a manifesto from 
a commander, at the head of a paltry 
force ; to have laid plans of w^ar before- 
hand, which should not for some time 
burst into view with glare and noise : All 
this would have indicated a strange, unac- 
countable deviation from the system w 1 ch 
has been unremittingly at work sMce the 
treaty of Pilnitz*, by day and by night; 
during war and during truce, in aggran- 



* Such were the expressions in the first edition of 
this work ; but the author thought proper subsequently 
to strike out the word.-, " since the treaty of Pilnitz." 
Lord Grenville galled by the pointed censure of 
his conduct, which was thus spread abroad bv his col- 
leagues in office ? Did Mr. Fox and his friends shrink 
fr >ni the just indignation they had roused, and attempt 
to eat rds? But ithdrawin 

inted an allusion a sufficient reparation for 
public and gross insult? Or, indet 
omission of these five words in an 
directness of the censu 



Xll INTRODUCTION. 

dizing the proud and crushing the 
humble." 

These expressions require no comment. 
Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville are the ac- 
knowledged leaders of the cabinet, and I 
leave the reader to judge of the prudence 
of the minister who can give circulation to 
such unqualified accusations of the former 
conduct of his colleague. 

The answer I propose to the present In- 
quiry may be properly divided into two 

parts, 

I. An examination of the arguments 
adduced against the late ministry in regard 
to the last campaign as well as other con- 
tinental affairs ; and 

II. An inquiry how far the present mi- 

1 



INTRODUCTION. Xlll 

nistry have verified the predictions of our 
author, or justified the lofty encomiums 
he so confidently bestows on them. 

In the first part, I will discuss, in suc- 
cession, almost every important topic in 
the Inquiry. Without disputing with its 
author the superiority of rhetorical embel- 
lishment, I will fairly meet him on the 
legitimate ground of political disquisition 
— in a contest not of words but of facts— 
not in a stile of studied declamation, but in 
the direct and candid language of solid ar- 
gument. Truth in politics, as in other 
subjects, generally lies in a narrow com- 
pass. She is to be found, not by indulge 
ing the excursive flights of imagination, 
but by a diligent, a scrupulous, a rigid 
exercise of reason. 

In disproving the fallacies with which 



XIV INTRODUCTION. 

this work is replete, I shall feel much sa- 
tisfaction in lending my humble aid to 
the vindication of our late illustrious 
statesman. While I repel the aspersions 
of party, I shall not, however, attempt 
a complete illustration of his character. 
For such a task, I should feel my talents 
feeble and inadequate. Nor does his me- 
mory stand in need of panegyric, for it 
will remain engraven on the herts of his 
countrymen. But there is a living cha- 
racter of less imposing aspect, the discus- 
sion of whose merits is intimately con- 
nected with the object of my work. The 
" Inquiry into the State of the Nation' ' 
has been industriously patronised by the 
Right Honourable Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs. It would be inconsistent with 
his reputation for manly conduct to circu- 
late what he did not believe ; and I shall 
not, I presume, be contradicted, when I 



INTRODUCTION. XV 

consider as his the sentiments expressed 
in a work which has been currently termed 
the Manifesto of the new Ministry. In 
the Answer to the Inquiry, the Right Ho- 
nourable Secretary, therefore/ becomes a 
conspicuous object of attention. He has 
treated with ridicule the claims of his 
predecessors to public confidence — it is 
now time to examine his own. He has 
pourtrayed the late ministry as the most 
deficient of mankind in judgment and in- 
formation. Let us scutinize the validity 
of his own pretensions to these qualities 
by an inquiry into the consistency of his 
opinions on several subjects of high inte- 
rest — into their origin, their accuracy, and 
their depth: Such an inquiry will aid us 
to ascertain whether he is equally wise in 
Government as formidable in Opposition; 
whether he is in reality the great man he 
has been called ; and whether his opinions 



XVJ INTRODUCTION 

bear the stamp of reflexion and judgment 
or are the genuine offspring of a mind 
which conceives in precipitation and brings 
forth in error. 



AN 



ANSWER, 



1 HE Author of the Inquiry begins by 
remarking, that previously to the com- 
mencement of hostilities, no attempt at 
negotiation was made. He enlarges on 
our having taken no step to procure " the 
mediation of Russia, a power equally fa- 
vourable to us and the independence of 
Europe." But this disposition, while it 
afforded to us the strongest inducement 
to desire her mediation, was an insur- 
mountable obstacle to its adoption by 
France. Bonaparte, in January, 1800. 

B - - 



1 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

soon after committing the grossest out- 
rages against the laws of nations and the 
independence of neutral powers, in the 
seizure of Sir George Rumbold and the 
robbery of our Messenger, suddenly trans- 
mits to us a pacific overture. Our cabinet 
return an answer, at once manly and 
temperate, declining to enter into any 
negotiation until they should consult their 
allies, and particularly the Emperor of 
Russia. Had there been any probability 
that, on the part of France the mediation 
of Russia would have been accepted, our 
government would have been unquestion- 
ably most desirous to have urged the cause 
of justice under so favourable auspices. 
.But all direct intercourse had ceased be- 
tween Russia and France. Indignant as 
Russia was at the multiplied aggressions of 
France, is it probable that Bonaparte, al- 
though he granted passports to Novozil- 
zofF, would have acceded to any proposi- 
tion so specific as a negotiation for peace 
with England, under the mediation of 
Russia, ? He would have rejected the 

l 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 1 1 

overture, and accompanied his refusal 
with his characteristic disdain ; unless, 
indeed, he committed to Talleyrand the 
composition of ther reply. In this case, 
Russia would have received a vague and 
invidious answer, in the strain of that 
which he transmitted to Austria, on a si- 
milar proposition, at a subsequent period 
of the year — " That on the one hand from 
the nature of things, and on the other 
from the situation of circumstances, it was 
not even permitted to hope that the prof- 
fered good offices could be employed with 
advantage." 

The seizure of Genoa, the author con- 
tends, was an inadequate cause for the 
rupture of the proposed overtures of Na- 
vozilzofF. It was inferior in importance, 
perhaps, to the invasion of Switzerland, 
or the incorporation of Piedmont ; but aii 
act of aggression is momentous, less from 
its political consequence, than from the 
spirit of. , the aggressor. Bonaparte had 
: given very recent assurances of pacific dis- 
b 2 



12 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

position, both in his overture to our Court, 
and in granting passports to Novozilzoff, 
But he had scarcely subscribed his name 
to the latter pledge, when he violates good 
faith anew in the face of all Europe, by 
the seizure of one of its most ancient 
states. This act of perfidy, serious in it- 
self from the importance of its object, was 
doubly dangerous, from the time of its 
execution. As demonstrative of his insa- 
tiable ambition and lawless violence, it 
was most alarming to all Europe. Need 
we then wonder that, to an independent 
state, it was the signal for breaking off 
the advances to a negotiation which could 
not even be commenced without disho- 
nour? 

The author next proceeds to argue, that 
the league had no precise or definite ob- 
ject in view. In opposition to so extra* 
ordinary a charge, I shall quote the Treaty 
itself. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. } 3 

Art. 2d of the Treaty of Concert at 
St. Petersburg, 11 April, 1805. 

u The object of the league will be to 
carry into effect what is proposed by 
the present Concert, namely, 

" (a) The evacuation of the country of 
Hanover and of the North of Ger- 



many. 



** fbj The establishment of the indepen- 
dence of the republics of Holland 
and Switzerland. 

" fcj The re-establishment of the King 
of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as 
large an augmentation of territory 
• as circumstance will permit. 

" (d) The future security of the kingdom 
of Naples, and the complete eva- 
cuation of Italy, the island of Elba: 
included, by the French forces- 



1 4 ANSWER TO TOE INQUIRY INTO 

" (e) The establishment of an order of 
things in Europe, which may effec- 
tually guarantee the security and 
independence of the different states, 
and present a solid barrier against 
future usurpations." 

On the first article our author makes no 
comment; but he affects to be doubtful 
of the ineaning of the second, which sti- 
pulates the independence of Holland and 
Switzerland. He inquires, whether by 
this treaty is meant the nominal indepen- 
dence of these states, as had been already 
guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville ; or 
their real independence, consisting in se- 
curity from French influence during peace, 
and invasion during war. Is it possible to 
doubt that a league, formed expressly for 
establishing the independence of these re- 
publics, should not mean their real inde- 
pendence ? Was it probable that so im- 
portant a measure should have been adopt- 
ed with no other object than their nomi- 
nal independence, or that independency 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. ] $ 

for which the treaty of Luneville had pro- 
vided, and which experience had demon- 
strated to be inadequate ? The terms of 
the treaty of Luneville would at any time 
Jiave been carried into execution by France, 
on condition of peace with England alone. 
But the confederacy was formed in order 
to get better terms; and its object was 
undoubtedly not merely the evacuation of 
these republics by the French troops, but 
the restoration of their barriers in the 
same condition as previous to the French 
revolution — barriers which, in the better 
times of Europe, had maintained for cen- 
turies the independence of both republics. 

Our author appears entirely unacquaint- 
ed with the nature of the Dutch frontier. 
His words are — " As soon as a new war 
breaks out — as soon as the occupation of 
Holland is of the smallest importance to 
France, or detriment to us, has she not the 
means of agaj.n over- running the, D 
territories in a week ?" After so confi- 
dent an assertion, we should; be inclueejl^o 



16 ANSWER. TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

think that the Dutch barrier, once so fa- 
mous, had been totally swept from the 
face of the earth. How has this writer, 
then, disposed of Breda and Bergen-op- 
Zoom, two of the strongest cities 'of the 
universe ? Where has he placed Bois-le- 
Duc and Gertruydenberg, or has he forgot 
how much French blood was shed before 
the fortresses, comparatively inconsider- 
able, of Grave, Williamstadt, and Sluys ? 
By every treaty between France and the 
United Provinces, all these places, as well 
as others of strength, have invariably con- 
stituted an integral part of the latter. 

He proceeds to state, that " the whole 
of. Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, 
from Antwerp to Wesel, is French. No 
barrier remains between the enormous 
mass of the French dominions, and the 
little, insulated, defenceless province of 
Holland. The strongest part of her fron- 
tier, the triple line of fortresses which sur- 
round France in the north, is opposed to 
the weakest side of the D^tch territories," 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 1 7 

The whole of this extract, with exception 
©f the two first lines, is erroneous. That 
part of the Dutch territories which is op- 
posed to the French frontiers, instead of 
being their weakest side, is the strongest 
barrier in Europe. It contains the fort- 
resses I have mentioned, and can besides 
be completely inundated in twenty- four 
hours. Our author calls it the weakest 
side of the Dutch territories. Now the 
fact is precisely the reverse ; for it is their 
only strong side. Where else do they 
possess a fortress which deserves the 
name ? Is this the sum of that volume of 
knowledge in foreign affairs which has 
been so lavishly ascribed to our Right 
Honourable Secretary in that department ? 
And after this detection, what claim can 
an author have to our confidence ? 

In regard to Italy, likewise, he affects 
to consider the expressions in the treaty 
as vague and indeterminate. " The eva- 
cuation of Italy by the French troops," he 
;says, " would be nugatory in its effect. 



1 8 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

The whole Cisalpine territory is substan- 
tially a province of France, whether she 
rules it by French or Italian troops, and 
even if entirely freed from French armies, 
would continue under the influence of 
France, acknowledge her alliance, and re- 
ceive her troops as soon as hostilities were 
renewed/' I answer, that from Turin to 
Tarentum, the name of Frenchman is held 
in detestation. Let them fulfil the provi- 
sions of the treaty, by withdrawing 'their 
troops, and re-establishing, the king of 
Sardinia in Piedmont, and not a vestige of 
French influence will remain in all Italy. 
The whole system established by Bona- 
parte, his boasted laws and institutions, 
would share from this indignant people a 
fate equally destructive with that of the 
unwary Frenchman who wanders from 
his corps to fall by the stiletto. 

The author has, in this part of his work, 
put to himself a question, to which it will 
be gratifying to have a more explicit an- 
swer. "It may be asked," he says, " is 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. J g 

the situation of Europe so hopeless, that 
no means can be devised for accomplish- 
ing the grand objects which we have been 
rapidly surveying? Must Holland be 
united in fate with Belgium, and the 
Cisalpine decide the destinies of the 
south ? The consideration of these mat- 
ters belongs to a future stage of this in- 
quiry." I have looked through the pam- 
phlet in vain for a reply to this interroga- 
tion, and I solicit the author's attention to 
the pledge he has given us of his senti- 
ments on so interesting a topic. 

He proceeds to argue, that we hurried 
on the allies to a premature contest, be- 
fore circumstances justified a conviction of 
their firm adherence to the league. He 
insinuates that our reliance on the hostility 
of Russia to France should have been 
doubtful, because their political relations 
had recently borne the aspect of good un- 
derstanding. How completely is expe- 
rience at variance with these argumei 
Russia, firm to her purpose, continues 



20 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

faithful to the alliance, and the resolute 
enemy of Bonaparte's insolence and ag- 
grandizement. Austria, likewise, although 
fatally unsuccessful in the conduct of the 
campaign, was not inconstant to the 
league. She adhered to it with charac- 
teristic fortitude, and never forsook it un- 
til compelled by imperious necessity. 

The author of the Inquiry next blames 
our government for forming treaties, and 
stipulating subsidies, with Russia and 
Sweden, before we had secured Austria. 
The answer is obvious. These powers, 
remote from France and safe from her hos- 
tility, durst form engagements, which at 
that early period of the alliance would 
have been the height of imprudence in her 
immediate neighbour. In cementing a 
general league, which is necessarily a 
work of time, and of communications be- 
tween the respective powers too frequent 
to escape the eye of a watchful enemy, do 
you propose to begin with that power 
which, from its contiguity, he can make 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 2 1 

the object of his immediate vengeance? 
Certainty not. The just and obvious po- 
licy is, let us make our arrangements in 
the first place with those powers who 
are safe from the resentment of France : 
let us next exhibit to Austria the nature 
and extent of the aid we have procured 
for her. It will then remain for her to 
determine whether that aid is such as to 
justify her to incur the hazard inseparable 
from a grand effort to resent the aggres- 
sion of France. 

Inconsistency is the genuine offspring of 
error; and the performance under review 
now affords a striking exemplification of 
this maxim. The author blames minis- 
try for cultivating an intimate connexion 
with Russia, at a time when he conceives 
Austria was offended with that power. 
Yet, in the next page, he finds out that 
these two cabinets were so well recon- 
ciled, that the . influence of Russia with 
Austria was formidable, and a princi- 



22 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

pal cause of the court of Vienna acceding 
to the league. . 

The author of* the Inquiry proceeds* in 
a train of general reasoning, to argue that 
delay was infinitely desirable to Austria, 
and might be prejudicial to France. But 
the discovery has come too late. In order 
to have benefited the country, the late Op- 
position should have given us this informa- 
tion before the events of last campaign. 
Their sentiments, however, with the ex- 
ception of Mr. Fox, were then highly fa- 
vourable, not qnly to continental alliance, 
but to continental co-operation. On the 
opening of the session on the 15th January 
last year, Lord Grenville expressed anxiety 
not merely for a confidential intercourse 
with Russia, but for her active assistance. 
On the 20th June, Lord Carysfort blamed 
ministers for having been perfectly inac- 
tive for more than six months, in regard 
to continental connexions. Lord Gren- 
ville urged that no time should be lost, 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. . 23 

either in acting with the continental 
powers^as allies, or taking them as the um- 
pires of our differences in open congress. 
Eren Lord Howick, on the same day, 
urged a great and powerful co-operation 
on the continent, His speech, like those 
of the other members of Opposition, (ex- 
cept Mr. Fox) implied, that the alliance of 
either Austria or Prussia, joined to Russia, 
would form that great co-operation ; for 
it was distinctly stated, that no one had 
ever been so sanguine as to expect the ac- 
cession of both Austria and Prussia. The 
coalition actually formed was therefore 
not only in correspondence with the ad- 
vice of Opposition, but its magnitude ex- 
ceeded their demands, and surpassed the 
expectations of the most ardent. That 
was the time to have disclosed the circum- 
stances in the situation of Austria which 
forbade her to tempt the hazards of war. 
But, on the contrary, although Air 
was in the mouth of every speaker, no 
.seemed to think her situation unfavotu- 



24 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

able to active hostility; and all, except 
Mr. Fox, called for her co-operation. And 
such was the general satisfaction upon the 
developement of so extensive a confede- 
racy, that the Opposition press, while they 
termed it a glorious coalition, made every 
exertion to deprive Mr. Pitt of the merit 
of its formation. 

The events, however, of which Mr. 
Fox alone expressed an apprehension, have 
taken place. Had he then the gift of fore- 
sight ? or was he alone, of all our states- 
men, qualified to judge rightly on this 
most important subject ? Appearances 
may suggest this conclusion ; but an in- 
vestigation of circumstances will condemn 
it. The opinion he so decidedly asserted, 
was supported by no conclusive arguments. 
We shall look in vain in his speech for 
any allusion to the superior talents of Bo- 
naparte, or for any exposition of those er- 
rors on the part of confederacies, by which 
one vigorous opponent has generally been 



THE STATE OF THE NATION; 25 

enabled to overcome a coalition of several 
nations, united indeed by treaties, but dif- 
fering both in their political views and in 
the conduct of their operations. Had he 
enforced the application of such consider- 
ations as these to the actual state of Eu- 
rope, and deduced, in a chain of argument, 
those reasons which made him differ from 
all our other statesmen, he would have 
merited the reputation of superior judg- 
ment. We find, however, only a gene- 
ral allusion to the former disasters of Aus- 
tria. She had been defeated, when act- 
ing alone in 1797 and 1800, and forced to 
sign the treaties of Leoben and Luneville. 
Mr. Fox mentioned these treaties ; but he 
urged no arguments applicable to the new 
situation of Austria, when assured of the 
cordial co-operation of so formidable a, 
power as Russia. 

Was there not then a most material al- 
teration in the state of circumstances, when 
to the solitary erForts of Austria was su- 
peradded the confederate strength of a sis- 

c 



2 6 ANSWER TO THE INSUIRY INTO 

ter empire ? And, entertaining a convic- 
tion that both Austria and Russia, assisted 
by England, were unequal to cope with 
France, was it not incumbent on him to- 
explain his reasons for so singular an opi- 
nion? 

These reasons, I apprehend, we shall be 
forced to seek elsewhere than in the im- 
mediate subject of discussion, Mr. Fox 
has been through life the advocate of peace 
and the opponent of government — the pro- 
phet of success to France, and of failure tot 
her adversaries. The French revolution 
had been formerly described by him as an 
event splendid but harmless. In 1802, 
when France'had half a million of soldiers^ 
he counsels a reduction of our army. Then, 
indeed, he assigned his reason. It was on 
account of the strength of our navy, and 
because the navy w T as a more constitu- 
tional force. In ] 802, then, the danger 
from France does not appear to him suffi- 
ciently great to share his Jealousy with the 
influence of the crown ; but, in 1805, sq 

1 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 2/ 

formidable does he consider France, that 
if England, Russia, and Austria, with 
united force, dare to take the field against 
her, the war is not only hopeless, but the 
existence of Austria is endangered. 

Did Mr. Fox, in dissuading an active 
co-operation on the continent, recommend 
any other efficient measure in its stead ? — 
The only suggestion he offered, was the 
Tague and nugatory plan of a general con- 
gress. c ? Offer," said he, " at once the 
most reasonable terms. France will either 
accept them, or, by her refusal, she will 
draw on herself the indignation of Europe, 
in a degree commensurate with your mo- 
deration." In reply, I ask, what will this 
avail you ? Europe has been indignant 
for years at the aggressions of France. No 
new display of arrogance, no fresh viola- 
tion of sacred treaties, were requisite to in- 
crease her sense of injury. The inde- 
pendent powers had long complained, but 
the gate was barred to every demand of 
satisfaction. The cup of the bitterness of 

C 2 



28 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

Europe was full ; but when she appealed 
to Bonaparte, the substance of his replies 
were, " You shall drain it to the dregs, 

and you shall not even remonstrate." 

«/ 

Mr. Fox, therefore, opposed a conti- 
nental coalition, without offering any ef- 
fectual substitute. In the blindness of his 
predilection for peace, he forgot that, with 
so domineering a neighbour as France, the 
only chance for obtaining permanent tran- 
quillity is in vigorous war. In depreci- 
ating the importance of an alliance with 
Russia and Austria, he differed, not only 
from all the leading men on both sides, 
but with that inconsistency which has fre- 
quently marked his conduct, he differed 
from himself. In June, 1805, he says, cc I 
will refuse my sanction to any subsidy ta 
Russia, even if leagued with Austria." But 
in May, 1 803, so highly did this profound 
statesman estimate the influence of Russia 
and the condescension of Bonaparte, that 
he exclaimed, " I ask any one who has at- 
tended to the, affairs of the continent,, whe- 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 29 

ther he thinks that' France, if she saw 
Great Britain and Russia firmly united 
against her, would not be appalled into 
justice and moderation." 

Our author occupies nearly ten pages in 
treating of the imprudence of commencing 
hostilities before the disposition of Prussia 
was ascertained. He comments on the 
changes of disposition in that power, and 
on her apparent hostility to the confede- 
racy at the commencement of the opera- 
tions. While he acknowledges that our 
documents on this important subject are 
peculiarly defective, he adopts a decided 
tone throughout, on a subject, in many 
respects, involved in mystery. This is 
, neither a candid procedure, nor likely to 
lead to a true result. Let us, in availing 
ourselves of the scanty materials afforded 
'by the official papers, combine with these 
. an attentive consideration of circumstances 
• and events. This mode of reasoning will 
-be found more favourable to the attain- 
-anent of impartial conclusions on a most 



30 , ANSWER. TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

interesting topic, than the plan adopted in 
the Inquiry, which appears to recognize 
no arguments unless those which have a 
tendency to. censure the conduct of the 
allies. 

■ - . . 

Had the allies deemed the assistance of 
Prussia essential to the success of the co- 
alition, and relied on obtaining it, such 
, confidence in a power whose policy has 
long been either wavering, ox favourable 
to France, would have been extremely in- 
judicious. It appears, however, from the 
\5dh0le tenor of the official documents, that 
tjiey neither reckoned upon her accession 
to^ the^ league, nor considered her co-ope- 
ration necessary for .their success. But 
although they neither calculated on her 
alliance, nor viewed it as indispensable, it 
is probable they entertained hopes that in 
consequence of the league, Prussia would 
be reanimated to a sense of what she owed 
to her own safety and to the interest of 
Europe. That these hopes were not with- 
out foundation, may not only be presumed 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 31 

from a just view of her own situation, but 
is made apparent by the promptitude with 
which she assumed a hostile attitude to 
France immediately after the violation of 
the territory of Anspach, from the known 
disposition of her Minister Hardenberg, 
and from the influence of Russia at Berlin 
— an influence of which it is difficult ta 
describe the nature or extent^ but which 
appears from its effects to have been ver^ 
powerful. 

Of the hostility of Prussia the- allies 
had no reason to be afraid. She had con- 
tinued neutral since 3 794, during a series 
of campaigns in the heart of Germany .' 
Even when Austria fought alone, Prussia 
could not be induced by France to a de- 
parture from her favourite system. ~ Much 
less would the arguments of France have 
availed, when Russia not only favoured 
the' cause 'of Austria, but had become a 
principal in the war. Russia is not only ' 
the immediate and most formidable neigh- 
bour 1 of Prussia i but I have the'a^n*?^^ 



32 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

of the writer of the Inquiry himself when 
I state, that the provinces of Polish Prus- 
sia are a constant subject of anxiety to the 
Court ot Berlin ; and that Russia, without 
incurring risk to herself, may at any time 
excite them to revolt. There is therefore 
no danger that the Cabinet of Berlin will 
hazard a war with that of St. Petersburg. 
With a view to the maintenance of peace 
in Germany, she interdicted, in the first 
instance, the passage of her territories to 
the Russians. But she had communicated 
a similar injunction to the French. This, 
therefore, was no act of hostility to the 
allies, but a demonstration of neutrality-. 

In urging the importance of the acces- 
sion of Prussia to the league, our author 
maintains, that " without her co-operation, 
every chance of ultimate success was 
against the allies ; with her aid, it was 
scarcely possible their scheme oould alto- 
gether fail." This declaration is by much 
too absolute. The success of a confede- 
racy against France depends less upon the 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 3 3 

number of its component members than 
upon the spirit which invigorates and the 
talents which direct. In a coalition of 
several powers, the accession of another 
^conveys less additional strength than the 
numerical statement of her forces may 
suggest. In an alliance of Austria and 
Russia, the addition of 15 0,000 excellent 
troops to the armies at their disposal, 
would be an incalculable augmentation of 
force. Not so the co-operation of 150,000 
Prussians, commanded hy different ge- 
nerals, actuated by distinct views, and 
acting on a remote part of the theatre of 
the war. In multiplying allies, you lose 
the benefit of unity of action, you incum- 
ber your plans, you delay yonr operations. 
Russia is to Austria a most valuable ally, 
not only from the magnitude of her power 
but from her disinterested views. Too 
distant from France to have any object in 
territorial acquisitions in the theatre of the 
war, she makes that disposition of her 
troops which Austria recommends. She 
renders their operations subservient, not 



34 ANSWER TO THF INOUIRY INTO 

to the acquisition of a particular province, 
but to the general purposes of the league. 
Prussia, on the other hand, is possessed 
of territories near the seat of war, and de- 
sirous of making conquests for herself. 
Instead, therefore, of generously contri- 
buting her whole force to the common 
object of the league, she will direct her 
operations to tHe'attainment of points Gen^ 
ducive to her own views. An army of 
50)000 men may be thus detained for 
months, in the siege of "a fortress, garri- 
soned by one-fourth of their numbers, 
while the enemy throw the mass of their 
troops, in irresistible force, in a different 
direction. Had ~ Prussia ^Been, -from the 
beginning of the campaign, 'an actiVe 
member of the coalition, ' the scenes of 
her operation would naturally have been 
Hanover, Westphalia, and ultimately Hoi* 
land. According to their usual policy, the 

French would have left in these countries 

i 

scarcely any more regular troops than 
were necessary to garrison the fortresses. 
The chief part of their force would have 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 35 

been withdrawn to attempts of daring en-> 
terprise towards the centre of the war. 
The sieges of Hameln, and of the fortified 
towns in Holland, would have long occu- 
pied the Prussians. During this precious 
interval, the French would have made a 
diligent and effectual use of their troops in 
a different quarter. And it would have 
been conformable to their system to have 
brought back, on the approach of winter, 
large bodies into Brabant and Flanders, 
and to have attempted, by dint of an over- 
powering force, the recovery of the Prus- 
sian conquests. 

However singular it may appear, the 
Austrians have been more successful in se- 
veral campaigns without than with allies. 
In 1794, although aided by the Prussians, 
the English, and Dutch, they experienced 
nothing but disasters. Left alone in 1 7Q5, 
they obtained the most brilliant victories. 
The issue of the campaign, of ] ~Q(), had it 
not been for the fatal talents of Bonaparte, 
would have been eminently successful. In 



36 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

the memorable campaign of 17QQ, they re- 
pulsed the French in every direction, and 
met with no misfortune until the arrival of 
Korsakoff, with 30,000 Russians, induced 
the Archduke Charles to give an unfor- 
tunate extension to the theatre of ope- 
rations. 

These examples by no means prove that 
the accession of an ally confers no increase 
of strength, but they warn us against 
adopting the additional numbers as the 
rule of computation for the extent of ac- 
tual assistance. The aid of 150, ooo troops, 
so well disciplined as the Prussians, would 
be incalculable were they placed at the 
absolute disposal of the generalissimo of 
the coalition. But if they receive their 
orders from the Court of Berlin, we must 
make a most important deduction from 
their computed efficiency, in consequence 
of the distinction of their objects, and 
their distance from the central operations 
of the war. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 3 / 

The author of the Inquiry finds fault 
with Ministry " for not attempting to 
avail themselves of the favourable change 
produced in the sentiments of Prussia, by 
the violation of the territory of Anspach, 
in submitting the whole dispute to Prus- 
sian mediation at a time when France/' he 
affirms, " would have listened to whatever 
came from Berlin ; while the forces of 
Austria were not irreparably injured, and 
the armies of Russia were still unim- 
paired." In this instance, as in many 
others, our author's reasoning is at vari- 
ance, not merely with probability, but 
witrMacts of public notoriety. The vio- 
lation of the territory of Anspach took 
place on the 4th and 5 th October ; and in 
a week afterwards, by Mack losing the 
opportunity of retreat, his army was lost 
to Austria. The sentence I have quoted 
must have one of two meanings : Either 
" that Ministers ought to have acquired 
the knowledge of the violation of Ans- 
pach, procured the mediation of Prussia, 
and saved the Austrian army in a week," 



SB ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

which is too absurd ever to have been in 
the contemplation of the author ; or " that 
they should have obtained the Prussian 
mediation before the Austrian forces were 
otherwise injured than by Mack's sur- 
render, and while the armies of Russia 
were still unimpaired. 9 * Strange to tell, 
this explanation of the author's meaning 
is equally inconsistent with fact as the 
other with possibility ; for before the Aus- 
trian force was otherwise injured than by 
Mack's surrender, before the Russians had 
fought at all, (except at Krems where 
they were victorious) Count Haugwitz did 
arrive in the French camp with offers of 
mediation, to which Bonaparte refused to 
listen, except on the terms he had already 
offered to Austria — terms equivalent to 
her absolute and unconditional submis- 
sion. 

Mediation is a favourite topic with our 
author. He seems disposed to recom- 
mend it on every occasion ; and there is 
an obvious correspondence between hisr 



. THE STATE OF THE NATION. • 3«J 

views, in this respect; and the strain of 
pacific sentiments expressed at all times 
by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons* 
It is important, however, to observe, that 
the French are still more formidable in ne- 
gotiation than in the field ; and the history 
of Europe since 1792 offers a series of 
proofs of the fatal effects of armistices and 
treaties. Their object in making these 
is not to conclude an equitable peace, but 
to gain time, to divide allies from each 
other, to effect separate negotiations, and 
always to avoid treating with a confede- 
racy. Even in the latter case, if obliged 
to treat with several powers at the same 
time, all the chances of success from di- 
plomatic artifice are in favour of France. 
In the progress of the negotiation, she 
will calculate on detaching one at least of 
the allied courts from the league. In re- 
gard to the duration of the conferences, as 
she is under no necessity to consult any 
other power, she may make it as long or 
as short as suits her purpose. She may 
at one period gain time, by inducing false 



40 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

expectations of a conceding disposition, or 
she may proclaim a sudden rupture, if she 
consider her forces in a state of prepara- 
tion to anticipate the allies. Upon the 
violation of the territory of Anspach, 
Prussia with one hand unsheathed the 
sword, and with the other, opened the 
path to amicable negotiation. Our mini- 
stry then dispatched Lord Harrowby to 
secure her in the interest of the league. 
The chief object of his mission was pro- 
bably a liberal overture of subsidy, if she 
would join her forces to the common 
cause. Had ministers omitted so import- 
ant a measure, or had they confined them- 
selves, as the author of the Inquiry re- 
commends, to soliciting her mediation, 
what a torrent of abuse would have been 
poured upon them by the Opposition ! 
They would have been told that a con- 
federacy is formidable only in the field — 
that in negotiation it loses not only its 
energy, but the chance of its existence — 
that when a coalition has been formed, 
the only just policy is to proceed to im-r 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 41 

mediate action — that when a great power 
indicates a disposition to accede to a 
league, the most decisive measures should 
be adopted to procure her immediate co- 
operation in the field— and that ministers, 
by confining their application to Prussia, 
at such a crisis, to the solicitation of her 
mediatory offices, had lost the only mo- 
ment for the redemption of Europe — a 
moment which would never return. 

The writer of the Inquiry next censures 
the British government for allowing the 
command in chief to be intrusted to Ge- 
neral Mack. I agree with him that this 
choice was singularly injudicious, but the 
interference of our Cabinet could not have 
prevented his nomination. The same 
blind predilection in the Court of Vienna 
which led to his appointment, would have 
persisted in his choice. An ally may in- 
terpose in the election of a commander 
for a particular service in which that 
ally is interested. Had the campaign pro- 
ceeded as originally proposed, it is proba- 



42 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

ble that that part of the Austro-Russian 
forces which would have been stationed 
to preserve the communication between 
the allies in Hanover and the grand ar- 
mies in the South, would have been given 
to any officer the English Cabinet might 
have preferred ; but to prescribe to Austria 
the nomination of the commander in chief 
of her forces, in the heart of her own 
empire, would have been an attempt not 
only fruitless but highly offensive to a 
great state. 

The Austrian plan of operations was 
very judiciously drawn, and has been ge- 
nerally ascribed to Mack, with the quali- 
fication that he was skilful to combine but 
unfit to execute. After misconduct, how- 
ever, so glaring and inexcusable as that of 
last year, combined with his former er- 
rors, it is inconsistent to allow him any 
skill but that of intrigue, or any art ex- 
cept that of impressing others with a no- 
tion of his ability. It is very extraordi- 
nary that a man of such contemptible 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 43 

parts should have been so long in favour 
at the Court of Vienna. No individual 
has contributed more to the success of 
France, and to the degradation both of his 
own country and of Europe. It is very 
probable that his influence with Prince 
Coboug in 1792 and 1793 counter ed 
that vigorous plan of warfare which the 
genius of Clairfait would have recom- 
mended, and which, when he became com- 
mander in chief, he so gloriously exem- 
plified. In 1799, Mack was sent to Na- 
ples, and in a few months entirely lost 
the army intrusted to him. Finally, in 
1805, he is placed at the head of one of 
the finest armies ever sent into the fields 
and in six weeks he delivered it into the 
possession of the enemy. 

Our author proceeds to state, that a 
grand error was committed by the Aus- 
trians in passing the Inn, and carrying the 
war at once into Bavaria before the Rus- 
sians were near to support them. The in- 
fluence of England, he adds, should have 

d 2 



44 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

interfered to " modify the plan of the cam- 
paign, and prevent the violation of the 
Bavarian neutrality." 

To suppose that Austria would pay any 
attention to the suggestions of so distant 
a cabinet as our's, in regard to her opera- 
tions in Bavaria is almost as extraordinary 
as to believe that our Admiralty would 
send to Vienna for instructions for the 
channel fleet. Passing by this charge as 
undeserving either of the author's atten- 
tion or of mine, I shall proceed to a more 

interesting topic the consideration of 

what should have been the conduct of 
Austria to Bavaria. This question will 
involve reflexions on some of those grand 
causes which decide the fate of battles and 
the issue of campaigns — a subject most 
important in itself, and essential to a dis- 
quisition of this nature, but on which it 
does not appear from the Inquiry that its 
author has bestowed the attention it de- 
serves. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 45 

The conduct of Austria to Bavaria ought 
to have been similar to that of the King 
of Prussia to Saxony in 1756. That vigi- 
lant prince foresaw the approach of a war, 
in which he had reason to believe that his 
neighbour was concerned — he therefore 
took immediate possession of his country. 
The connexion between Bonaparte and the 
Elector of Bavaria was notorious. The 
.electoral house is the hereditary enemy of 
the house of Austria. When his troops 
have fought under its banners, it has been 
the effect, not of cordiality but of necessity. 
The known duplicity of the Elector not 
only justified but necessitated the prompt- 
est measures. The obvious policy of Aus- 
tria was, therefore, as soon as she judged 
hostilities inevitable, to invade Bavaria 
with a very numerous army, to over-run it 
with the greatest celerity, to disarm every 
electoral soldier, and to strip the treasury 
of its last dollar, not with the mean in- 
tention of finally retaining the money, but 
to deprive the Elector of the means of ful- 



46 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

filling his perfidious engagements with 
France. 



The invasion of Bavaria took place on 
the 7th September. The time appears to 
have been well chosen, as it was exactly 
the period at which Bonaparte ceased to 
entertain all ideas of peace, and to prepare 
with energy for war. While the main 
body of the Austrians passed the Inn, a 
division under General Klenau was or- 
dered to advance by forced marches to 
Neuburg on the Danube, to cut off the 
retreat of the Bavarians into Franconia. 
Hitherto all was well managed, and the 
electoral army, it was probable, would 
soon have been surrounded, when the cre- 
dulous Mack listened to the treacherous 
negotiations of the Elector and counter- 
manded Klenau's march, at a time when 
the progress of the Austrians against Ba- 
varia should not have been suspended an 
hour, by night or by day, except for the pur- 
poses of indispensible refreshment to the 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 4? 

troops. The consequence of the Elector's 
falsehoods, and of Mack's simplicity, was 
the safe retreat of the Bavarians to meet 
the French at Wurtzburg. 

To have communicated the intended 
league to a power so intimately connected 
with France as Bavaria, in the expectatioa 
of gaining her over to the alliance, would 
ha\e been the height of folly. Instead of 
treating the Elector with more delicacy, 
as the author of the Inquiry recommends, 
the great error was in showing him too 
much, and in suspending operations for a 
moment upon the pledge of so faithless a 
prince. 

Although to invade Bavaria and disarm 
her troops was the undoubted policy of 
Austria, it by no means follows that the 
campaign should have been opened on the 
Iller, Wherever it was opened, the duty 
of the Austrian commander was unques- 
tionably to retire upon the approach of the 
French, until he should have been joined 



48 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

by the Russians. The plains of Suabia 
and Bavaria offered to the Austrians every 
advantage for retreat — here were no de- 
files or mountains to impede their retro- 
grade march, or enable the enemy to cut 
off even detachments. It was not re- 
quisite to fight at all, unless perhaps some 
actions between the cavalry, a description 
of force in /which the Austrians are far 
superior. That Mack should not have 
adopted so obvious a measure would jus- 
tify the suspicion of treachery or madness, 
were we not assured, by fatal experience, 
that his intellects are of the meanest class. 

Our author proceeds to explain the im- 
portance of Switzerland in an offensive 
war against France, and to insist on the 
impropriety of Austria acceding to the 
neutrality of that republic. I agree with 
him in regard to the importance of that 
country, and that it is in vain to think of 
assailing France elsewhere with effect, 
But it must be apparent to whoever has 
read the official papers, that although Aus~ 
2 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 4Q 

tria acceded to the demand of the Can- 
tons as long as Bonaparte should respect 
their neutrality, she was fully impressed 
with the advantages ot carrying the war 
through Switzerland, intoFranche Compt£. 
It was evident, however, that until the 
whole of the Russian force should have 
arrived, there was no probability of the 
operations of the allies being sufficiently 
successful or extensive to justify the ex- 
pectation of carrying the war into Swit- 
zerland. To have refused, therefore, to 
acknowledge the neutrality of Switzerland, 
would have been to have declared to 
France, from the beginning, the plan of 
the campaign — a declaration not only most 
imprudent but wholly unnecessary, for 
the chances were a hundred to one that 
before the allies could have penetrated to 
the neighbourhood of Switzerland, the 
French, agreeable to all former and reeent 
example, would have of themselves vio- 
lated its neutrality. 

If it be argued that Austria ought not 



50 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INT© 

to have made any calculation on the pro* 
bable conduct of the French, but to have 
declared from the beginning her determi- 
nation to make Switzerland the theatre of 
war, although such declaration was nei- 
ther prudent or necessary, I answer, 
that if such conduct be dignified, it is not 
wise ; and that the simplicity it would 
discover, would at once unfit Austria to 
be the adversary of a power who is inca- 
pable of good faith, and whose whole 
policy is a system of fraud and false- 
hood. 

The next object of our authors animad- 
version, is the conduct of the British mi- 
nistry in the mode of our co-operation. 
He begins by blaming the expedition to 
Hanover, when a diversion might have 
been effected either in Holland or the 
north of France. To this the answer is 
obvious. By sending our troops to Hol- 
land, or the north of France, we should 
have exposed them to speedy destruction. 
.What chance of success could attend a 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5 1 

detached force in the heart of an enemy's 
country, remote not only from the assist- 
ance, but even the communication of our 
allies ? By sending our troops to Hanover 
they formed, in conjunction with the 
Swedes and Russians, an efficient army ; 
and had not fortune so unexpectedly 
proved adverse to Austria, they would 
have assailed Holland in the only quarter 
in which her frontiers are . open to at- 
tack. 

Boulogne now becomes the subject of 
our author's attention ; and he censures 
government because, when the French 
were conceived to have withdrawn their 
troops, they made no attempt against the 
flotilla. In a work professedly founded 
on official documents, and written in a 
style superior to common pamphlets, it is 
extraordinary to see the adoption of so 
vulgar an error as the eligibility of an at- 
tack, last autumn, upon Boulogne. " Ex- 
peditions of descent are, of all operations 



£2 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

in war/' says a very intelligent author*, 
" the most difficult and dangerous, To 
all the fortuitous accidents of war, are 
joined those of the seasons, the weather, 
and the sea." The batteries of Boulogne 
are of such strength that they may be de- 
fended by a very small number, compared 
with the force of the assailants. What 
proof have we that all the veteran troops 
were at any time withdrawn, and the de- 
fence intrusted to new levies ? How ab- 
surd is it to suppose that such a master in 
the art of war as Bonaparte should leave 
this, the most important of all his stations, 
inadequately protected. And even had 
there been a reasonable expectation of suc- 
cess, would our government have been 
justified in wasting on an object purely 
English, those forces which our engage- 
ments with our allies, and the common 
cause of Europe, called to the scene of 
combined operation ? 

* Character of European Armies 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 53 

He proceeds to find fault with govern- 
ment for accompanying the pensions to 
Swiss officers, with a stipulation that they 
should not reside in their own country. 
If government required the condition of 
non-residence, I must conclude, until the 
contrary be proved, that this measure was 
suggested by substantial reasons — espe- 
cially when I perceive that the arguments 
advanced in the Inquiry, to censure, in 
this respect, the conduct of government, 
are fallacious. Let us briefly examine 
them. 

The author describes the Swiss officers 
in our pay as " panting after the moment 
when their rage against France might once 
more shew itself at the head of their pea- 
santry," and that " had they been allowed 
to receive their pensions at home, the 
means would have been prepared of rous- 
ing the whole Alps, from Constance to 
the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon 
as the war should break out." 



54 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

I reply to this elegant declamation, that 
the Swiss officer, embarked in foreign 
service, is not actuated by those generous 
feelings which our author so liberally at- 
tributes to him. He discharges his duty 
with exemplary fidelity, but he follows 
his profession, not for the honour but for 
the profit it affords. He feels no other at* 
tachment to England, to Holland, or to 
France, than on account of the pay he re- 
ceives. On the contrary, the general dis- 
position of men in foreign service, is a ha- 
bit of invidious contrast between the coun- 
try of their temporary adoption and their 
own. In case of Switzerland becoming 
the theatre of war, the Swiss officer who 
might be resident there, and in the receipt 
of a pension from England, w ould obey 
her summons to repair to the standard of 
her allies, and w ould discharge his duty in 
the field as a man of honour. But if it be 
expected that he will be zealous beyond 
the line of military duty, and that he 
•' pants," as our author presumes, to excite 



THE STATS OF THE NATION. 55 

his countrymen to active hostility against 
the French, and in favour of the allies, the 
deception will be egregious. The prevail- 
ing sentiment in Switzerland is indeed a 
hatred of the French ; but this sentiment 
has not yet led to a predilection for any 
foreign power. The inhabitants of this 
once happy republic are strongly attached 
to their country and to independence ; and 
were not the attempt hopeless, they w r ould 
generously brave every danger in a struggle 
between Switzerland and France, But it 
will be difficult to convince them that the 
invasion of their country by foreign armies 
will be the means of restoring its liberty. 

So slender is the basis on which our 

author would have depended for u rousing 

the whole Alps from Constance to the 

Rhone in hostility to France." He " words 

it well ;" but if you attempt to seize the 

substance, it will fleet, like a shadow, 

from the grasp. 

frustra cornprensa manus effugit imago* 

Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima ?omno- 



5(5 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

Were Mr. Fox, in the event of a new 
war, to make any reliance on opposing 
the arms of Bonaparte by means so ineffi- 
cient as these, his campaigns would be 
the counterpart of Mack's, and we might 
prepare ourselves for fresh disasters as fa- 
tal as those of Ulm. 

Our author proceeds to ascribe to minis- 
ters the delay which occurred in the sail- 
ing of our expedition to Hanover. With 
his accustomed confidence of assertion, he 
insists that '* we were still less^prepared 
than our allies," and " that we took the 
means to defeat as far as possible the uti- 
lity, and narrow the chance of success of 
our expedition." If the author was unac- 
quainted with the real cause of the delay, 
his negligence in inquiry is reprehensible. 
If he knew it, and affected ignorance, the 
charge is more serious, and it would not 
be amiss to remind him of the temperate 
language of his patron, Mr. Fox, to the 
opponent whom he considers capable of 
wilful misrepresentation. The real cause 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5J 

of the delay of the expedition was the 
prevalence of a strong north-east wind, 
from September till the middle of Novem- 
ber. The armament was ready long before 
their sailing took place, and the same 
cause of detention prevented, for more than 
six weeks, a homeward-bound West India 
fleet from coming round from Portsmouth 
to London. Does our author mean to 
make Ministers responsible for the state of 
the wdnds ? or will he ascribe wilful neg- 
ligence to our merchants, on account of a 
delay of which there had been no example 
for fourteen years ? 

In one respect, however, I correspond 
in opinion with him — in the impropriety 
of landing an army in Naples. This mea- 
sure was obviously the wish of Russia, but 
it effected no diversion, and was conse- 
quently an unavailing mode of employing 
twenty thousand men. 

The author of the Inquiry proposes two 
alternatives for the disposal of these troops; 



58 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY W?0 

either to have disembarked them in the 
Venetian territory, and placed them under 
the command of the Archduke Charles, 
which would have been the proper plan ; 
or to have landed them in Lombardy, in 
order to hang upon Massena's rear. To 
land in Lombardy would indeed be a dif- 
ficult operation, for Lombardy has no sea- 
coast. But our author's meaning, no 
doubt, is, that while the Archduke made 
head against Massena's army in front, the 
English and Russians should have been 
landed in the north of Italy, and marched 
to Lombardy to hang upon Massena's 
rear. After making such a proposition, 
the author must forego his claims to the 
reputation of judgment in tactics. The 
disembarked army must either have con- 
fined its operations, with a view to its 
own safety, within such narrow limits, 
as to enable it to regain the shipping when 
threatened by superior numbers ; a scheme 
so adverse to all efficient hostility, that I 
cannot consider it as having entered into 
the contemplation of an intelligent writers 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 5Q 

or, the author's idea must have been, 
that the English and Russians should have 
advanced, with decided resolution, into 
that part of the interior where it was 
judged they could most effectually annoy 
the enemy. This plan, although appa- 
rently vigorous, would have been a renewal 
of the disastrous system of last war,in acting 
with divided forces against a bold and 
active enemy, whose greatest successes 
have been obtained by a rapid and skilful 
concentration of numbers. Twenty thou- 
sand Russians and English would thus have 
been placed behind Massena, whose army 
was not over-rated at seventy thousand. 
They could have had no direct communi- 
cation with the Archduke, and, in the 
event of attack from superior numbers, 
he could have afforded them no support ; 
for it is highly improbable that he should 
have received intelligence of their danger, 
until the season of relief was past. Mas- 
sena's army was composed of men in the 
prime of life, many of whom had marched 
in 1797, at the rate of thirty miles a day, 
e 2 



60 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

to destroy, on the same fatal scene, ar* 
Austrian force, detached and unsupported 
in consequence of the adoption of the 
unwise system recommended by the author 
of the Inquiry. This idea is equally ju- 
dicious with his proposal to disembark the 
British troops in Holland, or the north 
of France. In either case, speedy and 
inevitable ruin would have ensued. The 
system of the French is to accumulate, by 
sudden movements, a mass of force, in 
order to overpower any detached body of 
their enemies. And in both instances, the 
author of the Inquiry recommends exactly 
that plan which will throw our troops inte. 
their hands. 



The Second Part of the Inquiry relates 
to the consequences of our late foreign 
policy. The author begins by expatiating 
on the value of the cessions made by 
Austria to France. In speaking of Tyrol, 
he describes its loss as " of greater detri- 
3 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. Si 

jnent to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy, 
because it was invaluable as a barrier 
against the invasion of the hereditary 
states." He adds, that " Tyrol, if pro- 
perly managed, must always have been 
the main theatre of any war where Austria 
acted on the defensive." So erroneous is 
the whole of this reasoning, that the mis- 
fortunes of the Austrians have generally 
proceeded from acting in mountainous 
countries. It is this mode of warfare in 
which the French surpass them, and are 
always eager to engage. The French are 
not only superior in the agility and intel- 
ligence requisite for operations in hilly 
countries, but the nature of the ground 
prevents their adversaries from making use 
of their excellent cavalry. The Austrians 
must not put their trust in mountains or 
defiles ; they must summon their enemy 
to combat in the open plain— to the pitched 
battle — to the charge of the bayonet — to 
the deadly encounter of the sabre. Let 
the numbers be equal, and the commander 



02 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

of the Austrians a Suwarrow or a Clairfait, 
and the issue will not long be doubtful. 

After a florid enumeration of the advan- 
tages of Italy, our author adds, "All these 
are now in the hands of the nation in 
the world best able to improve them, to 
combine them, to make them aid one 
another; and after calling them forth to 
the incalculable augmentation of her for- 
mer resources, ready to turn them against 
those, if any such shall remain, who still 
dare to be her enemies. 5 ' This impartial 
writer does not then consider it necessary 
to notice, in a description of Italy, the 
hatred universally entertained in that 
country against the French ; the obstacles 
to improvement from the prejudices, the 
indolence, the cowardice of its inhabitants, 
or from the headstrong and injudicious 
nature of Bonaparte's civil administra- 
tion — his own tyranny — the rapacity of 
his officers — the embezzlement of the 
public property in every department of the 
French government, and a general system 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. f>3 

of arrogance, of rapine and oppression, 
which condemns to misery the inhabitants 
of this delightful country, and imposes 
silence by the bayonet on the just com- 
plaints of the victims of oppression. 

The conclusion of the sentence I have 
quoted is unworthy of a Briton. Can a 
citizen of this free and powerful nation 
be doubtful whether any countries shall 
remain who still dare to be the enemies 
of France ? Are Britain and Russia then 
so degraded and intimidated that they shall 
not presume even to take up arms ? Is 
their strength so exhausted, and their spirit 
sunk so loWj that no alternative remains 
but to receive, in silent submission, the 
dictates of the enemy ? of an enemy who 
acknowledges no law but his own will, 
no appeal but to the sword ? 

Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer 

Jura nogat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis. 

I must submit to the painful task of 
exposing to the indignation they deserve, 



04 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

several similar expressions in the publica- 
tion under review. They are unworthy 
of a member of a free commonwealth, 
and, how much more, of a mind enlight- 
ened by the envied gifts of literature ! In 
mentioning that since last campaign, the 
prospect of the deliverance of Holland, 
♦Switzerland, and Italy, is much lessened, 
the author concludes, " They have Eng- 
land to thank for this reverse of prospects, 
and it is probably the last favour they will 
receive at her hands." In a few pages 
farther he says, speaking of the continental 
war, and of the dread of invasion, " We 
have purchased a miserable respite from 
our alarms ; for, in spite of our boasting, 
we were the dupes of our fears." Again, 
when adverting to the picture he has 
drawn of the state of the nation, he adds, 
" It is our misfortune that we look around 
in vain for any circumstances which may 
soften its features, while it is impossible 
to imagine any addition which may aggra- 
vate them." And he recommends to offer 
equitable terms of peace, " in order to ob~ 



1THE STATE OF THE NATION. 6-5 

tain, for the first time, the favourable cha- 
racter of moderation and pacific disposi- 
tions." 

How false and treacherous are these 
assertions ! By what fatality is a writer 
of such talents impelled, instead of ac- 
cusing a party, to insult the nation ? Mr. 
Fox, in giving an avowed sanction to so 
unguarded a production, belies his re- 
putation for manly and liberal conduct, 
and justifies all the censures which 
have passed on him for imprudence. In 
the heat of debate, a generous audience 
will forgive the incautious expressions 
which have so frequently marked his 
speeches. But the invectives in the per- 
formance under examination are gratui- 
tous. They have been provoked by no 
aggression— they are justified by no hos- 
tility. Composed by the author in the 
leisure of the closet, and revised at the 
office of his patron, the injury they in* 
flfct is deliberate and wanton. The chi- f 
object of their acrimony is an illustrious 



•66 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

statesman, now beyond the reach of hu- 
man censure ; and with a blind eagerness 
to condemn his measures, the Inquiry be- 
fore us transfers its reproaches from Mr. 
Pitt to the country for whose cause his 
life was devoted. 

Not content with extolling the value of 
the countries lost to Austria by the last 
campaign, the author dwells upon the ba- 
lance produced in favour of the conquerors 
beyond the mere changes of territory. 
" Defeat," he says, " has caused humilia- 
tion in the Austrians, and victory a cor- 
responding elevation in the French/* 
However the French may be animated by 
success, he ill appreciates the firmness of 
the Austrian character who represents that 
brave people as crushed, because they 
have been unfortunate. The Austrian 
soldier knows neither intimidation nor 
despondency ; he will not forsake the 
field until ordered by his commander, and 
he meets death with a firmness peculiar to 
himself Equal constancy actuates the 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 0/ 

nation in their attachment to their sove- 
reigns. With such subjects what may not 
the Cabinet of Vienna accomplish if guided 
by enlightened views ? The weakness of 
Austria has confessedly been only in her 
government. The severe lessons of mis- 
fortune have a powerful tendency to era- 
dicate abuses. Such perhaps were the 
errors in the Imperial administration, that 
adversity alone could effect their cure. 
Its salutary effects are already apparent. 
The Archduke Charles is raised to the 
supreme direction of military affairs — a 
general enrolment for acquiring the use of 
arms is stated to have taken place. These 
wholesome provisions justify the expecta- 
tion of still greater improvements : they 
tend to promote the introduction of a wise 
system of policy in every department of 
this extensive empire. The loss of Venice 
and Tyrol will be compensated by the 
acquisition of a species of strength far 
more solid and effective; and Austria, 
when the wisdom of her government shall 
£qual the energy of her subjects, and the 



68 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

resources of her dominions, may with 
confidence appeal to arms, in vindication 
of her own rights and of the cause of 
Europe, 

The next remarks in the Inquiry relate 
to the increased danger of invasion. I 
view these in a very different light from 
the rest of the work, and I have accor- 
dingly made them the subject of a separate 
discussion. 

The author proceeds to accuse Ministry 
of having made no use of the interval of 
security from invasion, to effect a reform 
of our defensive measures. He neither 
indicates distinctly the plan of ameliora- 
tion he requires, nor gives any explicit 
reason why that was the proper season 
for its adoption. He mentions indeed, 
that we were then exempt from the ap- 
prehension of invasion ; but in that cir- 
cumstance there was nothing novel, for 
two winters had already elapsed since the 
beginning of the war, and every reflecting 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 6§ 

man must be aware that, during that sea- 
son, the danger from Boulogne is infinitely 
lessened. The best apology the author 
can make for this awkward argument is, 
that at the time he urged it, he could not 
foresee that Mr. Fox would be in office 
for several months without passing a single 
act to remedy those defects, for which he 
had so loudly reproached his predecessor; 
that a principal feature in his measures of 
military improvement should be the inef- 
ficient scheme of an armed peasantry ; 
and that the whole plan should be inade- 
quate equally to the expectations of the 
country, and to the splendid promises of 
radical amelioration held out by himself 
and his friends, before coming into power 



We have now reviewed a large pro- 
portion of the Inquiry : we have seen the 
author attack almost every measure of 



70 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY IKTO 

Ministry since the prorogation of last 
session. He adopts the strain of unqua- 
lified disapprobation formerly pursued by 
the Right Hon. Secretary : he commences 
where Mr. Fox ceased, and he rivals him 
in asperity of abuse ; perhaps also he may 
dispute with his patron the palm of incon- 
sistent and erroneous assertion. 

Not satisfied with so liberal an effusion 
of censure, the author deems it necessary 
to revert to circumstances antecedent to 
the late coalition. In this, as in former 
parts of the Inquiry, we are presented 
with a fluent series of arguments deduced 
from the most fallacious views. He dwells 
on the probability of our having been able 
to procure the accession of Spain to a 
general league, when it is notorious that 
since I7g5 the Court of Madrid has been 
blindly devoted to France. After expend- 
ing every epithet of reprehension on the 
imprudence of Austria and Russia in at- 
tacking France, he affects to consider the 
hostility of Spain, on the side of the Py- 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 71 

renees, as likely to be extremely hurtful 
to that powerful neighbour. The immense 
subsidies paid to France by the treaty of 
St. Ildefonso, as the price of the neutrality 
of Spain, he denominates a trifling aid. 
But the most extraordinary of his asser- 
tions is, that " if unfortunately we pre- 
ferred hostilities, we should have taken 
care to make the war as advantageous as 
possible, by liberating the Spanish colonies 
from the galling monopoly of the mother- 
country, and opening a most profitable 
inlet for our commercial speculations," 
This profound politician would then re- 
commend it as judicious to waste the lives 
of our se&men and soldiers, in attempts to 
conquer settlements in the fatal atmo- 
sphere of the Spanish main. He con- 
siders that commerce as likely to be most 
profitable, which, even in the event of 
conquest, we should have to carry on in 
a country without law, and with a race of 
men devoid of principle. Let him permit 
me to inform him that the evil of our 
West India acquisitions is their being 



72 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

already too extensive. They are the grave 
of our population and the drain of our 
capital. The climate of the continent of 
America, on which he seems so desirous 
that we should extend our possessions, is 
still more destructive than that of our 
own islands: and the inhabitants are so 
destitute of good faith, that to sell them 
merchandise upon credit, is synonymous, 
in the language of our merchants, with 
the absolute loss of the property. 



I come now to that part of the Inquiry 
where the author considers the situation 
of Holland. - He infers but too justly, both 
from its immediate proximity to France 
and from the character of the people, that 
the chance of freeing them from the influ- 
ence of our enemy is extremely doubtful. 
From the natural effects of commerce on 
national character, he concludes, that the 
Dutch dread revolution and war as the 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 7$ 

last of dangers, and that they depend too 
much on their trade to put honour and 
glory in competition with it. 

Having had the means of very accurate 
information, 1 feel justified in expressing a 
decided opinion on this important topic. 
My reasoning is the result of experience 
and observation. It applies to an interest- 
ing part of our foreign relations, and I 
claim accordingly the attention of the 
Right Honourable Secretary. 

Holland exhibits in every feature of her 
national character the effects of long com- 
mercial habits. Accustomed for ages to 
pursue trade and to reap its comforts, her 
people possess the care, temperance, and 
regularity, consequent upon the discipline 
of industry, but they are devoid of energy 
or enterprise. Her soldiers, and even her 
sailors, are raised only in a small propor- 
tion from her own population. West- 
phalia, and the other adjoining parts of 
Germany, supply recruits for her army 



?4 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

and the landmen of her navy. Even the 
seamen, whether in the public or private 
shipping, are not in general native Dutch- 
men, but from the north of Germany, 
from Denmark and Sweden. Of the men 
who fought oft' Camperdown, and so 
bravely maintained the former fame of 
-Holland, only a small proportion were 
Dutch. With respect to the army, Guel- 
derland, a province comparatively incon- 
siderable, is the only source of supply. 
There exists not a nation more destitute of 
military habits, or possessing less aptitude 
to acquire them. If the writer of the 
Inquiry believes that from a greater dread 
of the horrors of internal war than of their 
present subjection, they would rise in ac- 
tive opposition to an invading foe, he is 
egregiously mistaken. The Dutch, what- 
ever be their expectations from a force sent 
to deliver them, or whatever the tyranny 
of their oppressors, will act a neutral part. 
Individual safety is a Dutchman's object ; 
and from that, no consideration, except 
downright compulsion, can make him de- 



* THE STATE OF THE NATION. 7 5 

part. They are divided into two parties^ 
apparently so equal in numbers and influ- 
ence, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty 
to decide which of the two really possesses 
that superiority which is claimed by both. 
The highest and lowest classes are in 
general devoted to the Orange family, 
white the middle ranks constitute the 
popular party. The former are attached 
to the French ; the latter, as far as com- 
mercial jealousy will allow, to the English. 
This division has subsisted nearly two 
hundred years. Its spirit is hereditary, 
imbibed from the earliest period of life* 
and retained with the characteristic perti- 
nacity of the Dutch. So rooted is attach- 
ment to the Orange family in the minds of 
its adherents, that while that House pos- 
sesses a representative, no succession of 
revolutions, no variety of new constitu- 
tions, will eradicate it from their breasts. 
Yet such are the habits and disposition of 
the people* that, notwithstanding this 
strong predilection, no active co-operation 
in the work of their deliverance is to be 
F 2 



?6 ANSWER TO THE tXQVITLY .ISTO 

expected from them. In 1794, when the 
French approached their frontier, and 
threatened the overthrow of all that w T as 
dear to the Orange party, there was made 
no exertion of individual patriotism— no 
voluntary levies — no pecuniary subscrip- 
tions. The hired troops of the Republic 
(Swiss and Germans) were left to fight, 
unaided, the battles of the state. In 1 799, 
when the successes of the campaign had 
been entirely on the side of the allies, and 
the Prince's party had the strongest mo- 
tives, from the prospect of success, as well 
as congeniality of feeling, to co-operate 
with the invading army, it is notorious that 
they afforded not the smallest assistance. 

The republican party partakes equally of 
the national apathy. Their leaders, how- 
ever, have the benefit of whatever move- 
ment can be communicated to this languid 
mass by the machine of government. In 
1795, after the French invasion, a number 
of the citizens attached to the democratic 
side were formed into volunteer corps 



THE STATJS OF THE NATION. ?/ 

These, in the event of invasion, would be 
marched out against the assailing force. 
They would take the field from the neces- 
sity of obeying orders; but although nu- 
merous, they are so inefficient in a military 
view, that I do not under-rate the measure 
of their exertion, w r hen I state that the ad- 
dition of 5000 regular soldiers to the in- 
vading army would be an adequate pro- 
vision against the whole annoyance to be 
expected from the collective body of Dutch 
volunteers. 

M/y reasoning on the subject of Holland 
has not hitherto materially varied from that 
of the author of the Inquiry. We differ in 
the mode of deduction, but approximate in 
the result. In what remains, however, of 
this branch of the subject, we are most 
widely in opposition. He appears very 
imperfectly acquainted with the actual 
state of Holland ; and it is important that 
his inferences, should be investigated with 
care. 



78 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

In treating of the Dutch commerce, his 
language conveys a belief/ that, although 
not equally extensive, it continues in other 
respects in the same busy and prosperous 
state as in the better days of the Republic, 
Nothing can be more fallacious. A war 
with England is the signal for the Dutch 
flag to disappear from the ocean, Their 
West-India colonies fall an easy conquest 
to our arms, and their trade with the East, 
formerly the pride of Holland and admira- 
tion of the universe, is carried on by the 
limited and hazardous system of neutral 
flags. That portion of intercourse which 
they still maintain with other countries in 
Europe, is transacted in the same preca- 
rious manner. Their internal trade and 
manufactures are in a state of correspondent 
decay, and the whole country is under- 
going a most serious diminution, not only 
of wealth, but of population. 

Of this diminution our author appears to 
have been aware ; but he recollects also to 
have read, as a principle in political econq-* 



THE STATE OF THE N ATI OX. , j 

my, that the profits of stock increase as its 
total amount in a society is lessened. He 
not only applies this principle to the pre- 
sent state of Holland, but deduces from it 
a conclusion, which, in its present unqua- 
lified shape, conveys an impression alto- 
gether contrary to the actual condition of 
that unhappy country. I quote his own 
words: 

" In fact, the accounts of the Dutch op- 
pressions are greatly exaggerated. Many 
capitalists haye been ruined and forced to 
emigrate. Many persons have had their 
wealth diminished, and the whole riches of 
the state are greatly impaired ; but the 
profits, which are still drawn upon the 
remaining stock, are necessarily higher ; 
and this of itsef tends to alleviate the har- 
dens of the capitalists ivho are left behind" 

The general principle here introduced is^ 
illustrated in book 1st, chapter lXth, of 
that invaluable work, the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations. It is thus ex- 



SO ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

pressed : " The diminution of the capital 
stock of the society, or of the funds des- 
tined for the maintenance of industry, as it 
lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the 
profits of stock, and consequently the in- 
terest of money." Dr. Smith quotes in 
support of this principle, the great fortunes 
suddenly acquired in the ruined countries 
of Bengal and the other British settlements 
in the East Indies. 

This principle is not to be denied, and 
receives, in fact, an exemplification from 
the state of Holland. It was easy formerly 
to borrow money there at an interest of 
four per cent. ; at present, it is nearly im- 
possible to procure it at five. But the de- 
duction of the author of the Inquiry, that 
the increased profit of stock tends to alle^ 
viate the burdens of the capitalists left be- 
hind, is most erroneous, if we are to take it 
in the natural meaning of the words, that 
the profit on capital having become 
greater, the whole income of the capitalist 
has increased. This does not result from 



THE STATE OF THE NATIOK. 81 

the general principle, and it is fully dis- 
proved by the actual condition of Holland. 

'The diminution of stock in all societies 
is attended with the most ruinous conse- 
quences to the country at large. The 
capitalist sustains his share in the general 
calamity : he obtains a higher rate of in- 
terest, but his capital is less secure : he 
therefore dares not in prudence either lend 
or employ the whole. The hazards of 
trade are multiplied by the increased num- 
ber of -failures. He suffers from this cause 
directly, if he trade himself ; or indirectly 
through the instability of his debtors, if he 
lend his capital to others: he therefore does 
not employ the whole, either in trade or 
upon loan. Upon the invasion of Holland 
by the French, a large proportion of capital 
was hoarded. The practice of hoarding 
indicates a situation the Teverse of pro- 
sperous, both in the individual and in the 
country. By a total loss of profit there- 
fore on a part of his stock, the capitalist, 
notwithstanding the increased rate of in- 



82 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

terest on the remainder, derives much less 
income from his whole property in times 
of public calamity. 

In speaking of Bengal, Dr. Smith men^ 
tions, " that the great fortunes so sud- 
denly and so easily acquired in it, and the 
other British settlements in the East Indies, 
may satisfy us, that as the wages of labour 
are very low, so the profits of stock are 
very high in those ruined countries. The 
interest of money is proportionably so. In 
Bengal money is frequently lent to the 
farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent." 
If this was the state of India thirty or forty 
years ago, it is now materially altered, 
The usual interest of money is at present 
from ten to twelve per cent. The fortunes 
said to have been made in that country, 
have, both in Dr. Smith's days and our 
own, been much over- rated. If their origin 
be investigated, it will be found more fre- 
quently in the official situation of the in* 
dividual in the Company's service, than in 
the legitimate profits of trade. They have 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 8$ 

generally been acquired by men who were 
strangers equally to the principles and the 
habits of commerce : presents from the 
natives, or the possession of monopolies, 
will be found in the history of British 
India to have been a more fruitful source 
of fortune, than industry. The nature and 
progress of such requisitions have been re- 
gulated therefore by causes very different 
from the rules of political economy. 

It must be apparent that the state of 
gociety in Bengal and Holland is extremely 
different. In Bengal, property was for- 
merly very insecure, and trade confined 
to a small number. In Holland, property- 
was sacred, and trade the universal occu- 
pation. No two countries can differ more 
widely in the gifts of nature. The fertile 
soil of Bengal supplies with the returning 
season, a harvest abundant both for the 
industrious husbandman and his rapacious 
master. But Holland, bereft of commerce, 
Would lose that which alone renders her 
territory valuable. Her coast would be 



S4 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

reduced to a barren asylum for fishermen ; 
her interior would become a dreary marsh. 

The ruinous effects of diminished ca- 
pital would therefore be infinitely more 
felt in Holland, where commerce was both 
so generally prosecuted, and so indispen^ 
sable to the prosperity of the country. 
There, as in thi^ and in every trading 
country, a great part of business was trans-, 
acted upon credit. So important an in- 
strument is credit in mercantile operations, 
that in many branches the amount of stock 
or capital ceases to be the criterion of the 
extent either of business or of profit. In 
this country a longer or shorter term is 
taken for the payment of almost every 
purchase, and credit is as essential to 
trade, in its present state, as the atmo- 
sphere to our existence, The Dutch, fur- 
ther advanced in their commercial career 
than the English, more abundant in money 
and less accustomed to speculative enter-? 
prise, transacted more business by imme- 
diate payments. But eyen in Holland, 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. S3 

credit was the soul of commerce. A fo- 
reign conquest, a revolution, but above 
all, their wars with England, have les- 
sened exceedingly the mutual confidence 
of the merchants. By the interruption of 
her intercourse w T ith the East and West 
Indies, Holland is deprived of the most 
extensive and lucrative branches of her 
trade. The rum of almost all the public 
funds of Europe, except the British, is a 
fatal blow to a people who had lent out a 
large portion of their stock to foreign 
powers. Their internal trade suffers under 
a universal diminution of consumption. 
This complication of disasters has conti- 
nued to press upon them for above ten 
years. Its consequences have been, the 
emigration of a large proportion of the 
population, and despondency in those who 
have remained. Peace alone can preserve 
to them what they still possess, and peace 
is the prayer of every Hollander. But in 
the present state of Europe there is no 
prospect of any pacification which can re- 
store them to independence. It may. pro- 



86 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTd 

cure a partial relief from their burdens, 
but it will confirm their degradation, and 
rivet the chains of French despotism. 

The argument of the author of the In* 
quiry> that the increased profit of stock 
tends to alleviate the burdens of the capi- 
talist would have weight, provided taxa- 
tion in Holland observed a uniform ratio 
to the amount or profit of stock. Their 
late taxes are indeed a very large ratio or 
per centage upon property ; but this ratio 
is not uniform. It varies in different years; 
and instead of being more easily paid by 
the remaining capitalists in consequence of 
the faiin and emigration of their country- 
men, its pressure is by that cause exceed- 
ingly augmented. The measure of taxa- 
tion in Holland has long been, not a just 
regard to the means of its inhabitants, but 
the unavoidable necessities of the state* 
The French prescribe to them the mainte* 
nance of an extensive military and naval 
establishment, or the payment of a direct 
contribution to themselves : for these, and 



THE STATE OF THE NATION, Sf 

the interest of their immense funded debt> 
provision must be made. It is therefore 
the amount of their burdens, not the ratio 
of taxation, which is certain. The ruin 
and emigration of a number of capitalists, 
and the consequent diminution of the na- 
tional stock, increases very much the pro- 
portion of taxation on the remaining indi- 
viduals. A sum, certain and of* large 
amount, must be paid — the smaller the 
national property, the fewer the contribu- 
tors, so much greater must be the ratio 
of contribution. 

I have proved, I trust, that although, 
in the present calamitous State of Holland, 
the rate of interest is higher than formerly, 
the whole income of the capitalist is by 
no means increased. To maintain that 
the ruin and emigration of many capitalists 
is productive of effects tending to alleviate 
the burdens of those w r ho remain, without 
taking any notice that the same causes pro- 
duce other consequences tending in a much 
greater degree to aggravate their misery, 



88 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

Is an extraordinary mode of describing 
the situation of a country. The total re- 
lief afforded is one per cent, additional to the 
capitalist on part of his stock. Our author 
dwells on this advantage,but makes no men- 
tion that it can take place only under such 
circumstances of general distrust, that a 
considerable proportion of capital must re- 
main at the same time unemployed ; and 
that from the same causes the national de- 
spondency is so great, that this solitary 
advantage affords no substantial relief. It 
is a single ray of comfort sinking unper^ 
ceived in the universal gloom. 

To lend a sanction to a work so erro- 
neous in these inyporfant points, is no slight 
imputation on the accuracy of the Right 
Hon. Secretary himself. It is whimsical 
to consider how he will be apostrophized 
on the perusal of such a doctrine, by the 
classes whom it affects. The political 
economist will exclaim, " You lately ex- 
pressed a most extraordinary opinion, that 
you were very doubtful of the practical 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 8$ 

application of general principles. In the 
present case you not only apply decidedly 
the general principle, but you overstrain 
its operation." The merchant will say, 
M Your arguments are contradicted both 
by experience and common sense. To tell 
us that our burdens will be alleviated in 
consequence of failures and emigration, is 
equally judicious as to state that it is better 
to pay, instead of a moderate rate of in- 
come-tax, the enormous amount of ten 
per cent, at once," 

To the doctrine of moderation and pa- 
cific disposition recommended in the pub- 
lication under review, every man will 
subscribe. The difference will not be in 
regard to the admission of such principles 
while expressed in general terms, but in 
their application to particular circum- 
stances. Until these circumstances are 
defined, to descant in general terms, is to 
say no more than that peace is preferable 
to war, and moderation to violence. Un- 
questionably every enlightened and liberal 



£)() ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

mind, capable of appreciating the real 
causes of the prosperity of nations, will 
pronounce, that by a secure peace the in- 
terests of this country will be more effec- 
tually promoted, and its welfare more ra- 
dically and permanently established, than 
by the most successful war: and if Mr. 
Fox succeed in negotiating a peace ho- 
nourable to us and safe for the continent, 
he will deserve, not only the thanks of the 
country, but the forgiveness of all his in* 
consistencies. 

Of such a peace, however, we have no 
flattering prospect. To act a condescend- 
ing part in negotiation with so arrogant 
an enemy in Bonaparte, is to insure a 
renewal of hostility. Let it never be for- 
gotten, that the treaty of Amiens, of which 
the chief recommendation was its having 
been made " in the spirit of peace," kept 
us, during the short interval of its duration, 
in 2 state of alarm worse than war. In 
any negotiation with Bonaparte, let Mr. 
Fox remember, that he is treating with the 



yl** 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. Qi 

most false and artful of men, with one 
who combines the most subtle mind with 
the most perfidious heart. He alternately 
oppresses by open violence, seduces by 
secret fraud, or assassinates in midnight 
obscurity. 

Iile venena 

Colchica et quicquid usquam concipitur nefas, 
Tractavit. 

His system is to crush the w v eak, and be- 
guile the powerful— to frighten the timid, 
and cajole the brave. The sword is the 
favourite engine of his government, and 
it is congenial to the turbulence of his 
temper. But he combines in his adminis- 
tration every species of support to himself, 
and of danger to his enemies. By the em- 
ployment of enlightened men like Talley- 
rand, he makes even Philosophy administer 
her sacred aid to his lawless violence. He 
has reduced falsehood into a system, and 
adapts his lies with w r onderful sagacity, to 
whatever character he addresses. He pre- 
vailed on the Cabinet of Yienna to ac- 
quiesce in his usurpations in Italy, by pre- 
g 2 - 



g2 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

tending that they were necessary to enable 
him to re-establish with security, here- 
ditary monarchy in France. With equal 
truth, he will endeavour to persuade Mr. 
Fox that he desires peace for the sake of 
alleviating the sufferings of mankind — that 
he has always admired pacific sentiments 
— that he has no wish to abridge the power 
of Britain, but that he is desirous to culti- 
vate with her the most amicable relations, 
and to forget the evils of war in the inno- 
cent emulation of commercial rivalship. 



£ We have now followed the author of the 
Inquiry through the greatest, and by far 
most important part of his work. We have 
seen that the prospect of France agreeing 
to a negotiation under the mediation of 
Russia, was extremely doubtful : and even 
had it been ostensibly adopted by Bona- 
parte, we could have entertained no hopes 
of the cordiality of his acceptance, or the 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. Q3 

sincerity of his overtures : for he had 
scarcely agreed to the advances made by 
Russia, when, regardless of peace, he com- 
mits in the seizure of Genoa, an outrage 
replete with alarm, and declaratory of hos- 
tility to all Europe. 

The pretended vagueness of the terms of 
the treaty of concert is best disproved by 
a reference to the treaty itself. The au- 
thor's ignorance of the Dutch frontier will 
be apparent on a slight inspection of the 
map. Yet though thus imperfectly in- 
formed, he has no hesitation in passing 
unqualified censure on the statesmen w T ho 
represented England and Russia in the con- 
clusion of a treaty, whose object was the 
deliverance of Europe. The proper con- 
tents of a treaty, like that of St. Petersburg, 
is a declaration of its objects, and an out- 
line of the means for their attainment. In 
both these respects, this treaty is equal in 
precision to any antecedent treaty entered 
into for the purpose of a general con- 
federal. Its objects are defined with 



94 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

perspicuity, and it includes every provision 
which a treaty, contracted under such cir- 
cumstances, could contain. Its result was 
a coalition far more powerful than any late 
confederacy against France. Europe, from 
the north to the south, seemed to rise up as 
one man against that overgrown power. 
She failed in her efforts hy the infatuation 
of a General, who, in the first month of 
operation, lost to his Sovereign an army of 
80,000 men. 

The exemplary adherence of both Aus- 
tria and Russia to the common cause af- 
fords a most satisfactory contradiction to 
the insinuations in thfe Inquiry. The fidelity 
of these powers justifies both the past con- 
fidence and the future hopes of Britain, 
Honour and courage are not always suc- 
cessful, but they are the best guardians of 
independence, and they offer a fair field of 
promise against a future period, when they 
may be called into exertion under more 
favourable circumstances. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. Q5 

The co-operation of Prussia is valuable ; 
but it is not indispensable to the success of 
a confederacy against France. The allies 
do not appear to have reckoned on her 
assistance ; but they had, in her own situ- 
ation, the most satisfactory assurances that 
she would entertain no hostility against 
them, 

It is a whimsical excess of crimination 
to accuse our Cabinet of the mistakes com- 
mitted in conferences held between Russian 
and Austrian Generals in the heart of Ger- 
many, and of not having nominated the 
Commander in Chief of an army, where 
there was not a single British soldier, and 
of which we did not pay a third part. It 
is still more extraordinary to propose our 
Envoy at Vienna as a fit adviser for Gene- 
rals in matters purely military. Mr. Adair 
might have adopted, but Sir Arthur Paget, 
we have no doubt, would have declined 
this innovation in diplomatic arrange* 
ment. 



00 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

The necessity of insuring by treaties the 
CQ-roperation of powers safe in their dis- 
tance from France, before we called on 
Austria, her neighbour, to incur the for- 
midable hazard of her hostility, is so ob- 
vious as to require no comment, unless it 
be on the ingenuity of the author of the 
Inquiry, who devises arguments for every 
case. Although facts and reason oppose 
him, he will not shrink from the en- 
counter, but, like a true combatant, asserts 
the cause he has adopted under every dis- 
advantage, 

The invasion of Bavaria, so much con- 
demned by our author, was a wise and 
vigorous measure, It failed through the 
credulity of Mack in exercising towards a 
faithless Prince too much of that confi- 
dence which the writer of the Inquiry so 
strenuously recommends. 

Let him peruse again the Austrian plan 
of operations, and judge whether it was 
the intention of that Court to forego, in 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 97 

the event of successful operations, the ad* 
vantages of carrying the war into Switzer- 
land — advantages which he has himself so 
fully and forcibly illustrated. 

The sailing of our expedition to Hanover 
was delayed, not through the fault of Go- 
vernment, but by the continuance of con- 
trary winds. The author censures the 
sending our forces to that Electorate, be- 
cause the object was purely British ; and 
in the same page he accuses Ministers of 
making no attempt upon Boulogne. Does 
he then mean, that to have attacked Bou- 
logne would not have been an object purely 
British ? And would it have been an evi- 
dence of disinterested policy, after arming 
the continent against France, to have con- 
fined our exertions exclusively to our own 
security ? 

To counsel an expedition against Bou- 
logne, to dissuade the speedy conquest of 
Bavaria, to recommend the landing of 
bodies of British troops necessarily de- 



Q8 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

tached and unsupported, in Holland, in the 
north of France, and in Lombardy, are 
propositions so radically erroneous as to 
prove a total ignorance of tactics in those 
who have composed this Inquiry. To a 
literary man, it is no reproach to have 
omitted to study a subject foreign to his 
usual pursuits ; but w r hy does Mr. Fox 
lend his sanction to a work replete \vith 
such fallacious views ? The conclusion 
must be, that this far-famed statesman is 
unacquainted with the causes which de- 
cide the fate of battles and the issue of 
campaigns. When he relies on a defence 
so frail as an armed peasantry ; when he 
countenances the recommendation of de- 
tached operations in the heart of the 
country of an enemy so fatally active as 
the French ; and above all, when he makes 
light of the danger of invasion, without 
explaining the grounds of his security, 
except in vague and general terms, we are 
but too well justified to conclude, that he 
has neglected to give to these most im- 
portant subjects the grave consideration 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 99 

they demand, and that he has seen Europe 
shaken to her centre without investigating 
the causes of the awful convulsion. 

It is a no less glaring error to assert, that 
the Austrians, by relinquishing Tyrol, have 
lost the best theatre of warlike operations. 
Mountains have been to them the scenes of 
reiterated disasters ; their strength is in 
cavalry ; and their wisest plan of warfare 
is to force the French to pitched battles. 

In delineating the consequences of un- 
successful war, the author of the Inquiry 
views the question only on that side which 
suits his argument. With singular can- 
dour, he avoids taking any notice of the 
salutary reforms produced by the severe 
lessons of misfortune, and he describes as 
dejected and despondent a people who are 
strangers to intimidation. 

The causes of our quarrel with Spain 
have been so amply discussed, and its 
necessity so fully demonstrated, that I have 



100 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

confined myself to combating the absurd 
idea of acquisitions on the continent of 
America. The Spanish settlements would 
not be difficult of conquest, but success 
would to us be as fatal as discomfiture. 

To Holland I have assigned a longer 
chapter. The real situation of that coun- 
try, although contiguous to us, is very 
imperfectly known ; and the Inquiry de- 
scribes it in terms which could not fail to 
increase the previous misconceptions of 
the public, 

I have already expressed surprise at the 
palpable errors in regard- to tactics, in the 
high quarter which has patronized the 
present publication. An equal degree of 
ignorance in regard to trade, is apparent 
throughout. The commercial situation of 
Holland is as egregiously misunderstood as 
the nature of her frontier ; and to recom- 
mend an attack on Spanish America with 
a view to profitable trade, betrays an equal 
unacquaintance with the nature of these 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 101 

settlements, and of West India colonies in 
general. 

To the author, or rather assistant author 
of this Inquiry, I will recommend a better 
task. By adopting the distorted views of 
party, he narrows the wide field which is 
the legitimate province of the philosophic 
mind. While he obtains the patronage of 
the Minister of the day, he relinquishes a 
fair claim to general and permanent ap- 
probation. Instead of being the apologist 
of a party, let him constitute himself the 
advocate of Britain against France, the 
vindicator of the cause of Europe against 
the arrogant tyrant who threatens to en- 
slave her. If we can indulge the hope of 
a secure peace, let him exercise his talents 
in an inquiry into those conditions and 
that system which alone can insure per- 
manent tranquillity. If this prospect be 
denied us, if Bonaparte refuse to acknow- 
ledge claims indispensable to our safety. 
and belie, as usual, his professions, it will 
then become an adequate object for the 



102 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

talents of this writer to excite merited in- 
dignation against such insatiable ambition, 
to point out the nature and extent of our 
danger, and unfold those resources by 
which it may be successfully opposed. 

Had the publication under review been 
even less directly sanctioned by Mr. Fox, 
its internal evidence would have bespoke 
its parentage. It is replete with those 
extremes, both in thought and language, 
which characterize his speeches. Like 
them, the Inquiry presents us with an 
accumulation of arguments in support of 
whatever idea is uppermost at the mo- 
ment, without considering that the best 
means of refutation may be frequently 
found in this hasty assemblage. And, like 
his own career in public life, this work is 
an instructive exemplification of those in- 
consistencies which infallibly proceed from 
an ardent mind, unrestrained by caution 
and undisciplined by moderation. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 103 

Although Mr. Pittas name is not men- 
tioned in this publication, the whole at- 
tack, with the exception of Lord Gran- 
ville' s share, is directed in substance against 
him. When the present confederacy, the 
greatest w T hich for nearly a century had 
b>een formed against France, first developed 
its strength, the Opposition press loudly 
refused Mr. Pitt the merit of its formation ; 
but since Mack's infatuation marred our 
fairest prospects, every epithet of censure 
has been cast upon that distinguished Mi- 
nister. He is accused of not having ex- 
ercised in foreign states an extent of power 
which a sovereign often finds difficult in 
his own kingdom — of not having con- 
trolled from London the operations in Ba- 
varia. The faults of every court are 
ascribed to him, as if he had ruled Europe 
with despotic sway. Is it not obvious 
that England, remote from the theatre of 
war, must leave the conduct of military 
operations to the powers who are near 
them, whose force consists in armies, and 



104 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

who are more immediately interested in 
the issue of the campaign than herself? 
Were she permitted to direct the move- 
ments of the league, what could ensue 
from her distance but delay and disaster? 
The province of the British Minister was 
therefore to employ the resources of his 
country to unite as large a part as possible 
of the commonwealth of Europe against 
its oppressor; to conciliate the jarring in- 
terests of those powers, and bind them 
together in a solid league, definite in its 
objects, and upright in its views ; to con- 
duct this arduous negotiation with secrecy, 
and by every possible precaution to avoid 
awakening the suspicion of a vigilant 
enemy ; and finally, after having agreed 
upon a general plan of operations, to com- 
mit the detail to those who were to exe- 
cute them, avoiding that interference in 
particular objects which involves the ruin 
of confederacies by the distraction of their 
Views, and the division of their force. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 105 

In whatever way we examine the con- 
duct of these important measures on the 
part of Mr* Pitt, we shall find the most 
solid grounds of approbation. The alliance 
was formidable in magnitude beyond ex- 
ample, the cordiality of its members has 
been evinced by their constancy under 
disaster, and the whole scheme was con- 
cealed from the enemy until the Russians 
were approaching to Germany. England 
therefore amply fulfilled her part in the 
coalition, and its failure was occasioned by 
causes beyond her controul. 

The career of the illustrious Statesman 
we have lost, has been uniform ; it was no 
less great in its close than promising in its 
commencement. The historian of his life 
will be under no necessity to call in to his 
panegyric the aid of eloquent or impas- 
sioned language : let him endeavour to 
elevate his mind to the conception of Mr. 
Pitt's views, to investigate his measures 
by their own merits, to weigh his mo- 

H 



106 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

lives and conduct in silent meditation, 
without attending to the reports either of 
friends or enemies, and he will pourtray a 
character equally admirable in all that 
enlightens the mind, and dignifies the 
heart. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 107 



STRICTURES 

OH THE 

CONDUCT 

OF THE 

PRESENT MINISTRY, 



The author of the Inquiry re-echoes the 
high encomiums on our present Adminis- 
tration, which were so lavishly bestowed 
on them when entering into office ; but of 
which we every day hear less. He de- 
scribes them as " uniting the largest portion 
of talents, experience, rank, and integrity; 
the most ample share of all the qualities, 
whether natural or acquired, intrinsic or 
accidental, which ever enabled a govern- 
ment to secure influence with its subjects, 
and command respect among foreign na- 

H 2 



208 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

tions." He subsequently adds, " No com- 
promise of principles, no paltry half-mea- 
sures, no incongruous mixture or big 
words and little doings, will bear them out 
in redeeming their pledge to save the 
country." Let us briefly examine how far 
their proceedings, since they came into 
office, have entitled them to the lofty de- 
scription given of them by our author, have 
accorded with their own promises, or have 
fulfilled the expectations of the country. 

1. Lord Ellenborough's appointment to 
a seat in the Cabinet. In an Administra- 
tion composed of men who, on all occa- 
sions, had professed so great a jealousy of 
the executive power, and so firm an ad- 
herence to the rights of the people, above 
all to the impartial administration of public 
justice, the introduction of the Lord Chief 
Justice into the Cabinet was a step equally 
unexpected and inconsistent To unite 
in one person functions so opposite as the 
judicial and executive, is repugnant equally 
to the provisions of our excellent consti- 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 10Q 

tion, and to the first principles of justice. 
The impropriety of the measure was com- 
pensated by no countervailing advantage, 
it was required by no imperious necessity. 
Already fully occupied by most laborious 
duties, his Lordship can devote no ade- 
quate portion of his time to political avo- 
cations. Advanced to the summit of his 
profession, and enjoying its highest ho- 
nours, his dignity does not require this 
adventitious distinction. 

Besides, the study of law is not the 
school of politics. The best pleaders of 
the present day, whether distinguished 
for animated oratory, or depth of legal 
knowledge, are, with very few exceptions, 
unimpressive in the senate. The causes 
are obvious. A difficult and laborious 
profession absorbs that time, which, to 
make an able statesman, it is indispensable 
should be given to objects of general policy. 
The incessant study of former enactments 
and records accumulates a mass of in- 
formation in regard to statutes and prece- 



1 1 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

dents, but is unfavourable to the exercise 
of those faculties which must be roused 
into action in order to provide for combina- 
tions of circumstances perpetually varying, 
and contingencies perpetually new. 

Were the study of the law indeed con- 
ducted in thi$ country as it ought, it might 
well be considered a proper preparation 
for the duties of a statesman. Judicial 
may be no less necessary than political 
interference in the transactions which take 
place between the members of a com- 
munity; and an intimate knowledge of the 
general principles which regulate these 
transactions, as well as of the actual cir- 
cumstances in which the society is placed, 
seems equally essential to the complete 
education of the lawyer as of the politician. 
But while the study of the law consists 
almost wholly in a knowledge of forms, of 
an ill-contrived technical jargon, and of a 
mass of decisions and regulations, without 
any attention to the circumstances in which 
they originated, the principles on which 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. Ill 

they are founded, or their defects and 
possible improvements — the study of the 
law cannot fit a man for any employment 
beyond the precincts of a court of justice. 

This extraordinary measure of giving 
the Chief Justice a voice in the Cabinet, 
might suit the arrangement of parties, but 
it does not suit the country. It might 
gratify his Lordship, but it gives him no 
real exaltation. It renders more prominent 
that part of his character which is least 
admired. We reverence inflexible integrity 
and eminent talents in the Judge — in the 
Senator we recognise the common passions 
and prejudices of men. 

2. The accession of Lord Sidmouth to a 
Cabinet, of wnich Mr. Fox and Lord 
Grenville were the leading members, was 
matter equally of surprise and censure. 
So glaring an inconsistency is not to be 
excused by attributing similar conduct to 
Mr. Pitt. There were no such radical 
grounds of difference between his Lord- 



112 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

ship and Mr. Pitt as between his Lordship 
and the present Ministers. Of the three 
years of Lord Sidmouth's administration, 
Mr. Pitt concurred in and supported the 
measures of the first two. In the third 
year, upon the renewal of the war, he 
gave an example of constitutional and 
temperate opposition, which> let us hope 
for our country's sake, will not be soon 
forgotten. He disapproved of several im- 
portant parts of the conduct of Adminis- 
tration ; but he continued to give them 
that assistance which he considered due to 
men of irreproachable intentions. He was 
desirous to introduce more decision and 
celerity into our military preparations ; 
yet, instead of thwarting, he supported 
the measures of Ministers. Instead of 
impeding their progress by new proposi- 
tions from himself, he transfused his own 
energy into theirs. A negotiation for his 
return to office had been broken off under 
circumstances which he conceived the 
ground of just resentment towards Lord 
Sidmouth. But, contrary to the almost 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 113 

uniform example of statesmen, his per- 
sonal indignation led to no public oppo- 
sition; he was satisfied in telling the House 
of Commons that he was detached from 
Administration, and took no part in ad- 
Vising their measures, except in Parlia- 
ment. Conduct, so temperate and patri- 
otic, endeared him to many who had for- 
merly admired only his talents. Even 
among his opponents there was not a man, 
alive to generous sentiments, or open to 
conviction, who did not forget all former 
hostility, and join in the general appro- 
bation. 

An opposition on such moderate and 
impartial principles as these, we are still 
fortunate enough to possess in Mr. Wil- 
berforce and other independent gentle- 
men. They, however, have never been 
in office, and are unconnected with party; 
they are strangers, therefore, to those cir- 
cumstances which intriguing men render 
instrumental to their ambitious designs, 
and which, even in the upright, have a 
powerful tendency to interest the feelings 



114 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

and biass the judgment. But a Minister 
out of office is almost unavoidably exposed 
to the influence of party connexion. And 
in a leading Statesman, I know not, in our 
history, a parallel to the dignified and im- 
partial conduct of Mr. Pitt. 

It was not until the Addington ministry 
had put a negative upon several of his most 
important military propositi's, and that 
our navy was hastening to decay, that Mr. 
Pitt considered it incumbent on him to 
make serious exertions for their removal 
from office. How differently had they 
been treated by Lord Grenville and Mr. 
Fox ! His Lordship had combated and 
ridiculed every measure they had brought 
forward ; and Mr. Fox, not contented with 
opposing particular propositions, declared 
them the weakest Administration who had 
ever governed the country. Despised, 
however, and vilified as he has been, Lord 
Sidmouth, instead of honourably disdain- 
ing the connexion, is induced to sit in the 
Cabinet with those whom he never can for- 
4 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 115 

give. After laying claim to the confidence 
of his Sovereign and the Country by a 
uniform appearance of candour and disin- 
terestedness, he is tempted to a connexion 
with men of the most opposite principles, 
by an office, nominal in every respect but 
income. Indebted to Mr. Pitt for his in- 
troduction into public life, by the appoint- 
ment to the high rank of Speaker, and 
professing throughout the greatest venera- 
tion for his talents and principles, his Lord- 
ship feels now no hesitation to act with 
the man who h#d been through life the 
opponent of his benefactor. Lord Gren- 
ville and Mr. Fox, who had formerly dif- 
fered in every thing, excepting the ridicule 
of Addington, now agree, with wonderful 
harmony, in recommending him\s one of 
the confidential servants of the Crown *. 

V 

* The publication by the French of the intercepted 
letters in the Admiral Aplin undeceived the public in 
regard to a most important political transaction. On 
the unexpected appointment of Mr. Addington to the 
head of the new Administration in 1801, it was gene- 
rally believed, from his intimate connexion with Mr. 



1 1 6 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

3. The remission of the unpaid penalties 
for the Additional Force Act, and the re- 
imbursement of those which had been 



Pitt, from his apparent unfitness for the situation, and 
from Mr. Pitt's reputed love of power, that Mr. Ad- 
dington was only a glove for the hand that still con- 
tinned to guide the reins of Government. This opinion 
was openly declared by the Opposition. Mr. Fox, 
with his usual discretion, harangued the Whig Club 
about a King who threatened to send his jack-boot to 
direct his Senate, and that we might now see the Jack- 
boot's jack-boot. This sagacious insinuation, how- 
ever, is disproved by Lord Grenville's letter to Marquis 
Wellesley of the I2th of July 1803 (intercepted and 
published), in which his Lordship, in speaking of the 
Ministry, says, " Mr. Pitt did not recommend Ad- 
dington ; and who that knew him would have done 
it Y* Again ; Mr. Henry Wellesley, in a letter to his 
brother by the same conveyance, dated 28th of July 
1803, after mentioning that Mr. Pitt and Mr. Adding- 
ton were no longer on speaking terms, uses these re- 
markable expressions : " Mr. Pitt opposes daily the 
Defence Bill in the House, but he opposes it as a 
Counsellor ; and by his very objections, he has ren- 
dered it fit for its intended purposes, which would 
otherwise never have been the case." 

Those who justly appreciated Mr. Pitt's manly and 
disinterested character knew him to be incapable either 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 11? 

paid, ivithoat any compensation to the 
parishes who had zealously fulfilled the 
intentions of Parliament, is one of the most 
extraordinary proceedings in history. We 
were prepared for obloquy being thrown 
on Mr. Pitt's measures ; but we could 
hardly expect in a Ministry, pourtrayed in 
such glowing colours, that even equity and 
justice should give way to resentment. 
By the mode adopted in rescinding this 
Act, those are acquitted who have con- 
temned the authority of the Legislature ; 
and those only have suffered who have 
evinced a meritorious and exemplary obe- 
dience. The anticipation of this dispo- 

of Court intrigue for the appointment of a Minister, or 
of an insidious support in Parliament for his continu- 
ance in office. But the aspersions were plausible", and 
the Opposition urged them with an assurance calcu- 
lated to impose on all those who adopted the current 
report of Mr. Pitt's ambitious disposition. Of these 
and similar calumnies, that great man disdained to 
take the smallest notice ; and this specious assertion 
might have continued to mislead the public, had not 
the accidental publication of Lord Grenville's letter 
given it an explicit denial. 



1 IS ANSWER TO THE iKQtTIRT INTQ 

sition on the part of Government was lat- 
terly the cause of the non-execution of the 
Act. By the actual remission of the fines, 
a most dangerous example is given to 
neglect the fulfilment of future statutes ; 
to oppose whatever may be troublesome or 
disagreeable to individuals, not by a con- 
stitutional resistance to a Bill in Parlia- 
ment, but by a treacherous dereliction of 
duty in the execution of the law. 

The intention of the author of the Bill, 
I am aware, was to find not money but 
men. The payment of the fine, however, 
was an evil on no account to be put in 
competition with the inconsistency and 
danger of rescinding an Act of Parliament 
under circumstances of direct injustice to 
that part of the nation whose exertions 
had been most zealous. Did Ministers re* 
peal the Act as a measure of popularity ? 
It could please only a part of the nation, 
and of that part only those narrow minds 
who can rejoice at their own escape, while 
their neighbours have Suffered, Of this 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. tlQ 

obvious consideration, Ministers must have 
been aware ; yet for the temporary grati- 
fication of condemning a measure of their 
predecessors, they have put on record, in 
its repeal, a precedent of most injurious 
tendency — the pernicious effects of which 
will take a deep and permanent root, and 
will continue in destructive operation 
when the Act itself shall be forgotten. 

4. Complaints of the exclusion of merit 
from the high offices of State, have been 
sounded in our ears these twenty years. 
The failures of our expeditions, and the 
errors in the administration of important 
departments at home, have been uniformly 
ascribed to the employment of incompe- 
tent persons, and to the exclusion of the 
tried servants of the State. Party-favour, 
in short, has been the theme of the bit- 
terest reproaches from the late Opposition. 
Pledged as they were to the preference of 
merit, and possessing ample choice of able 
men by the union of parties, what a selec- 
tion have they made for the Treasurership 



120 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRE INTO 

of the Ordnance ! They have intrusted the 
control over millions of the public money 
to a man, by profession a contractor and a 
banker, that line which, of all others, offers 
the greatest facility for a lucrative use of 
the public treasure. They have promoted 
to a station of high rank, a private trader 
unknown to the public service of his 
country: and they have associated with 
themselves a man convicted, by an impar- 
tial tribunal, of bribery and corruption. 

It will not avail them to plead, in apo- 
logy, the recommendation of higher influ- 
ence. As the Ministers of a free country, 
it is their duty to correct the misrepresent- 
ations to which Princes are exposed, and 
to inculcate the value of public opinion. 
A nation characterized by rectitude of sen- 
timent and integrity of conduct, requires 
its public officers to be exempt, not only 
from the censure of the law, but even from 
suspicion. Adulation, or pretended purky, 
may deceive an individual, but they will 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 121 

not deceive a people. Of the talents of its 
servants, the public is not, perhaps, the 
fittest judge ; but it will seldom err in the 
broad distinction between honour and im- 
morality. That to remove from offices of 
trust whoever shall have forfeited the 
public confidence, is necessary for the 
popularity of Government, w r ill be readily 
acknowledged. It is a kindred maxim 
with the wise saying, " that a King of Eng- 
land, to be powerful or happy, must reign 
in the hearts of his people." 

5. The refusal of a votejsf thanks for the 
capture of so very valuable a possession as 
the Cape of Good Hope, is an act of un- 
precedented injustice. The time taken for 
its achievement was short ; but are we not 
indebted in a great degree for the prompti- 
tude of our success, to the skill and gal- 
lantry of the attack ? To the timid or 
unskilful, every enterprise is difficult. Has 
our navy the less merit because the de- 
struction of an enemy has now become the 
work of a few hours ? Had the attack on 

I 



122 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

the Cape been mismanaged, the force op- 
posed to our expedition was sufficiently 
large to have repelled it. But the question 
has long been decided by repeated prece- 
dents. Both the value of the object and 
the difficulty of capture were much greater 
than on former occasions, when honours 
were conferred, and the national gratitude 
expressed. Let it be contrasted in both 
respects with the conquest of Tobago, 
Demerara, or Surinam, and say, whether 
it is fair to deprive the Commanders on 
this occasion of the fair meed of their gal- 
lantry. 

The injustice of the measure is aggra- 
vated by its inconsistency. The tribute of 
national gratitude is withheld from our 
brave defenders by Ministers who profess 
the most anxious solicitude in their behalf. 
Sir Home Popham is not, indeed, attached 
to Lord Sti Vincent ; but may he not justly 
claim the patronage of an Administration 
which pretends to make no ^'rtinction of 
parties, but to unite the talents, and re- 
ward the merits of all ? 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 123 

6. The next subject of my attention re- 
gards the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs. Were an admirer of that gen- 
tleman desired to select any late conspi- 
cuous display of his talents, he would pro- 
bably name his speech on 23d April last, 
on the hostile conduct of Prussia. Let us 
examine the prudence and consistency of 
this celebrated oration. 

The Right Hon . Secretary had very lately 
given his sanction to the Inquiry we have 
reviewed, a work replete with the con- 
demnation of the haughty and intemperate 
conduct of former Ministers towards fo- 
reign countries. In the beginning of his 
speech itself, he advises mild and concili- 
atory language : in what manner does he 
exemplify the moderation he thus pre- 
scribes to himself, and recommends to 
others ? By terming the seizure of Hanover 
an outrage unprecedented in the history 
of the worst proceedings of the worst 
times of Europe — the union of every 
thing contemptible in servility with every 
I 2 



124 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

thing odious in rapacity ! In the prelude, 
he states this to be the measure of France; 
but soon forgetting this admission, he ar- 
raigns it as the act of Prussia. He declares 
in his outset, that Prussia had been forced 
into the conduct he now deprecates ; but 
proceeding in his speech, he makes the 
important discovery, that this compulsion 
was only partial^ and that, though obliged 
to cede Anspach and Bayreuth, she was 
not obliged to seize Hanover. And he 
concludes this most judicious and concili- 
ating harangue, by declaring this great 
Power (who is naturally our ally, and 
whom he had declared it bad policy to 
irritate) to be in the last stage of complete 
vassalage, and to have become the con- 
temptible instrument of the injustice of a 
master. 

Such is the consistency and moderation 
of that great man, to whom it was called 
presumption in Mr. Pitt to consider him- 
self a rival ! 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 126 

7. There is no talent of more essential im- 
portance to a country, in those who are 
placed at the head of its affairs, than the 
capacity of penetrating into the characters 
around them, and of making the wisest 
selections for the various departments of 
Government. Unless this be accomplished, 
it is in vain that some' able men occupy the 
very highest situations ; if the accomplish- 
ment of their views be intrusted to assist- 
tants of a different character, the best plans 
may become nugatory in the execution. 
But whether from want of sagacity to pe- 
netrate into character, or from certain other 
motives, which lull that sagacity asleep, 
there are more instances than one, in which 
the choice of the present Administration 
seems to be very different from what the 
welfare of the nation requires. Let us 
turn our eyes to the most important station 
which it is in the power of a British Cabinet 
to confer, the government of our vast pos- 
sessions in the East Indies. The exaspe- 
rated state of the powers who surround 
these possessions, the pernicious animosio 



126 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

ties which subsist between the servants of 
Government and of the country in that 
quarter, and the still more dangerous jea- 
lousies which have for years continued to 
increase between the Directors and the 
Board of Controul ; all require that the 
supreme government of India should be 
intrusted to a man of known prudence and 
exemplary moderation. The temptations 
which immense power and the opportunity 
pf extending it still farther, afford to am- 
bition, demand that the Governor General 
should be a man in whom the love of rule 
ever yields with facility to a sense of public 
duty, and who is too careless of personal 
aggrandizement to make the slightest sa-? 
crifice for its attainment. The embarrass- 
ment of the Company's finances, the ex- 
hausted state of its finest provinces, the 
ruin which must ensue from augmenting 
the expences and exactions of Government, 
by again plunging into war : all these cir- 
cumstances require a Governor General 
who shall regard the waste of public money 
with a degree of horror, and be impressed 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 127 

with the conviction, that rigid economy is 
indispensable, not only to the prosperity, 
but to the salvation of our Indian empire. 

But which of these qualities is found in 
Lord Lauderdale ? For his moderation, 
let us look back to his public conduct when 
in Parliament, where, by the violence of 
his declamations, he obtained distinction 
even among the most violent. For the dis- 
cretion that guides his ambition, let us 
appeal to the citizens of London, who saw 
him come down to the Common Hall, and 
condescend to solicit the Livery as a can- 
didate for the office of Sheriff. For his 
sense of the indispensable necessity of public 
economy, we have not to refer to speeches 
which may have been ill-reported, or to 
actions which may have been misconstrued. 
We have his opinions on this important 
subject, fully stated and eagerly enforced 
in the work which he has lately given to 
the world on public wealth. We there find 
that private wealth is public poverty, and 
private poverty, public wealth; that eco- 



128 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

nomy is the certain way to beggar a nation, 
and prodigality an infallible method of 
raising it to opulence ; that to pay off a 
national debt is in every point of view a 
most ruinous and impoverishing measure ; 
and that the heaviest taxation serves only to 
circulate the wealth of a country ! ! ! Such 
are the avowed tenets of the man who has 
been selected for the government of India. 
In looking around for the merits which 
have entitled him to this distinction, we 
find that he has been a constant and violent 
adherent to the old Opposition ; that he 
lost his seat in Parliament in consequence ; 
that he was considered a martyr to their 
cause, and that in the day of prosperity it 
was deemed just to bestow a signal reward 
on his attachment. By being made, how- 
ever, a British peer, he has already obtained 
an ample indemnity for his late exclusion. 
To appoint him Governor General of India, 
in order to avenge him of Lord Melville, 
would be a monstrous retaliation *." 

* It deserves observation, that the reputed author, 
or assistant author of the " Inquiry into the State of 



THE STATE OF THE XATION. 12Q 

I might add that the Property Tax, 
formerly the most obnoxious to the present 
Administration of all Mr. Pitt's financial 
measures, and the object of their most cla- 
morous resistance, has been not only con- 
tinued, but almost doubled by them in a 
single stage. The measures on which I 
have animadverted, and others of a similar 

the Nation," was also the writer of a severe exposure of 
Lord Lauderdale's work on public wealth. This cri- 
ticism appeared in the Edinburgh Review for July 1804, 
and so much irritated his Lordship as to draw from 
him an indignant and very angry reply. The critic 
answered in a pamphlet, in which he drew a parallel 
between his Lordship and Dennis, and exposed to 
public ridicule both the noble author and his opinions. 
Mr. Fox, the zealous patron of his Lordship, has 
doubtless read his book and approved its principles. 
In the overflow of admiration, he may have declared 
it, like Mr. Francis's speech, unanswerable. If offi- 
cial avocations will allow, I should beg leave to direct 
his attention to the Review I have mentioned. A pe- 
rusal of it will probably alter his sentiments of his 
Lordship's work, and induce him to qualify the 
warmth of former approbation, by declaring that in 
calling it unanswerable, he meant of course it was so, 
untess some one should he able to answer it. 



130 ANSWElt TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

nature, have already very much impaired 
the popularity of the new Ministry, Mr. 
Fox, so long the strenuous champion of 
popular rights, the jealous observer of Mi- 
nisters, has become in office an accommo- 
dating colleague, a pliant imitator of his 
predecessors. The adoption of those prin- 
ciples which it has been the object of his 
life to urge with vehemence, he now good- 
naturedly adjourns to a future period. He 
accounted them formerly of sufficient mag- 
nitude to hazard the division of the country. 
Such is now his additional stock of pru- 
dence, that he will not for their sake divide 
even the Cabinet. To the majority of his 
own party, who believed that all he said 
was sincere, and all that he proposed prac- 
ticable; who, on his coming into office, 
were big with the expectation of that radical 
change which he had declared to be our only 
remaining chance of salvation, the disap- 
pointment has been inexpressible. His 
consequent loss of popularity has been in- 
calculable. With the opposite party his 
conduct in office has had a tendency to 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 131 

tranquillize fear without procuring esteem. 
Those keen partisans of the late Ministry, 
who from his constant and violent opposi- 
tion considered him devoid of all principle, 
are pleased, without a minute scrutiny o£ 
his motives, to firid him pursue that course 
which raises a lasting monument to Mr., 
Pitt's fame, while it affixes the seal of con-< 
demnation to himself. Those calmer minds, 
who explained the inveteracy of his oppo- 
sition by the warmth of his temperament, 
and who considered his speeches in generaL 
to be the effusions of the moment, have 
experienced no surprise from his late con- 
duct. They had always deemed him a man 
of more imagination than judgment. His. 
talents they knew were great, but inade- 
quately cultivated. They had no sanguine 
expectations from his coming into office ; 
but they had some dread of danger from 
the practical execution of former declara- 
tions. Ot this diead they now begin to be 
relieved, and they consider it infinitely bet- 
ter for the country that a party should be 
inconsistent, than that the public safety 
should be compromised. The contrast 



1&2 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

therefore between the present and former 
conduct of the old Opposition affords them 
matter of security : but this security, how- 
ever satisfactory in itself, is unmixed with 
any approving sentiment towards the quarter 
from whence it is derived. From Mr, 
Fox, the adoption of Mr. Pitt's measures 
proceeds with the worst grace, since it im- 
plies the dereliction gf those principles for 
which he has so long and so violently con- 
tended. He must be impressed with a 
conviction either of the wisdom of Mr. 
Pitt's plans, or of the reverse. In the 
former case, he has made a very sudden 
discovery that he has himself been mistaken 
throughout ; that the objects of his hosti- 
lity to Ministers, and of his promises du- 
ring so many years to the country, have 
been fallacious, and his long course of op- 
position captious, wanton, and criminal; 
or if he still retain his former sentiments, 
it will be difficult to explain his conduct in 
other terms than those the Morning Chro- 
nicle lately applied to the Governor, ad in- 
terim, of India, when desirous to make 
him give way for Lord Lauderdale; namely, 



THE STATE ON THE NATION. 13d 

u by commending his personal policy and 
prudence at the expence of some other qua- 
lifications which alone can entitle any man 
to esteem in private life or to the confidence 
of the public." 

Of the motives indeed which have In- 
duced such a change, different opinions will 
be entertained. Conversion by argument 
in so short a time, will hardly be alledged 
at the mature age of sixty. Some persons, 
and among these many of the most zealous 
of his former friends, will explain his con- 
duct as originating in the vulgar feding 
already alluded to— the desire of keeping in 
place. Others, with more courtesy, and 
we hope with more truth, however per- 
plexed to reconcile his past and present con- 
duct, stoutly reject this idea as unworthy 
of so distinguished a statesman. 

Of the talents of the present Ministry a 
more decided opinion may be give.-n. A 
most liberal portion of praise has been as- 
signed them by their adherents. The 
writer of the pamphlet now under preview, 



3134 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

a fter extolling them in terms of the most 
fulsome adulation, adds, " No compro- 
mise of principles, no paltry half-measures, 
n<D incongruous mixture of big words and 
lit :tle doings, will bear them out in redeem- 
in g their pledge to save the country. " 
Were not the author evidently devoted to 
the; cause of Ministers, it would be natural 
to consider him a mauvais plaisant, amusing 
the public at their expence. They have 
bee n a considerable time in office, and what 
have they done? Have they performed any 
thing commensurate with the lavish enco- 
miuims of their friends or the public ex- 
pect lations? Had Mr. Pitt proceeded in 
that course of injustice, inconsistency, and 
error, which has characterized so many of 
their measures, how loudly would they 
have exposed his conduct to public repro- 
batio, a ! If the author of the Inquiry is 
desire >us to give a faithful description of 
their conduct since they came into office, 
let me i recommend to him to reverse exactly 
the se ntence I have quoted. He will nei- 
ther impair its fluency, nor will he be dis- 
tant fn )m the truth. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 135 

If the public expectation has been disap- 
pointed in the Ministry, the conclusion is 
fair that their talents were over-rated. With 
the exception of Lord Grenville, the lead- 
ing members of Administration have been 
eminent only in opposition. Now it is 
much easier to harangue with plausibility 
than to act with wisdom. There is gene- 
rally much more to be said against than in 
favour of a subject. The opponent of Mi- 
nistry has an advantage similar to that of the 
general who acts on the offensive. The 
enemy's positions lie before him, and he 
may choose his point of attack. If this ad- 
vantage be acknowledged, and it will hardly 
be disputed, I am justified in attributing a 
very considerable portion of the reputation 
of the late Opposition for ability to this cause. 
Mr.Foxhas long been the chief of this party, 
and held up by them to the country as an un- 
paralleled assemblage of all that is wise and 
great. Instead therefore of discussing the 
merits of the minor members, I shall pro- 
ceed at once to examine the pretensions of 
thejr leader* 



136 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

No man, of even the best natural parts, 
can become without application a profound 
statesman. The most acute penetration 
will not avail, unless exercised in diligent 
research. The benefit of experience from 
a long political life, embracing every vicis- 
situde of situation, and bringing under dis- 
cussion almost every important question, 
will be inadequately reaped by a mind averse 
from assiduous investigation. The expres- 
sion of manly sentiments is always gratify- 
ing to a British audience, for it promises 
independence and vigour. But what avails 
animation of language or of thought, with- 
out a correspondent firmness of conduct? 
That fertile imagination, which on the first 
view of a subject suggests argument upon 
argument in rapid succession, is the certain 
evidence of genius, and constitutes a for- 
cible orator. But in the great statesman 
we expect not only natural ardour and im- 
pressive eloquence, but a profound know- 
ledge of every important political question, 
and an unshaken adherence to fixed maxims. 
These are not the spontaneous fruits of na- 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 137 

ture, even in her richest soil. They are 
the precious result of talents and industry 
combined— the effects of scrupulous re- 
search and careful meditation. Let us ap- 
ply these remarks to the Right Hon. Se- 
cretary for Foreign Affairs. On particular 
occasions his eloquence has blazed forth with 
luminous splendour, while at other times 
his speeches have been apparently the crude 
effusions of the moment. 

It is proper I should support by illustra- 
tion an opinion of Mr. Fox so different 
from what his friends are desirous to pro- 
mulgate. I shall select therefore for exa- 
mination his sentiments on a subject upon 
which, above all others, it is indispensable 
that a British statesman should have the 
fullest information, and entertain opinions 
formed on the most decided conviction— a 
subject, of which the ignorance in a Minister 
involves not only his own disgrace, but the 
fate of the country itself-— I mean the de- 
fence of Britain against invasion. 



K 



138 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

This most important topic has been a 
very frequent and anxious object of parlia- 
mentary discussion. During the first year 
of the present war, both Mr. Pitt and Mr. 
Fox were detached from all share in Ad- 
ministration. What a contrast was exhi- 
bited in their conduct ! We saw Mr. Pitt 
bestow on the defence of the country the 
most indefatigable attention, and discover 
in his speeches that profound knowledge of 
military science, the acquisition of which 
is to most men the labour of a lifetime : 
while he roused the country by his ardour, 
he enlightened it by his wisdom. Mr. 
Fox, on the other hand, spoke like one 
who had never studied the subject ; who 
rose to repel with vehemence a particular 
point, but took no comprehensive view of 
the various relations of the whole system. 
Even on the debate, which through Mr. 
Pitt's support produced the resignation of 
the Addington Ministry, when Mr. Fox 
had summoned the attention both of the 
House and of the country ; when the " prize 
contended" was the fate of an administra- 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 139 

tion ; when the subject of discussion was 
the defence of Britain, and Mr. Fox the 
leader of the debate, his speech was vague, 
superficial, and defective to a degree alto- 
gether unworthy the importance of the oc- 
casion. 

It may be urged, that his object on this 
occasion (23d of April 1804) was l ess to 
make impression by his own eloquence, 
than to choose with dexterity a point which 
might unite Mr. Pitt in a joint attack on 
the Addington Ministry. I shall admit 
that this circumstance may account for a 
want of energy on this occasion on the 
part of Mr. Fox; but no man will ad- 
vance it to justify any radical fallacy in the 
measures he proposed, especially since one 
of the principal measures (an armed pea- 
santry), so far from having been aban- 
doned, has been revived in a conspicuous 
shape, under the denomination of trained 
men, in the new military regulations. 
The plan of an armed peasantry thus be- 
comes incorporated in a modified shape into 



140 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

our system of defence. This qualification 
bears the presumptive marks of a compro- 
mise of sentiment between the two Right 
Honourable Secretaries for the War and 
Foreign Departments. The one, it would 
appear, must have urged the superiority of 
a large regular force ; while the other saga- 
ciously adhered to his favourite system of 
an armed peasantry. The adoption of a 
happy medium appears to have been the 
result. Mr. Windham consents to intro- 
duce the peasantry, provided Mr. Fox will 
assimilate them in some degree to the regu- 
lars. It is important therefore to examine 
the degree of efficient resistance which may 
be expected from an armed peasantry, or 
from trained men, in the event of invasion. 

The local knowledge of the peasantry 
was a leading feature in Mr. Fox's recom- 
mendation of this description of force. Yet 
although he judged fit to term them irre- 
sistible, a little reflection will convince us, 
that in regard to efficient operations, in this 
country, local knowledge is a chimera. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 141 

The peasant, it is obvious, knows the lo- 
cality only of a particular district : beyond 
that he possesses neither knowledge nor an 
aptitude forits acquisition. This precious 
quality then of local knowledge is necessa- 
rily confined to very few. And if the pea- 
sant know very little more than a French 
soldier of any district except his own, the 
inaptitude of the former to extend his 
knowledge by observation, will not be 
compared with the activity and ardour of 
the Frenchman. 

Local knowledge can be of use only in 
the neighbourhood of military operations. 
The French will keep together in strong 
and compact corps. Nothing will have 
divided them, unless they have separated 
on the passage, and been obliged to land on 
different points. Even in that case, the 
different bodies will strain every nerve to 
form a junction, and their object will be to 
advance with combined strength, by forced 
marches, to London. Against such formi- 
dable ailailants, what would avail the efforts 



142 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

of a peasantry ? The local knowledge of 
the district through which the French may 
be passing being possessed by the in- 
habitants only of that district, these are 
necessarily so few in number as to be inef- 
ficient for any enterprise of moment. The 
French advance on the succeeding day into 
a district unknown to these countrymen, 
and the British General must apply to a 
different class of peasants, the inhabitants 
of the district newly invaded, if he is de- 
sirous to avail himself of this boasted ad- 
vantage of local knowledge. So imperfect 
must be the useful employment of this qua- 
lity, which Mr. Fox extolled as the rock of 
our salvation. Was the Right Honourable 
Secretary aware of the circumstance I have 
stated ? or were his encomiums on this 
force founded upon the sage idea, that a 
peasant by living in the county must have 
a general knowledge of the whole county? 

In mountainous and difficult- countries, 
where the roads are few, and frequently 
through defiles, local knowledge has often 






THE STATE OF THE NATION. 143 

been useful. How different is the aspect 
of this country, every where open and in- 
tersected by public roads ! Did Mr. Fox 
mean that we should abandon London and 
England to the French, and retire to fight 
for an exemplification of his theory on the 
mountains of Wales or Scotland ? 

Whoever is acquainted with the quick- 
ness and activity of the French, their intel- 
ligence in a strange country, their skill, 
their ardour, and extraordinary success in 
desultory warfare, will never advise to act 
against them with half-disciplined troops. 
The only effectual mode of resisting them 
is by a brave and active army. You must 
oppose French veterans by British regulars. 
Avoid a general engagement, but multiply 
partial actions in every direction. Attack 
promptly whatever part of the enemy may 
be detached from the immediate support of 
the main body. Carry on a war of posts by 
night and by day. Our success will neces- 
sarily be various, and the scenes of blood- 
shed distressing ; but we can afford to lose 



1 44 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

more men than the enemy. By these in- 
cessant interruptions, they will buy their 
progress with a loss of lives, which to them 
will be irreparable ; the time required for 
their march will be doubled, and, before 
they reach the capital, they will be harassed 
to such a degree that a battle may be hazarded 
without imprudence. If we are beaten, our 
superior cavalry will cover our retreat, and 
our numbers will supply a fresh army ready 
to engage the enemy next day. Let it be 
our practice, whether in general or partial 
engagements, to avoid manoeuvring, and to 
come, at every proper opportunity, to close 
action with the enemy. It is chiefly in this 
rude combat that we are superior to the 
French ; in stratagem and artifice we should 
wage with them a hopeless warfare. The 
flower of that force which has subjugated 
Europe will be brought against us; and 
unless they are opposed with incessant 
vigour, they will bear down every obstacle s 
and rush forward like 3. torrent. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 145 

How unavailing in such a contest would 
be the tardy efforts of an armed peasantry ! 
To the inexperience of recruits, they join the 
heaviness natural to their mode of life : their 
numbers would not correct the evil of their 
inefficiency, but would engender a confu- 
sion calculated to increase it. Had we 
200,000, or even 500,000 peasants in arms, 
the issue would be the same. The French 
army, unless opposed by a regular force, 
would sweep the country like a whirlwind. 
The peasants might fight with courage, and 
support, in honourable death, Mr. Fox's 
opinion of the national spirit. But this re- 
sistance would be ineffectual, and their 
feeble efforts would not prevent the French 
from reaching London before our Right 
Honourable Secretary had recovered from 
his surprise at the overthrow of his favourite 
force. 

I have no wish to insinuate that Mr. 
Fox has ever represented an armed peasantry 
as sufficient for our defence without a regu- 
lar army. Misrepresentation is not neces- 



140 ANSWER TO THE INQUHIY INTO 

sary to my arguments, and will not, I trust, 
be ascribed to my work. My object is dis- 
tinctly to state, that the plan of an armed 
peasantry, so strongly urged by Mr. Fox, is, 
in this open country, and against such an 
enemy as the French, not only inefficient, 
but nugatory ; that to describe such a force 
as irresistible is a.proof of gross ignorance ; 
that such evidence of error on the part of 
the Right Honourable Secretary cannot fail 
to impair the authority attached to his 
opinion, and justify us to question the 
accuracy of his assertions in every matter in 
which they are not accompanied by proof. 

Of this vague and unsatisfactory nature 
are his sentiments on the subject of Inva- 
sion. He has expressed himself entirely 
tranquil on this head, and considers the at- 
tempt neither likely to be made, nor dan- 
gerous to us, if tried. The grounds of his 
confidence are the superiority of our army 
and the spirit of the people. These are 
neither new discoveries, nor sentiments 
peculiar to himself. Few will differ from 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 147 

him in considering our countrymen the 
bravest, as they are the freest nation in 
Europe : but of the inefficiency of courage 
without discipline against veteran troops, I 
have already treated at some length ; and I 
refer the Right Honourable Secretary for 
ampler information to his friends Mr. 
Windham and Colonel Crawford. These 
gentlemen, I apprehend, will tell him, that 
the spirit of a gallant nation is valuable, as 
affording to Government abundant means 
of preparation ; but that on the day of in- 
vasion, we must not depend on the people, 
but on our army. 

In regard to our navy, no man will differ 
from Mr. Fox in an opinion of its decided 
superiority to the enemy. But when the 
strength of our Boulogne squadron is not to 
the adverse force in the proportion of one 
to ten, it becomes important to inquire what 
other circumstances justify the security so 
confidently entertained by Mr. Fox. 1 beg 
leave to submit to him a few considerations 
on this momentous subject. 



t 



48 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 



i. Our late naval victories, while they 
insure the safety of Ireland, have lessened 
very little the degree of danger from Bou- 
logne. 

2. Bonaparte, naturally presumptuous, is 
inflated with late success. He is no longer 
deterred from the experiment of invasion 
by the apprehension of domestic insurrec- 
tion or foreign invasion in the event of 
failure. Hatred to Britain is his predo- 
minant passion ; and where he cannot con- 
quer, he will delight to lay waste. His 
professions of peace should be viewed, like 
his flag of truce to Acre, as artifices to 
lull our vigilance asleep. 

3. The chief disadvantage of Boulogne, 
Ambleteuse, and Vimereux, has hitherto 
1>een the difficulty of ingress and egress. 
The French have been indefatigable in their 
improvements, and the number of craft 
which can now be brought out in twenty- 
four hours, is not, I apprehend, over rated 
at five hundred. 



THE STATE OF THE N*ATION. 14Q 

4. A flotilla of two thousand gun-ves- 
sels may be moored in Boulogne bay under 
the protection of the batteries, and secure 
from our attacks. They may ride there in 
safety, unless in strong gales, which, du- 
ring the summer months, it is known, do 
not frequently occur. 

5. In the event of the sailing of the 
flotilla, we shall be able to oppose to it 
only the force which may then be on the 
Boulogne station, or in the Downs. The 
easterly wind which brings out the flotilla, 
will prevent the arrival, till too late, of as- 
sistance from Portsmouth ; and our force 
to the northward will be occupied by the 
movements (doubtless simultaneous) of the 
Dutch in the Texel, the Maese, and the 
Scheldt. 

6. Yet although it cannot be unknown, 
that we can depend only on the force ap- 
pointed to the Boulogne station, that force 
is allowed to remain in a state of inade- 
quacy. If the French sail, as is likely, in 



150 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

temperate weather, what would be the pro- 
bable issue of the conflict ? 1 certainly do 
not under-rate the exertions of our squa- 
drons, when I suppose them to capture or 
destroy twice their own force. But even 
this degree of success would neither arrest 
the course of the expedition, or make any 
great deduction from its immense numbers. 

7. lam aware that it may be urged, that 
in the event of the preparations at Boulogne 
assuming a serious aspect, our squadron 
may be considerably reinforced. But in 
what will this reinforcement chiefly con- 
sist ? Not in sloops and gun-brigs, which 
are the best description of force for op- 
posing the Boulogne flotilla, whether in the 
passage or the landing, but in large ships 
of war, which are incapable of acting 
in shoal water, and ill calculated to destroy 
any considerable number of the small ves- 
sels of the enemy during the temperate 
weather, of which it is probable they will 
make choice to put to sea. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 151 

These considerations prove, that invasion 
is a more serious danger than Mr. Fox ap- 
pears to believe. That it would ultimately 
end in the defeat of the enemy, cannot 
justly be doubted ; but the ravage they 
might make is incalculable, and the present 
question is not their final success, but the 
probability of the attempt. 

If Mr. Fox, in expressing his opinion 
on invasion, will take a comprehensive 
view of its various chances under different 
contingencies, and, adducing satisfactory 
arguments for its speedy defeat under every 
probable combination of circumstances, de- 
monstrate, that not merely its issue but its 
progress would be so hopeless, as to offer 
no strong inducement to the vindictive 
mind of Bonaparte to tempt the hazards of 
the enterprise : in that case Mr. Fox's con- 
fidence will be justified. He will not only 
enjoy security himself, he will communi- 
cate it likewise to the country; but without 
a full and conclusive exposition of this 
nature, the nation must give no attention to 



152 ANSWER TO TttE INQUIRY INTO 

the opinion or assertion of any man, in a 
question which involves its existence ; es- 
pecially if proceeding from a quarter where 
we are blamed for not having conducted 
offensive operations, by landing our troops 
detached from support in the country of the 
most active enemy in Europe, and where so 
languid a mass as an armed peasantry is 
described as irresistible. 



The present publication has been cur- 
rently denominated the Manifesto of the 
new Ministry. This title is, in one respect* 
not inapplicable ; for an invading enemy 
could not have scattered a declaration more 
calculated to depress the spirit of the coun- 
try. Although professedly an Inquiry into 
the State of the Nation, it fulfils but a 
small part of its title ; for its researches 
extend only to those points in our national 
situation which it suits Mr. Fox's purpose 



TkE STATE OF THE NATION. 153 

to examine. It endeavours, by every species 
of misrepresentation, to throw odium upon 
the late Ministry, and to constitute them 
the authors of all the disasters of last cam- 
paign. It describes the situation of Europe; 
and of this country, as to the last degree 
calamitous, in order that the nation may 
feel grateful to the present Ministers, for 
having consented to undertake the manage- 
ment of affairs at this pretended crisis, and 
may shut its eyes to the contrast between 
the splendour of their former promises j and 
the insignificance of their performance — 
between the abuse which they used to lavish 
on their predecessors, and the approbation 
they now confer by adopting the measures 
which they formerly reprobated. Delu- 
sions of this nature may impose on the cre- 
dulity of the French, but the British nation 
are not to be thus blinded ; they will not 
acknowledge that to be a just report of the 
state of the nation, in which all mention is 
studiously avoided of their trade, their 
finances, and their navy ; a trade extensive 
and flourishing beyQnd example; a navy 



154 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

triumphant in every quarter of the globe * 
finances, in which in the thirteenth year of 
war a loan is effected below the legal rate 
of interest, and our immense expences de- 
frayed, without increasing the national debt 
one fiftieth of its amount. The country 
is not in such terror of France as to 
consent to any peace which does not ef- 
fectually provide for their honour and se- 
curity. They will support the East India 
Company against Mr. Fox in their refusal 
to intrust the care of our Indian empire to 
a nobleman who has proved himself inca- 
pable of acting either wisely of his own 
accord, or of taking prudent advice from 
others. They will withhold their confi- 
dence from that Ministry which bestows 
offices of trust and emolument on such men 
as the Treasurer of the Ordnance: and until 
they see a wiser choice of measures, with a 
more upright selection of servants, they 
will refuse to acknowledge the pretensions 
of the new Ministry (so modestly expressed 
in the publication which has been examined), 
** to unite the largest portion of talents, 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 155 

experience, rank, and integrity, which ever 
enabled a go\ernment to secure influence 
with its subjects, and command respect 
among foreign nations.'* The establish- 
ment of a commission for auditing the 
public accounts, to an amount nominally 
immense, may be a dexterous expedient for 
popularity ; but the public will not accept 
it as a real discharge of the pledges so often 
given to effect that radical change, in which 
was affirmed to consist " our only remain* 
ing chance of salvation," 

An Administration skilful only in heap- 
ing censures on their predecessors, will not 
now avail us. In that respect, the abilities 
of the present Ministry have long been un- 
doubted. But the country now demands of 
them, • ' Either prove to us by your actions 
that you surpass your predecessors, or re- 
sign in unequivocal terms the pretensions 
you have made,'' 

If a secure and honourable peace can be 
obtained, there will be no necessity to pre- 

L 2 



156 ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY INTO 

pare the public mind by the circulation of 
pamphlets, the obvious tendency of which 
is to disseminate depressipn. Unless the 
peace be secure and honourable, we shall act 
wisely to prefer war with all its burdens, 
to a deceitful truce with a tyrant so arro- 
gant, so perfidious, and so insatiably am- 
bitious as Bonaparte. Before we can in- 
trust with confidence a negotiation with sq 
artful an adversary to IVk. Fox, he must 
give very different proofs of wisdom from 
any he has yet afforded ; whether in his 
former erroneous sentiments of the French 
ruler*, in his late speeches in Parliament, 
or in sanctioning a pamphlet w hich accuses 
the head of Adrninistra i< n while it insults 
the countiy— which declares to the British 
nation, " that it is in vain to look around for 
any circumstance which may soften the 
gloomy picture drawn of its affairs, while 
it is impossible to imagine any addition 
which may aggravate theta." 

If Mr. Fox proceed in. a course of sych 
egregious imprudence; if while he pro*. 



THE STATE OF THE NATION. 157 

claims moderation he shall endeavour to 
force obnoxious men into the most import- 
ant stations; if he flatter himself, that by 
scattering abuse on his predecessors, he 
will blind the nation to his own errors, or 
be aciuitted by nominal reforms of the 
pledges he has given the count ry ? the con- 
sequence will be 3 total loss of public con- 
fidence, and his present, like his former ad- 
ministration, will be the transient vision of 
a fe\y months. Let him exemplify the 
wise, just, and moderate policy he has 
so long recommended, or he will in vain 
endeavour to soothe the public indignation 
by such insidious appeals as the work we 
have novy examined. Fallacy and misre- 
presentation have had their day. 

THE END. 



S. Gosnell, Printer, 
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8. MEMOIRS OF MARMONTEL ; written by him- 
self. Containing his Literary and Political Life, and Anec- 
dotes of the principal Characters of the Eighteenth Century, 
including those of Voltaire, Rousseau, D\Alembert,Diderot, 
Cardinal Maury, Madame Pompadour, the Duke of Chois- 
seul, the Mareschal de Richelieu, the Mareschal de Saxe, 
Cardinal Bernis, Lord Albemarle, the Prince of Kaunitz, 
Duke of Brunswick, Calonne, Necker, theComte d'Artois, 
the late Queen of France, the King of Sweden, &c. &c,_ 
Second Edition, Four Volumes, i2mo. it, is. 

Preparing for Publication , 
A Fifth Edition of 

CURIOSITIES OF LITERATURE ; consisting of 
Anecdotes, Characters, Sketches, and Observations, Literary, 
Critical, and Historical, very handsomely printed in Three 
Volumes, 8vo. 

The Fourth Edition of this Work has served as a. basis for 
the present, which has been entirely re-cast. The more in- 
teresting topics have been more completely and more cu- 
riously investigated, and it has been the study of the Writer 
to class, and to compress, as many events of Literary His- 
tory, as the necessary limits of the Work allowed. The 
design of these arrangements is to stimulate literary curi- 
osity with those who already possess it, and to infuse it 
among those, whose leisure has not permitted them to 
pursue such inquiries. 

" Great Reading without applying it, is like corn heaped, 
that is not stirred ; it groweth musty ! The reading or the 
great scholars, if put into a limbeck, might be distilled into 
a small quantity of emnce* 

Marquis of Halifax* 



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